The Serbian authorities are actively seeking support from Moscow to counter the “color revolutions” allegedly being plotted by the West. But is Russia really interested in the stability of Vučić’s government?
Moscow dossier for Vulin
On August 10, a large protest against lithium mining rocked Belgrade. Prior to that, President Aleksandar Vučić said Russia’s intelligence warned him of mass riots were being in the works in Serbia, with the ultimate goal of toppling the legally elected government.
Although Vučić referred to some classified tip without disclosing any details, Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova was more elaborate in her comment.
On August 8, she accused “Western ideologues of square democracy and their local accomplices” – ‘puppet media and NGOs’ – of attempts to destabilize Serbia.
In mid-August, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin (designated by the U.S. Treasury) visited Moscow for a series of meetings with Russian high-ranking officials.
During talks with the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Sergei Shoigu, Vulin thanked the Russian security forces for “warning the leadership of Serbia about the preparation of mass riots and an attempted coup d’état,” and in an interview with RIA Novosti fully supported the Russian vision of developments in Serbia. “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation has clearly indicated that these protests are a platform for starting a color revolution aiming to overthrow the government,” he said, noting that the organizers of street rallies seek Milosevic’s fate for Vučić.
According to Vulin, Serbia and Russia have been helping each other to prevent “color revolutions” and a violent toppling of government.
Indeed, just about four years ago, Russia and Serbia, in strict secrecy, formed the “Working Group for Combating Color Revolutions”, whose task was to prevent mass protests and to constantly monitor opposition activists, NGOs, and independent journalists. From the Serbian side, it was (and apparently is) Aleksandar Vulin who supervised this area of cooperation with Russia.
In 2021, Vulin handed over to Russia’s intelligence an audio recording of a meeting members of the Russian opposition organization Open Russia had held at an apparently wired venue in Belgrade
Former executive chief of Open Russia Andriy Pivovarov, who was released on August 1 as part of a prisoner exchange between Russia and the West, had spent more than three years in prison. He told journalists he had been nabbed precisely following the handover of the Belgrade meeting recordings that Vulin gave Russia’s security agencies.
There is no doubt that the Russian intelligence “symmetrically” feed their Serbian colleagues with compromising data on Serbia’s opposition figures and civic society leaders. Obviously, it’s such reports that formed the core of the dossier on the “preparation of the color revolution”, handed over to Vučić early August.
Conspiracy theories
Cooperation between Serbian and Russian security agencies on countering domestic opposition has been going on for more than a year already, and Serbia’s status of a candidate for the EU accession doesn’t seem to be in the way of this joint work.
Vulin’s latest trip to Russia did not go unnoticed in Brussels but EU officials limited themselves to noting that maintaining ties with Russia amid its war of aggression against Ukraine is incompatible with EU values and the accession process.
It should be noted that the European Union and the West in general, found themselves in a rather peculiar situation amid the recent protests against lithium mining in Serbia because both the EU and the USA, as well as some other Western nations, primarily Germany, firmly support the lithium project that is to be implemented by a Western corporation.
Analysts have already stated that the rating of the European Union is decreasing among Serbians due to the EU’s interest in developing lithium deposits in the country. This problem is worth a separate analysis. Now I would like to point out one more thing: in such situation, why would the West support Serbian protests against the lithium project, let alone plot a “coup d’état”, as Belgrade and Moscow officials claim? It looks absurd, or illogical to say the least. On the other side, Kremlin’s willingness to help the Serbian authorities pursue a Western lithium mining project is just as surprising.
It would be more logical to consider the ongoing protests as a natural opposition on the part of average citizens to any industrial intervention in the environment, which is based on distrust of global corporations and their own government. Again, the history and current rise of anti-lithium mining movement requires a more thorough examination so it should only be noted that Vučić and his team see these processes only from the point of view of conspiracy theories.
However, if we do consider conspiracy theories, it would seem more logical, given all the circumstances, that it’s precisely anti-Western forces that stand behind the protests against the lithium project, which promises Serbia major investment and closer economic integration with the West, while this fundamentally contradicts the position of the Serbian authorities and their Russian friends.
A “letter to Putin”
Recently, the latest version unexpectedly drew more attention.
One of the pro-Russian opposition figures, President of the Oslobođenje movement Mladjan Djordjevic published on X an open letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin, calling on him to directly join the effort to overthrow Vučić, including over the latter’s stance on lithium.
“Vučić actually gave the strategic reserves of Serbian lithium to the Nazis, denying it to our Russian and Chinese brothers,” the appeal reads. “In this situation, Russia can and should provide all necessary assistance to the Serbian people to protect their national interests, up to direct intervention, with the aim of removing Vučić.”
Even more interesting than the content of the letter was the image pinned to it – there, Djordjevic posed with two men, one of whom is purportedly the ex-head of the Bulgarian Rusophila movement, Nikolai Malinov, whom Bulgarian law enforcement accused of spying for Russia. The other man on the picture is purportedly a retired Russian general, ex-head of the analysis and information department at the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Leonid Reshetnikov, who has been allegedly supervising a number of projects to promote Russian influence in the Balkans.
The post was shortly deleted and around the same time, Djordjevic publicly claimed that his account had been hacked, posting a photo of himself alongside a man, again, resembling Leonid Reshetnikov. (By the way, Sofia at one time banned Reshetnikov from entering. Apparently, Belgrade didn’t).
In Serbia, as well as across the wider region, Mladjan Djordjevic is rather well known. For everyone else, it it should be noted that he is a veteran of the Serbian political scene with close relationship with opposition leader Dragan Djilas. Djordjevic consistently criticizes Vučić for “surrendering” Kosovo, for his too pro-Western, “pro-NATO” policy, and now also for the lithium project. Pro-government media and politicians refer to him as the “gray opposition cardinal”, but these comments appear to be part of a political squabbles.
At the same time, it is an established fact that Djordjevic is one of the most pro-active and consistent pro-Russian politicians in Serbia. He really at one time cooperated with Reshetnikov and his structures (which has been widely covered in media). Also, Djordjevic takes part in various political events in Russia and from time to time surfaces in the Russian media space when it is important to harshly criticize Vučić (including over his stance on Ukraine). And now comes a weird situation around the “letter to Putin” and “photo with the Russian intelligence (SVR) general”…
All this raises a question of what Moscow’s plan is for the current Serbian government…
Complications of the “two chairs” policy
Vulin is convinced that the Russians help Serbia in fighting opposition, which allegedly seeks to stage a “color revolution.”
But the interaction of Russian officials and the media with Vučić’s implacable critic may indicate that there are some supporters of the “two chairs” game in Moscow’s high offices. It’s when senior officials in Moscow declare support for Belgrade and at the same time, through informal channels, establish cooperation with the protest movement. After all, Russia’s participation in the campaign against the Western lithium project would offer a much more logical explanation than an effort aimed at promoting and protecting it.
It would be incorrect to claim that the anti-government protests in Serbia, including the current environmental protests, are orchestrated by the Kremlin, or anyone in particular. However, it must be noted that Moscow would definitely benefit from having a lever over Vučić in the form of street rallies in order to be able to adjust Belgrade’s policy in directions that are key to Russia. And that’s primarily foreign policy. Also obvious is Moscow’s benefit from inciting anti-Western hysteria against the background of public rejection of the lithium project.
It is also obvious that Vučić’s team, first of all, Aleksandar Vulin, are trying their best to preserve Russian support for the current Serbian government, with its multi-vector policy. However, judging by the latest developments, it will be more and more difficult to retain Moscow’s favor.
