Western Balkans Overview Oct 09, 2025 – CWBS

Western Balkans Overview Oct 09, 2025 – CWBS
  • U.S. Sanctions Against Serbia’s Largest Energy Company Came Into Force

The sanctions imposed by the United States against Naftna industrija Srbije (NIS), after several postponements, came into effect on October 9.

NIS was included in the U.S. sanctions list on January 10 due to the Russian ownership of its controlling stake. The American sanctions are aimed primarily at preventing the financing of Russia’s war in Ukraine through funds generated by Russian energy companies.

The ownership structure of NIS has changed several times. However, the controlling stake of the company remains in the hands of Russian owners: since September, 11.3 percent of NIS shares belong to the joint-stock company Intelligence from Saint Petersburg instead of Gazprom, while 44.9 percent are owned by Gazprom Neft, a subsidiary of Gazprom. The state of Serbia owns 29.9 percent of the shares. The remaining shares belong to minority shareholders.

NIS provides 80 percent of Serbia’s gasoline and diesel fuel needs, as well as 90 percent or more of its jet fuel and fuel oil requirements. The company’s contribution to Serbia’s budget amounts to approximately 9 percent. After the sanctions against NIS are implemented, numerous negative consequences for the Serbian economy and end consumers are expected.

The Croatian oil pipeline operator JANAF has already stopped supplying crude oil to the NIS refinery in Pančevo, which, according to preliminary estimates, will be able to operate on existing reserves only until November 1.

President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić stated on October 9 that the U.S. sanctions against NIS are “bad news for Serbia in many respects,” and that “this is not only about the functioning of a single company — it has serious consequences for the entire country, in political, economic, and social terms”.

According to the Serbian president, the condition set by the American side for another postponement of the sanctions was the nationalization of NIS, but he refused to take this step.

  • Kosovo Constitutional Court Obliged Parliament to Elect a Deputy Speaker from the Serbian Minority

Several months have passed since the parliamentary elections, but Kosovo still does not have a functioning new parliament and government. In the elections, Albin Kurti’s “Self-Determination Movement” won the largest number of votes and 48 seats in parliament, but this is fewer than the 61 required for a majority.

After dozens of unsuccessful attempts, on August 26, Dimal Basha was elected as Speaker of Parliament. However, the election of the Speaker and some of his deputies did not unblock the process of forming new institutions, since, as ruled by the Constitutional Court, the session ended without electing a deputy speaker from the Serbian community.

On October 8, the Constitutional Court of Kosovo announced the full decision on the appeal filed by the Serb List (Srpska lista), the leading Serbian party in Kosovo, regarding the formation of the new parliament.

In its decision, adopted earlier on September 30, the court ruled that the inaugural session of parliament, which began on April 15, is not considered completed, and the parliament is not deemed constituted without the election of a deputy speaker from the Serbian community.

The decision states that, according to the Constitution and Rules of Procedure of the parliament, the deputy speaker from the Serbian community is elected by a majority of all members of parliament, i.e. 61 votes in favor, and the nomination must be submitted in writing by the majority of members from the Serbian community.

Deputies are given 12 days from the date of publication of the full Constitutional Court decision to complete the process of forming the parliament.

  • Bosnia and Herzegovina Approved a Document Required to Obtain EU Funds

After a long delay, the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the Reform Agenda on September 30. The vote became successful after ministers from Milorad Dodik’s party, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), lifted their veto on the adoption of the document.

The Reform Agenda contains a list of steps that the country will undertake until 2027 to gain access to the funds of the EU Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. Approval of the document was a prerequisite for receiving the first tranche. Bosnia and Herzegovina approved the required document with significant delay and has already lost access to €108 million in EU funds. Further delays would have cost the country another 10 percent of the total €1 billion allocated to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos, after the adoption of the Reform Agenda, wrote on X: “Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown much needed unity. We have a Reform Agenda! This is an important step to unlock the EU Growth Plan. Together we can deliver: better roads, cheaper energy, faster internet, no fees for money transactions & roaming”.

  • Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia Join the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA)

Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia began full implementation of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) system on October 7. This means that citizens and businesses of these countries can now send and receive money within the SEPA area much faster, cheaper, and more securely on equal terms with forty European countries, including all EU member states. SEPA processes cross-border euro payments in the same way as domestic ones, simplifying transactions across Europe.

The geographic coverage of SEPA now includes 41 countries — all EU member states, as well as several non-EU countries such as Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Monaco.

Albania and Montenegro became part of SEPA’s geographic coverage in November 2024, while North Macedonia joined in March 2025.

As for other Western Balkan countries, Serbia joined SEPA in May 2025, but the full implementation and operational readiness of Serbian banks to join SEPA are expected in May 2026.

The Central Bank of Kosovo submitted a preliminary membership application in December 2024, but the accession process is currently on hold due to unresolved legislative issues.

As for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Central Bank of BiH previously explained to the media that the current state of legislation in BiH does not meet the requirements necessary for SEPA access, and therefore no membership application has been submitted.

  • Serbia and Hungary Conduct Joint Tactical Exercises

The international tactical exercise “Neighbors 25”, involving personnel of the First Land Brigade of the Serbian Armed Forces and the 30th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the Hungarian Armed Forces, lasted for 10 days at the Pasuljanske livade training ground in eastern Serbia. The purpose of the exercise was “to improve the ability to plan and conduct multinational operations, organize cooperation and interaction, while strengthening mutual trust and sharing experience,” stated the Ministry of Defense of Serbia. It was reported that the armed forces of Serbia and Hungary jointly practiced combat operations at the tactical level, using modern combat vehicles and reconnaissance equipment.

These were the 10th joint exercises of the Serbian and Hungarian armies under the name “Neighbors,” noted the Serbian Ministry of Defense.

It is known that in 2023, Hungary and Serbia signed an agreement on strategic defense cooperation, and in April 2025, they signed another agreement specifying the earlier one. One of the points of the 2025 agreement is the conduct of joint exercises.

  • Large Shipment of Kamikaze Drones from Turkey Arrives in Kosovo

Acting Prime Minister of Kosovo Albin Kurti announced on October 8 on Facebook the arrival at Pristina International Airport “Adem Jashari” of “containers with thousands of Skydagger kamikaze combat drones”. “Dozens of soldiers of the Kosovo Security Force have already completed training in their use,” he added.

Kurti stated that the contract for the drone supply was signed in December of last year with the well-known Turkish company Baykar, the parent company of the Skydagger manufacturer. “The Skydagger drones were supposed to arrive in January 2026, but we received them three months earlier,” he noted. “These kamikaze drones, also known as RTF (Ready to Fly) Skydagger FPV, which we have acquired, are combat UAVs equipped with explosive devices designed to strike moving and stationary enemy targets. By purchasing this batch of UAVs, in addition to the Bayraktar TB2 and Puma drones, we continue to expand and strengthen the strike power of our army, aiming to build capable and cohesive forces with new technological developments and modern warfare tactics,” Kurti wrote.

The news of Turkey supplying combat drones to Kosovo provoked outrage in Belgrade.

Chief of the General Staff of the Serbian Armed Forces, General Milan Mojsilović, held an urgent telephone conversation with KFOR Commander, General Özkan Ulutaş of the Turkish Armed Forces.

In his conversation with the KFOR commander, who recently began his second term in office, General Mojsilović expressed a strong protest against the continued arming of the “so-called “Kosovo Security Force” and the violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Military-Technical Agreement”.

Chief of the General Staff of the Serbian Armed Forces also stated that “such steps send a very bad signal and threaten not only the security situation in Kosovo and Metohija but also throughout the entire Western Balkans region”.

Director of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija of the Government of Serbia, Petar Petković, also responded, repeating that by arming Pristina, Turkey directly violated UN Security Council Resolution 1244, according to which NATO forces, KFOR, are the only armed force in Kosovo and Metohija. According to him, “the militarization of Pristina and the transfer of lethal weapons into the hands of ‘the arsonist Albin Kurti’ are directed against “the peaceful Serbian people”.

Petković believes the drones were delivered three months earlier than planned, “just a few days before the local elections,” to provide the acting Prime Minister in Pristina with “the necessary support before the (local) elections on October 12”.

President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić wrote on Twitter on October 8 that he was “outraged by Turkey’s behavior and its blatant violation of the UN Charter and UN Security Council Resolution 1244, as well as by its continued arming of the authorities in Pristina”. “It is now absolutely clear that Turkey does not want stability in the Western Balkans and dreams of restoring the Ottoman Empire again,” he declared.

However, in a media address on October 9, Vučić slightly changed his rhetoric and called Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan “a great leader”. He announced that he would hold talks with his Turkish counterpart regarding the drones delivered to Pristina.

Croatia Demands Montenegro Return Property of Croatian Families in the Bay of Kotor

Croatia has sent a diplomatic note to Montenegro, demanding the return of property allegedly confiscated from members of the indigenous Croatian minority in the Bay of Kotor (Boka Kotorska).

According to the Croatian side, the issue concerns not only the rights of Croats in Montenegro but also the fulfillment of EU accession conditions, especially Chapter 23, which includes provisions on restitution. “Without the return of the property, this chapter will not be closed, meaning that Montenegro will, in effect, block its own path to the EU,” Croatian media report.

According to reports, the total value of property illegally confiscated from dozens of Croatian families in Tivat, Kotor, Dobrota, Kavač, and Škaljari exceeds €500 million.

The Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of Croatia expects Montenegro to take immediate action to return the property and provide fair compensation, and it announced that it will monitor this issue within the framework of bilateral dialogue and Montenegro’s EU accession process.

The issue of returning Croatian families’ real estate has added to Zagreb’s list of demands toward Podgorica within Montenegro’s EU accession process. The appearance of new items on this list indicates that Croatia’s veto on opening specific negotiation chapters is likely to continue.

It should be recalled that the reason for the deterioration of Croatian-Montenegrin relations was the adoption by the Montenegrin Parliament of a resolution on the “genocide in Jasenovac”, which caused outrage in Croatia. Zagreb regarded this move as following Belgrade’s directives and as an unfriendly act by official Podgorica.