Lithium and Serbia – Balša Božović

Lithium has become a central topic in the Serbian public sphere. As public opinion researchers might say, lithium is the trigger for civic discontent with Vučić’s autocratic regime, which has ruled unchallenged for twelve years. The lithium affair confuses many because of the prevailing mistrust and fervor in society, resulting in a lack of rational debate on the topic. Lithium has thus become an equation with two unknowns—a Pandora’s box from which numerous critical questions about Serbia’s situation emerge. These are just some of the questions being raised daily: What exactly is happening in Serbia concerning lithium? Why has lithium suddenly become the trigger for widespread discontent in Serbia? How realistic is the fear of environmental pollution due to lithium? Will we really poison ourselves with lithium? Is Serbia defending its independence, sovereignty, and dignity by fighting against lithium? Will Serbia truly become a mining colony akin to those in Africa? Has the West betrayed the citizens of Serbia by supporting Vučić’s decision to mine lithium? Are the anti-lithium protests truly an expression of ecological awareness, a form of political struggle against Aleksandar Vučić, or an opportunity for a final confrontation with the West?

To understand the issue of lithium in Serbia, one must first grasp the state of Serbian society since Vučić came to power in 2012.

Serbia has faced multiple crises since 2012, and through all these crises, the regime led by Vučić has not only managed to emerge victorious but has also strengthened its autocratic rule. How? 

After losing the second round of the 2012 presidential elections, when Tomislav Nikolić defeated Boris Tadić, the era of post-October 5th Serbia, which failed to meet the great expectations of the citizens following the year 2000 and fulfill its European ambition to become a full member of the European Union, came to an end. The old regime of Slobodan Milošević and Vojislav Šešelj returned to power under the leadership of Aleksandar Vučić, who adapted the old policy of Greater Serbian nationalism, of which he was a part, to new circumstances and implemented it in a hybrid manner. Greater Serbian nationalism is a specific ideology that seeks fertile ground in the shattered consciousness of citizens who have suffered significant war traumas during the 1990s, a decline in living standards, cultural collapse, social hopelessness, and the severance of all ties that connected Serbia with the civilized world. After the changes in 2000, a large number of citizens felt like losers of the economic transition following the privatization of the economy and the shift from social to private ownership. Thus, all the conditions necessary for a dangerous ideology of state nationalism to take root were present.

Thus, the lithium affair is just another crisis that has hit Serbian society, destined to be another passing episode for the many dissatisfied citizens hoping that this might be yet another opportunity for Serbia to democratize. In this text, I will try to explain why this is so.

Aleksandar Vučić has used a series of crises to strengthen his autocratic rule in Serbia over the past twelve years.

The first among these is the resolution of the Kosovo issue, which previous governments under Tadić and Koštunica had avoided solving. Vučić used this to gain Western support. As a proven extreme nationalist, he managed to convince Serbian citizens that he would never give up Kosovo while simultaneously persuading Western governments that only he, as a nationalist, could hand over Kosovo to the authorities in Pristina. Everyone was happy—both the nationalists, who wouldn’t give up Kosovo, and the West, for whom solving the Kosovo knot was extremely important, as well as the civic forces in Serbia and the NGO sector, which also wanted the Kosovo issue to be removed from Serbia’s political agenda once and for all. Thus, Vučić initially gained blank support from the West, which is often very steadfast and slow to withdraw.

The second crisis that worked in his favor was the migrant crisis in Europe. Angela Merkel and Germany, focused on resolving the migrant issue, turned a blind eye to the lack of democracy in Serbia, allowing Vučić to gain additional investments and political points in Europe. Situated on the migrant route that caused a political crisis in Germany and the European Union, Vučić became one of the darlings of Angela Merkel’s administration because he managed the migrant crisis more brutally than any other Balkan leader. Besides Germany, Vučić was also given a pass by the European Union.

The third crisis was Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections. The new American administration showed a willingness to consider the extremely dangerous idea of partitioning Kosovo, which would also entail reopening questions about other borders in the Western Balkans. This dialogue was led by the highly controversial special envoy of President Trump, Richard Grenell. As it turned out, Grenell was conducting a political game that went against the interests of the European Union, even Germany, and tried to make dangerous political deals with the most corrupt politicians from Kosovo, such as Hashim Thaçi and Ramush Haradinaj, and with Aleksandar Vučić in Serbia. Thaçi later ended up in the dock, where he remains on trial for war crimes. The entire plan that Grenell supported was proposed in a “non-paper” by Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša. Two things were particularly symptomatic: first, the plan supported the idea of creating three large states in the Balkans—Serbia, Croatia, and Albania—at the expense of Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This implied a new war in the Western Balkans. Second, the announcement of this plan in 2019 coincided with Russia’s major preparations for an invasion of Ukraine. A conflict over Kosovo or the dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina was in the highest interest of Putin’s regime, which needed new conflicts to break out in the Balkans to quietly and quickly conquer Ukraine while distracting the West. Fortunately, Trump lost the 2020 elections, and Richard Grenell lost his position. However, it is interesting that Grenell stayed in Belgrade after his dismissal and has very close financial ties with the Serbian government. All this allowed Vučić to present himself as a legitimate negotiator for (in)stability in the region, both in the West and the East. Although Vučić managed to strengthen his position, Trump’s loss in the election ensured peace in the Balkans and shifted focus back to Ukraine.

The fourth crisis was the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020, which paralyzed the world and allowed Vučić to further consolidate his power in Serbia, using the crisis as an opportunity to strengthen ties with China and remain untouched by Western criticism regarding democratic shortcomings. Thus, Serbia is today the only state on the European continent using Chinese weapons and surveillance equipment. As in the previous three instances, Vučić exploited the crisis in Western countries to introduce a new superpower to the European continent, which guaranteed his political balancing act with the West during dramatic times for the West. Naturally, Western governments were focused on domestic political crises arising from COVID and did not insist that Serbia follow European reforms. Discontent with the COVID crisis reached unprecedented levels in Serbia. Vučić dragged both the opposition and disgruntled citizens into anti-vaccination positions, resulting in the EU once again turning a blind eye to the issue of democracy in Serbia.

The fifth crisis was the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Vučić openly sided with Russia, expecting a quick victory. The regime’s media published headlines in Serbia’s most circulated newspapers claiming that Ukraine had actually attacked Russia and that Russia was waging a defensive war. Serbia remained silent on the issue of Russian aggression for days and never used that term. Vučić refused to impose sanctions on Russia and, through countless television appearances, convinced the Serbian public that Russia could not lose the war. Because of the fear of possible conflicts in the Balkans, which Putin, through Serbia, the Republika Srpska, and Montenegro, was actively working on, the West turned a blind eye to Vučić for the umpteenth time, which he skillfully exploited again. Vučić presented himself to the West as a leader who must balance between Russia and the West because he managed to portray the opposition in Serbia as pro-Russian. On the other hand, he remained a loyal partner to Russia and, through countless mutual visits by officials in the midst of the war, showed great commitment and understanding for Russian aggression. Serbia continued to protect Russian interests and capital in this part of Europe.

This brings us to the sixth crisis — the “Lithium Affair.”

Vučić describes himself as a great chess player who makes every move on the chessboard precisely and wisely. However, this is not true, no matter how highly he thinks of himself. Chess is a game with clear rules and equal opportunities for both players. In Vučić’s case, this is not the case because he plays chess in a way that leaves only one pawn for his opponent while he plays with all the pieces, engaging in inherently uneven matches. With a tremendous and unprecedented media control in Europe, which even Putin and Lukashenko could envy, Vučić constantly spreads fear among the population with an aggressive campaign, creating an image of an imaginary enemy who is just about to knock on their door. By confusing the public with various disinformation from the highest levels of the state, he easily manipulates and sets the rules of the game in which he has not lost so far.

From the beginning, the lithium issue has been framed as an opposition conflict with the West in Serbia. This is an old strategy of his. Vučić, through all state organs, including the secret service, places the most extreme pro-Russian activists at the protests to create an image of the political background of the protests. On the other hand, he presents the civic part of the protest—the pro-European part — as dominant to the Russian state, with the narrative that they came with Western money to overthrow the government in a “color revolution” and then to jeopardize the excellent relations between Serbia and Russia.

An expert debate was intentionally absent to further deepen the confusion. In this environment of public mistrust, where no one trusts anyone, Vučić radicalizes the public into pro- and anti-lithium camps, thus killing any rationality. Naturally, this is to the detriment of those who are genuinely concerned and increases the confusion from which Vučić easily emerges as a savior.

Strictly controlled media outlets release various dubious scientists to the public, spreading fear and disinformation about the lithium mine without evidence, and then the rational and reputable experts do not want to participate in such a circus. This breaks up the dissatisfied citizens and radicalizes their positions, leading to mutual distrust. This, in turn, pacifies the disgruntled masses.

Vučić presents the European Union to pro-European voters as the spokesperson for Rio Tinto to amplify their defeatism. To others, the pro-Russian and nationalist voters, he increases hatred through Rio Tinto against the West, turning protests into anti-Western demonstrations that call for violence. He pacifies his voters through corruption and the misuse of public resources, through budget allocations, and through the total confusion and fear he personally controls in the end.

Based on previous experiences, this is yet another opportunity for Vučić to present himself as the only solution in the country, as the opposition has once again entangled itself in an anti-Western narrative. Unable to reach a wider media space, the opposition panders to voters who express discontent on social networks. All of this leads to activities without any strategy or plan. The opposition thus irrationally becomes a voice not only against lithium but against mining in Serbia in general, leaving Vučić room to manipulate and address miners in Serbia as a protector of their interests and jobs. Vučić thus again shows Western governments that he is the only interlocutor in Serbia, while simultaneously manipulating both the West and citizens, using crises to strengthen his independence and foreign policy goals.

Vučić has proven to be a master of manipulation and lies, using every crisis to ensure his control and achieve his political goals, often at the expense of Serbian citizens or the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring countries in the region.

Every crisis has so far been managed in the same way, so everything indicates that it will be no different with lithium.

How did Vučić set a trap for the opposition again?

Vučić has exploited the dissatisfaction with lithium mining, initially sparked by environmental organizations and later joined by opposition parties from both ends of the political spectrum, to once again unite the left and right under the same demand and anti-Vučić policy. One might think this is a suicidal political move. No. Vučić knows very well how to dull the edge of public discontent by first giving space to “apolitical” environmental activists of highly dubious profiles to organize protests. By arresting and repressing these environmental activists, Vučić stokes the fire and creates the impression that he is truly worried about his power. This is the trap. Thus, Vučić legitimizes new faces as protest leaders, behind whom no opposition party stands, i.e., without any control that would strategically manage public discontent. Then he lets the opposition rush to exploit civic discontent in an attempt to score cheap political points. These points are never deep but exclusively superficial and short-lived because this support does not come with ideological or political loyalty to these parties. It is purely dissatisfaction based on a single issue. Then, besides the civic opposition, the anti-European opposition (pro-Russian) usually appears. There is no synergy here; on the contrary, the sum of environmental movements, civic opposition, and anti-Western opposition yields a minus and new demotivation among protesters and opposition voters. Soon, different political positions lead to mutual accusations and splits within the opposition. All this is a tried-and-true formula for failure because Vučić often plants “opposition members” who will introduce a planned discord.

In the end, the most rational part of the profession throws in the towel because activists begin to raise the temperature with misinformation that excites the public. All of this soon looks like a murky soup from which many will sooner or later seek an exit from yet another failure.

From the outside, Europe and the region closely follow the discontent in Serbia caused by the lithium affair initiated by Aleksandar Vučić’s regime.

Many in Serbia believe that the anti-lithium protests are an opportunity for democratic change in Serbia. This is the most honorable and at the same time the most desperate part of the resistance, which sees every crisis so far as an opportunity for change. Unfortunately, as we have shown in previous examples, this will not be the case.

The anti-lithium protests have been perfectly communicated as protests against Aleksandar Vučić. That is clear. Vučić, it seems, quite consciously positioned himself against the discontent over lithium mining. Why? In doing so, he has taken on the entire burden of public dissatisfaction in Serbia, which sees everything they generally criticize about Vučić and his rule over the past 12 years in the anti-lithium campaign. Does this mean that Vučić is announcing his political funeral, or is something else at play? It is, in fact, something else. It is political engineering and the unification of incompatible political options that have no synergy.

What is the possible solution for this and every future crisis?

The same pattern repeats itself in every crisis so far. Vučić has poisoned the political scene in Serbia and imposed the narrative that no one is good enough to come to power instead of him and that Serbia needs new faces in politics. This is the trap first swallowed by civic Serbia through “white ballots” in the 2012 elections, up to the present day. This is the labyrinth of Aleksandar Vučić, into which the opposition has entered a twelve-year internecine war and conflict in search of new faces, from which it has emerged fragmented, compromised, and weakened. This is why there is such great distrust towards the parties themselves, which also have insecurity and fear of leading a protest because it risks their position in public. Therefore, everyone lets “apolitical” activists take the lead in public discontent, and parties only timidly come in from the sidelines. This is exactly what Aleksandar Vučić wants. This is a recipe for the failure of any dissatisfaction and his renewed triumph. Therefore, parties must take a more active and decisive role in channeling discontent and ideologically profile themselves because a single dissatisfaction cannot unite people of different political profiles into one front, as such a front will not be long-lasting. It is necessary for parties, instead of activists, to formulate demands in line with ideology and politics and to lead the fight against the regime. This is the path to healing the political scene in Serbia and strengthening a truly pro-European opposition as a genuine alternative to Vučić’s regime.

Until the opposition reconsiders and recovers from constant defeats, Vučić will replace everything that has been criticized about him so far with lithium. After yet another victory, which is certain if nothing changes in the opposition’s strategy, he will focus, as usual, on creating the next crisis, because Vučić only knows how to rule in crises.

The articles published in the “Opinions” column reflect the personal opinion of the author and may not coincide with the position of the Center