The beginning of the 2000s. Under pressure from popular protests, Slobodan Milošević’s regime yields power to opposition politicians. The President of Montenegro, Milo Đukanović, who in recent years had conflicted with his former patron and supported the opposition, charts a course toward Montenegro’s sovereignty. Đukanović, a former Komsomol and party functionary, owes his rapid career rise to a de facto state coup that Milošević once organized in his native republic. It was then that Milo became the youngest prime minister in Europe, and his future opponent Momir Bulatović became President of Montenegro. In fact, this coup helped Milošević gain quicker control over the presidency of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav People’s Army, and it became the prelude to the Yugoslav wars, in which Montenegro, controlled from Belgrade, consistently supported Serbia. But over time, the futility of such support became evident to many members of Montenegro’s party elite, whom Prime Minister Đukanović led. It was this confrontation with President Bulatović, who continued to unconditionally orient toward Belgrade, that led the republic’s prime minister to victory in the presidential elections under the banner of sovereignty.
From nominees of Milošević, Đukanović transforms into one of his most serious opponents, but at the same time he is not an internal opponent. From Montenegro, one can observe the situation in Serbia and the moods of politicians, even democratic ones, almost from the side, but with much greater competence and integration into political processes. And the new Montenegrin president realizes that the period of power of democratic politicians may be short-lived. He does not want Montenegro to once again go through wartime trials together with Serbia. And most importantly—he does not want any control from Belgrade.
It is not difficult to guess that Serbian democrats are not enthusiastic about this position. But it is not only they—Western powers also seek to preserve the remnants of unity of former Yugoslavia. Western diplomats want Montenegro, like other former party functionaries, to remain in a state union with Serbia, which is now governed by nominees of the “color revolution.” The head of European diplomacy, Javier Solana, is pushing for Montenegrins to agree to the creation of a State Union with Serbia. Serbia and Montenegro are no longer called Yugoslavia, but the single state does not disappear from the world’s political map, though with an important concession—Montenegro gains the right to hold a referendum on independence in a few years. In effect, Đukanović acquires the possibility of postponed independence, provided he can persuade his compatriots of this. And this is a challenging task, considering that of all Yugoslav republics, Montenegro suffered the most from chauvinistic propaganda. I would even say—more than Serbia itself, with its constant debates between pro-government and democratic media. Đukanović needs allies, but he cannot find them in the West, where the overwhelming majority of political elites continue to defend the idea of a single state. And Montenegrin supporters of independence need proof that the proclamation of a new state will not make things worse and may even strengthen traditional development vectors of the country. Here, of course, one could use Montenegrins’ traditional sympathies for Russia, but what kind of ally for Montenegro’s separation can the Kremlin be when Putin constantly sighs over the collapse of the Soviet Union and even calls that event the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century? And Moscow never viewed Yugoslavia’s breakup favorably. But Milo Đukanović does not consider the leading motives in the West and in Moscow and does not recognize that these are irrational motives, far from reality, both among Western and Russian politicians. In time, we will all get used to such irrationality, but one can say that Montenegro was the beginning of this astonishing perception of the world, which will lead to many new mistakes.
In the West, they hope that during this period the new state will prove its democratic nature, and that in Montenegro the motivation to leave the union will disappear—similar to how George H. W. Bush insisted that Ukraine should help Mikhail Gorbachev build a renewed Soviet Union and made this appeal from the podium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR. So, one can say that Javier Solana, in his efforts to preserve a single state, behaves exactly as President Bush did.
In Moscow, the position is different. The collapse of Milošević’s regime and, especially, the extradition of the dictator to The Hague are perceived by Vladimir Putin as a personal affront. Russian security services receive orders to punish Serbs for their audacity. But how to do this if the new Serbia is supported by the West and orients toward Europe?
The answer comes quickly: to deprive Serbia of access to the sea—which is possible only through Montenegro’s declaration of independence. Thus, roles change: the West now favors unity, Moscow favors disintegration. Russia is ready to support Đukanović on the path to independence.
There was risk in such support. Montenegro is a small country and, moreover, the last stretch of the Mediterranean not under NATO control. Obviously, in the event of its independence, the West will seek to bring the country into the Alliance. All while NATO accession for Serbia or a unified Serbia and Montenegro is unlikely after NATO’s operation against Milošević.
Some members of the Russian Federation’s Security Council advise Putin not to rush, believing that an independent Montenegro may turn its back on Russia. But Putin does not even want to listen. First, he needs to punish the Serbs. Second, he considers Đukanović his man. The Montenegrin president has connections with Moscow’s mayor Yury Luzhkov and his clan, the country’s largest enterprise is controlled by oligarch Oleg Deripaska, real estate is being bought en masse by Russians, and Russian security services feel at home in Podgorica and Budva.
The decision is made: Russia will facilitate Đukanović’s break from Serbia.
And Putin will win—to see in a few years that the Security Council members who called for caution were right. Montenegro will sever its special relations with Moscow, Deripaska will lose his assets, Đukanović’s ties with the Russian Federation will melt along with the collapse of the “Luzhkov clan.” The country will join NATO. Russian security services, which until recently felt “at home,” will begin preparing a coup and even an assassination attempt on the president.
Meanwhile in Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić comes to power—a “reduced” Milošević. Đukanović, as one would expect, understood the political dynamics in Belgrade better than Western politicians, and Putin outplays himself once again.
And in conclusion—a personal story. After the annexation of Crimea, I was strolling the streets of Budva and came across a tourist office with a map of the former Yugoslavia. Seeing that I was examining it, the owners came out and asked where I was from. When they learned that I was from Ukraine, they began accusing Ukrainians of disrespecting Russia. Owners, citizens of Serbia, promised that Putin would punish Ukraine—and deprive it of access to the sea.
It was too hot for a long argument. “But you do not insult Russians,” I said melancholically. “And what about your own access to the sea?”
One of them almost lunged at me with his fists.
Vitaly Portnikov. Ukrainian journalist, political commentator, author and opinion-maker.
The articles published in the “Opinions” column reflect the personal opinion of the author and may not coincide with the position of the Center
