The violence against Turkish nationals that occurred in Montenegro represents the culmination of a weeks-long anti-immigration campaign of hatred and disinformation in the domestic media and social sphere. This campaign did not arise suddenly nor was it spontaneous. It was the result of accumulated discontent, years of pressure on the real estate market and the standard of living, as well as the organized spread of the narrative portraying “foreigners” as the cause of all economic and social problems. What particularly drew public attention and raised political suspicions was the fact that among the most active promoters of this narrative were actors close to the Serbian authorities and media centers proven to be under the control of Aleksandar Vučić’s regime. This opened the question of the extent and nature of external political influence on the destabilization of Montenegro, as well as the role of local political actors in channeling and instrumentalizing this discontent.
To fully understand this event, it is necessary to consider the broader context of immigration in Montenegro over the past twenty years. Since the restoration of independence in 2006, Montenegro has become a destination for several different waves of migration. The first wave was marked by the arrival of medium and large investors from Western Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, at a time when Montenegro was positioning itself as a new tourist and investment market in the Mediterranean. The largest portion of that wave came from Russia: from political and business elites to a large number of tourists who saw Montenegro as an open space for vacation, investment, and living.
The second wave followed Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014. At that time, political emigrants, intellectuals, media professionals, and economically stable Russian citizens who did not support Moscow’s new aggressive policy began arriving in Montenegro. This layer of migrants was mostly pro-European, integrated into urban environments, and did not provoke significant negative reactions in the local public.
The third wave, which by its structure and consequences was the most massive and sensitive, occurred during the preparation for and after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Both Ukrainians and Russians came to Montenegro then: the former fleeing war and destruction, the latter escaping mobilization and political repression. This migration was much more heterogeneous than the previous ones, both socially and culturally. At the same time, a parallel immigration from Turkey was taking place, which was not as visible in the public eye but gradually grew and was linked to business investments and the opening of numerous small enterprises, particularly in Podgorica, Bar, and Budva.
It is important to note that the economic aspect of this immigration developed simultaneously. Today, Turkey is the largest single investor in Montenegro. Turkish capital is present in the banking sector, energy infrastructure, construction, healthcare and education services, as well as in a widespread network of small and medium-sized businesses that directly employ local residents. The total consumption of immigrants in Montenegro, including Russian and Ukrainian residents who in recent years have found a temporary or permanent home here, constitutes one of the pillars of fiscal and monetary stability. Spending in the service sectors, real estate transactions, tax contributions, and the tourism industry form a significant part of the country’s economic lifeblood. In such a context, political narratives that incite hostility toward investors and foreign residents not only deepen social divisions but also directly threaten Montenegro’s economic interests and its ability to continue its path toward European integration.
Although anti-immigration messages had long existed in the public sphere, until this summer they had not had an organized political expression nor escalated into mass protests. They were most often articulated through dissatisfaction with price increases and the rise in real estate costs. The growing demand for apartments and houses by foreign nationals increased prices, while also driving up living costs. Despite the fiscal reforms of the Milojko Spajić government, which led to wage growth, part of the population felt economic pressure and growing inequality. However, this discontent remained dispersed and unorganized.
The turning point came this summer, when a piece of disinformation was spread about an alleged “100,000 Turks” supposedly settling in Montenegro with government support. This claim was first publicly articulated by Nebojša Medojević, once a reformist and opposition leader, and now a politician openly resorting to conspiracy theories, disinformation, and rhetoric of moral panic. Although Medojević is politically marginalized and outside parliament, his narrative was quickly adopted by Milan Knežević, leader of a political entity that is part of the ruling coalition and controls key security and local levers of power, including the Municipality of Zeta, a strategic transport hub with the airport in Podgorica.
Knežević, despite being in power, has long used every crisis as an opportunity to destabilize Montenegro’s political environment, often along the lines of Belgrade’s and Moscow’s foreign policy interests. His appearance on a television channel close to the Serbian regime, followed by a coordinated campaign on Telegram channels and other social networks used by Serbian and Russian nationalists, created an atmosphere of public mobilization with a strong nationalist undertone inspired by old historical prejudices and stereotypes about Turks and Muslims. The trigger for the protests was a street incident in which a Montenegrin citizen was injured, accompanied by sensational media reports that he had allegedly been seriously wounded and nearly killed by Turkish nationals. Most Montenegrin mainstream media transmitted the news without verification, contributing to panic and growing hostility.
This was followed by protests, attacks on property belonging to Turkish nationals, car burnings, and acts of vandalism that resulted in an immediate and ad hoc government decision to introduce visas for Turkish citizens. It was later established that the perpetrators of the incident were not Turkish nationals but citizens of Azerbaijan, that the injured person had not suffered serious injuries, and that the initiator of the conflict was still under investigation. Nevertheless, political and social damage had already been done.
If we observe the actors most actively inciting panic, hate speech, and calls for violence, we can see a recognizable pattern already observed during the crises of 2015, 2016, 2019, and 2020: the same media junctions, the same Telegram and Viber clusters, the same fan groups with criminal backgrounds, and the same political figures who are simultaneously part of the state apparatus and coordination networks in Belgrade. The campaign, therefore, did not develop organically from existing social discontent, but deliberately, through infrastructurally embedded channels of political influence. This continuity points to a clear political intent, in which anti-immigration hysteria is merely the latest “format,” while the goal remains the same: keeping Montenegro in a state of permanent tension, where reform processes never gain stable ground for implementation.
Thus, the question “whether Serbia is behind the attacks on Turks” is not about whether someone issued a direct order — but whether there exists a political interest, media infrastructure, and operational network that systematically produce instability in Montenegro whenever it moves toward consolidation and European normality. And while an open political conflict between Belgrade and Erdoğan unfolds over Kosovo and Bayraktar drones, in Podgorica, through local intermediaries, a political scene is being manufactured that revives the old archetype of the Turk as an eternal enemy. Hence the justified suspicion that the ultimate goal of such actions may be to hinder Montenegro’s path toward the European Union and to maintain Belgrade’s political influence over key centers of power in the country.
This brings us to the essential question: will Montenegro allow the street and the manipulated crowd to determine the state’s foreign policy orientation, capital value, investment security, and international credibility? Or, on the contrary, will it realize that it is precisely its multiethnicity, openness, and cosmopolitan character that form the only realistic development strategy for a country with a small market and great ambitions?
Ljubomir Filipović. Montenegrin political scientist
The articles published in the “Opinions” column reflect the personal opinion of the author and may not coincide with the position of the Center
