As of December 2025, the European integration of the Western Balkans is in an active phase and is a priority both for the region and for the EU. But while some countries are demonstrating record achievements, others are treading water. Against the backdrop of accelerated progress of some countries and geopolitical dead ends of others, the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić put forward a loud proposal for the simultaneous accession of all six countries of the region to the EU.
The President of Serbia voiced his position on 10 December at a forum in Belgrade.
“If you accept one, two or three of us, then what will we do with the rest? How will we deal with it? How will we resolve all open issues?” Vučić said during a speech on the panel titled “European Competitiveness in a Fragmented Geopolitical Environment.”
He added that the issue concerns not only the future of the region, but also the future of Europe. “If someone wants to understand geopolitics, this is the only thing the EU can do: accept us all together, with no borders between us. Serbs will feel better, Bosniaks will feel better, Albanians will feel better, Croats will be OK, I hope. And I see only good things as a common denominator of this idea,” Vučić said.
The state of European integration
The process of European integration of the Western Balkans began back in 1999 with the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements. In 2003, at the summit in Thessaloniki, the EU recognized that the future of the region lay within the European Union. Since then, all Western Balkan countries have signed Stabilisation and Association Agreements, received visa-free travel, and acquired either the status of candidate for membership or “potential candidate” (Kosovo).
Today the countries are at radically different stages of negotiations.
Montenegro
Candidate since 2010.
Goal – EU accession in three years. Prime Minister Milojko Spajić is confident: “We will be EU members in 2028.”
Public support for EU membership – 70% (Balkans Barometer 2025, RCC).
All 33 negotiating chapters were opened, 7 closed. The last — “Public Procurement” — in June 2025. Closure of five more chapters is expected in December 2025.
Montenegro’s progress is partially being held back by neighbouring Croatia (an EU member), which is effectively using its veto to block the closure of one of the key negotiating chapters – 31, which concerns foreign policy, security, and defence.
Zagreb insists on resolving a number of issues related to post-war settlement. Some demands are formalized, for others only unofficial information exists.
Among the disputed issues:
• the issue of ownership of the training ship “Jadran”,
• border delimitation between the two countries in the area of the Prevlaka peninsula,
• protection of the identity of the Croatian “autochthonous national minority” in Montenegro,
• punishment of war criminals involved in the attack on Dubrovnik in 1991–1992,
• ensuring “fair and dignified” compensation to all Croatian prisoners held in camps in Montenegro (in Morinj) during the aggression against Croatia,
• search for missing persons during the war of the early 1990s,
• renaming of the municipal swimming pool in Kotor, which is named after an athlete who served as a guard in the camp for Croatian prisoners.
Podgorica is already negotiating with Zagreb on resolving the contentious issues, but this process has not been finalized.
Albania
Candidate since 2014.
Goal – EU accession within five years. Prime Minister Edi Rama emphasizes: “Nothing will stop our path to membership in 2030.”
Support for joining the European Union – 91% (the highest in the region).
In November 2025, the last negotiating cluster — “Resources, Agriculture and Cohesion” — was opened. Thus, all negotiating chapters are open, but none has been closed.
Key EU requirements: judicial reform, fight against corruption and organized crime.
Serbia
Candidate since 2012.
Support for EU membership – 33%, the lowest in the region.
22 chapters opened, only 2 closed. Serbia has not opened a single chapter or cluster for more than three years.
Main requirements: normalization of relations with Kosovo, improvement of media freedom, ensuring free and fair elections, and aligning Serbia’s foreign policy with the EU’s foreign policy (joining sanctions against Russia).
President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen stressed in October 2025: “We expect actions from Serbia, not just words.”
North Macedonia
Candidate since 2005, thus 20 years already (a pensive achievement).
Support for European integration – 69%.
Negotiations opened in 2022, screening of all clusters completed.
After resolving the dispute with Greece (changing the name from Macedonia to North Macedonia), the country faced a new requirement – Bulgaria demands constitutional recognition of the Bulgarian minority. Importantly, this requirement is currently considered an EU requirement within the accession process. In October 2025, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen emphasized: “North Macedonia must implement constitutional changes to move forward.”
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Candidate since December 2022.
Support for EU membership – 60%.
In March 2024, the EU agreed to open negotiations, but the process has not yet begun.
Requirements: 14 key reforms (judicial system, electoral legislation, functional institutions).
The main obstacle to EU accession for BiH is the destructive position of representatives of Republika Srpska, primarily the leader of the Bosnian Serbs Milorad Dodik, who is promoting a pro-Russian and secessionist agenda.
Recently, the integration process encountered a new problem: blocking the appointment of the chief BiH’s EU negotiator by representatives of Republika Srpska.
Kosovo
Application submitted — December 2022, official candidate status not yet obtained (potential candidate).
Support for European integration – 78%.
Key conditions for successful European integration – normalization of relations with Serbia, implementation of all obligations reached within the EU-mediated dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. Primarily, this concerns the necessity of creating the Association of Serb Municipalities.
In addition, it is important to refrain from actions that may cause an escalation of the situation in the region. It is notable that restrictive measures against Pristina by the EU (suspension of funding and limitation of high-level contacts), imposed after the escalation in northern Kosovo in 2023 due to the policy of the Kosovo government aimed at strengthening central control over the northern municipalities, are still in force.
The non-recognition of Kosovo by five EU member states (Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania, and Greece) is also a significant obstacle on the path to the EU.
Individuality vs. collective
The idea of the region’s joint movement toward the EU, expressed by Vučić, is not new. It can confidently be stated that it was embedded in the basis of the Berlin Process, initiated by Angela Merkel in 2014. The aim of the initiative was to create a common regional economic area prior to the countries’ accession to the EU. Skeptics called the initiative “a new Yugoslavia without Slovenia and Croatia, but with Albania.”
The Berlin Process still exists. But the EU recognized that regional economic formats cannot replace the reforms necessary for EU integration.
The change in enlargement policy was implemented through the revised methodology (since 2020).
The new methodology requires irreversible progress in the fundamental Cluster 1 (Rule of Law and Fight against Corruption) before a country can close any other chapter.
A sanctions mechanism has been introduced, which may lead to suspension of negotiations or closure of already opened chapters.
The basis of the new enlargement methodology is the principle of individual merits, that is, achievements on the path of implementing European integration reforms.
The “collective” or “package” accession proposed by Vučić destroys the principle of EU integration based on a country’s individual success in conducting reforms and undermines the incentive system built by the European Union for reform-oriented countries.
Instead of “package” accession, the European Union is moving toward sectoral integration through the “New Growth Plan.” This approach offers economic benefits now, strengthening incentives for reforms while preserving the key rule: membership is possible only after full and irreversible compliance with all criteria.
The dreams of Belgrade… and Moscow
The idea of the Serbian president received a clear rebuff from the regional leader of EU integration. Prime Minister of Montenegro Milojko Spajić wrote on X: “I agree that the EU must be the ultimate determining factor for all the Western Balkans. However, we will be waiting for you there already in 2028 and are cheering for you to truly hurry up and accelerate the other candidates from the region.”
The President of Serbia commented on Spajić’s statement after a working dinner with President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and President of the European Council António Costa. According to him, he briefly presented the idea of joint accession of the Western Balkan countries to the EU, emphasizing that there was nothing bad or malicious in his proposal and again highlighting the positive aspect of open borders.
However, despite Vučić’s explanation, his initiative raises many questions. Because it appears that instead of following the Montenegrins’ advice and accelerating Serbia’s own European integration, including by fulfilling the EU’s requirements to introduce sanctions against Russia, Serbia is trying to artificially slow down the region’s path toward the EU by blocking the rapid accession of the process leader — Montenegro — and making the entire region dependent on Serbia’s policy.
It is likely that Belgrade hopes in this way to regain leadership and authority in the region, which it has not had since the days of Yugoslavia, and which it will never regain if the former Yugoslav republics continue to join the EU independently.
In addition, a “package accession” scenario would allow the Serbian leadership to continue ignoring EU foreign policy requirements, pursue a pro-Russian policy, but no longer feel like an outsider.
The only power that might find this advantageous is Moscow and its Serbian friends.
It is telling that the biggest supporter of Putin in the region, Milorad Dodik, has already stated full support for the Serbian President’s initiative regarding the simultaneous accession of all Western Balkans to the EU.
CWBS Analytical Group
