Introduction
On 4 August 2025, the Croatian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs sent a note of protest to Montenegro. The occasion was the issuance of a new series of badges for the crew of the training ship Jadran. The Ministry of Defence of Montenegro stated that the badges were produced “as a sign of respect for the long-standing naval tradition and the significance that this ship has for our country (Montenegro).” The Croatian note of protest also announced that, as a result of a “detailed analysis of overall military succession,” Montenegro owes Croatia USD 2 billion. This effectively concerns a re-examination of the terms for the division of the former SFRY’s naval military property among the states that emerged after the breakup of the former Yugoslavia.
The conflict around the training ship Jadran is far from the only factor complicating bilateral relations between Zagreb and Podgorica and potentially hindering Montenegro’s EU accession process (it should be noted that Croatia is currently Montenegro’s only land neighbour that is an EU member). Among them are the delimitation of the maritime border around the Prevlaka peninsula, compensation to victims of the Morinj camp (where, during the aggression of Serbia and Montenegro against Croatia, Croatian prisoners were held), the name of the swimming pool in the town of Kotor (named after Montenegrin athlete Zoran Gopčević, who was a guard of the aforementioned camp), and the resolution on “genocide” in the Jasenovac camp, which was adopted last year at the insistence of pro-Serb forces in the Montenegrin parliament in the summer of 2024.
The failure to close negotiation Chapter 31 (Foreign policy, security and defence) in December 2024 clearly underlined the importance of these issues for Croatia.
History of the conflict around “Jadran”
The training sailing ship Jadran was built in Hamburg in 1931–1933 on order of the Royal Yugoslav Navy. During World War II it twice changed hands — first seized by fascist Italy and, after Italy’s capitulation, by Nazi Germany. After the end of World War II the ship again became the property of Yugoslavia, albeit socialist.
Shortly before the beginning of Yugoslavia’s breakup, Jadran was sent from its “home” Croatian port of Split for repairs to Tivat in Montenegro. After the Croatian War of Independence, Zagreb demanded the return of the ship to its “native” port of Split, but the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro refused, citing legal arguments defined by the so-called Badinter Commission (regarding the distribution of the former Yugoslavia’s property — ed.).
As is known, the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, chaired by Robert Badinter, was convened by the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community (EEC) on 27 August 1991. The Commission consisted of five constitutional judges of the EEC and was tasked with providing answers to the “significant legal questions” arising from the bloody dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).
One of those questions concerned the succession of state property of the former SFRY.
Since the Commission ruled that none of the new states could claim the status of the sole continuing State of the SFRY, all issues concerning succession of property were to be resolved in a bilateral format. The Badinter Arbitration Commission voiced the principles of settlement, but differences in the interpretation of succession issues between the newly formed republics and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (which, for its part, considered itself the sole successor of the SFRY) prevented their implementation at the time.
The end of the dictator Slobodan Milošević’s era in October 2000 made it possible to return to resolving the succession problem. Thus, the Agreement on Succession Issues of the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was signed by all independent successor States of the SFRY — BiH, Croatia, North Macedonia, Slovenia and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro — on 29 June 2001 in Vienna (Austria).
That Agreement contains several articles regarding movable and immovable property, including military property. For example, Article 3 of Annex A provides that “tangible movable state property of the SFRY which was located within the territory of the SFRY shall pass to the successor state on whose territory that property was situated on the date on which it proclaimed independence”. Montenegro continues to rely on that article as a legal argument for ownership of the ship Jadran.
However, given that the vessel is military property, another principle (Article 4 of Annex A) established by the Vienna Agreement also applies: “tangible movable state property of the SFRY which formed part of the military property of that state shall be the subject of special arrangements to be agreed among the successor states concerned”.
Recent history of the conflict
After Montenegro’s declaration of independence in 2006, there were several attempts to resolve the Jadran dispute at the institutional level. Thus, in 2021 Zagreb and Podgorica agreed on the formation of a relevant intergovernmental commission, but nothing is known about any formats of its work from either official sources or the media to date.
Intergovernmental cooperation intensified significantly immediately after Croatia blocked Chapter 31 (within Montenegro’s negotiation process with the EU) in December 2024, since EU accession remains the unequivocal foreign policy priority of the incumbent Government of Montenegro headed by M. Spajić. In 2025 the Croatian and Montenegrin sides met twice — on 27 January and on 14 May (in the format of consultations between foreign policy departments). Both meetings were held with the aim of “achieving concrete results” regarding the resolution of “outstanding issues,” as emphasised by the Croatian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs.
At the same time, despite the Montenegrin side’s declared commitment to resolving urgent bilateral problems, some pro-Serb politicians and officials (who are currently part of the ruling majority in the country) cast doubt on the feasibility of reaching such an agreement.
A characteristic example in this context is, in particular, the Minister of Defence of Montenegro, Dragan Krapović. D. Krapović is a member of the moderately pro-Serb and declaratively centrist and pro-European party Democratic Montenegro (Demokratska Crna Gora), and previously served as mayor of the town of Budva, where in 2018 he participated in celebrations marking the centenary of the “re-union” of Montenegro with Serbia.
This refers to the historical event — after the end of World War I in November 1918, the People’s Assembly (council/viče) in Podgorica removed Montenegrin King Nikola I Petrović and proclaimed the union of the Serbian and Montenegrin states (ultimately culminating on 1 December 1918 with the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes — the “first” Yugoslavia).
It should be noted that in Montenegro this event is interpreted differently: pro-Serb forces view the Podgorica assembly’s decision as a “re-union.” In 2019, however, the then Prime Minister — Duško Marković of the Democratic Party of Socialists — called the Podgorica assembly’s decision “illegitimate,” and as a decision that led to Montenegro’s loss of independence.
Dragan Krapović took office as Minister of Defence of Montenegro in 2023.
His tenure to date has been marked by a number of scandals, primarily in the context of Montenegro’s bilateral relations with Croatia.
First, in January 2024 the Croatian Minister of Defence Ivan Anušić cancelled a planned meeting with Dragan Krapović because of the latter’s statements regarding the memorial plaque at the Morinj camp and regarding ownership rights over the ship Jadran.
Krapović at the time expressed the view that Montenegro was not ready to discuss the ship’s status, and that Croatia “has no right to claim” it.
Second, Dragan Krapović declined an invitation from the Croatian side to attend the thirtieth-anniversary commemorations of Operation Storm — the decisive battle in the Croatian War of Independence. In a comment to one of Montenegro’s leading media outlets Vijesti, representatives of the Montenegrin Ministry of Defence stated that Krapović made that decision “taking into account the entire historical and regional context,” as well as “the particular sensitivity this topic has for Montenegrin society”.
Finally, the Ministry of Defence of Montenegro’s decision to issue a new series of badges for the crew of the training ship Jadran became an additional painful blow to already strained bilateral relations between Podgorica and Zagreb. As noted above, Croatia sent a note of protest and accused the Montenegrin side of allegedly owing it former Yugoslav military property in the amount of USD 2 billion.
D. Krapović responded to this by saying in a comment for Vijesti that “in this particular case there was no need for any form of protest or reaction at all”. He also added that there is no official confirmation of claims about any debt of Montenegro to Croatia “in the monetary amounts mentioned in the media”.
Commenting on Krapović’s rhetoric, Vanda Babić-Galić, advisor to the Croatian Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, said: “Minister Krapović is deliberately misleading the Montenegrin public with such messages or is simply a hostage of some other policy that does not contribute to Montenegro’s progress (on the path to the EU)”. In addition, Babić-Galić reported that Croatia has the necessary expert analyses and exact calculations regarding all objects of the “seized military heritage,” its financial value, which it will at some point present to both the Montenegrin and the international political community.
Thus, it can be concluded that the Minister of Defence of Montenegro — Dragan Krapović — is having a destructive impact on the resolution of existing bilateral issues between Zagreb and Podgorica, primarily in the context of ownership rights to the training ship Jadran. However, he is not the only government official in Podgorica who is thereby hindering the country’s progress towards full EU membership.
The pro-Serb coalition in the Parliament of Montenegro
De facto pro-Serb political forces in the Parliament of Montenegro are a collection of parties and personalities, mainly participants of the former Democratic Front (disbanded in 2023): New Serb Democracy (Nova srpska demokratija — NSD), headed by Andrija Mandić (the current Speaker of the Parliament of Montenegro); the Democratic People’s Party (Demokratska narodna partija — DNP), led by Milan Knežević; and the broader bloc For the Future of Montenegro (Za budućnost Crne Gore — ZBCG), which, in addition to the two parties mentioned above, also includes the Workers’ Party (Radnička partija) led by Maksim Vučinić.
Andrija Mandić and Milan Knežević are widely known for their ties to Belgrade and Moscow. During Vladimir Putin’s visit to Belgrade in 2019 they conveyed “greetings from Serbs of Montenegro” to Putin and stated that the majority of the country considers him “their president”. The head of the Russian Federation then called Mandić and Knežević “heroes”.
Andrija Mandić and Milan Knežević were among the primary accused in the 2016 alleged coup plan case, which also involved Russian nationals. In 2019 the Higher Court of Montenegro delivered a verdict sentencing Mandić, Knežević, and 11 other suspects to imprisonment for planning “terrorist acts”.
However, in subsequent years Mandić and Knežević were acquitted: in 2021 the Appellate Court of Montenegro quashed the first-instance decision, and in 2024 the Higher Court of Montenegro fully acquitted them “due to lack of evidence of their involvement in the case”.
After the early parliamentary elections in Montenegro in 2023, the party of the incumbent Prime Minister Milojko Spajić — the Movement “Europe Now!” (Pokret Evropa sad) — did not have a sufficient number of seats to form a stable governing majority. As a result of months of negotiations, “Europe Now!” formed a parliamentary coalition in October 2023 with the pro-Serb coalition “For the Future of Montenegro,” the moderately pro-Serb Democratic Montenegro, and political forces of the Bosniak and Albanian minorities.
Pro-Serb politicians were thus guaranteed executive positions: A. Mandić became President of the Assembly (Parliament) of Montenegro, and representatives of Democratic Montenegro, among them the aforementioned Dragan Krapović, received two deputy prime ministerial positions and headed four ministries (including the country’s security block).
M. Knežević headed the coalition “For the Future of Montenegro” and retained his role as chair of the parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security.
In exchange for obtaining influential posts in the renewed government, representatives of the pro-Serb coalition signed an agreement with the Movement “Europe Now!” obliging them to respect Montenegro’s full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy.
However, the governing coalition then failed to secure a parliamentary majority.
Consequently, the pro-Serb parties’ influence was further expanded in July 2024, when Prime Minister M. Spajić reshuffled the governing cabinet.
As a result of that decision the government was expanded to 32 members, and representatives of the pro-Serb political forces (the Democratic People’s Party and New Serb Democracy) received two deputy prime ministerial posts and three ministerial positions.
Commenting on this in the Assembly, Prime Minister Spajić called the new government “historic” and a “guarantor of stability and maturity”.
International partners of Podgorica did not share that assessment. In particular, the U.S. Embassy in Montenegro commented to Radio Free Europe:
“We are concerned about the inclusion in the Government of parties and leaders who do not condemn Russian aggression against Ukraine, are against European Union sanctions against Russia, and whose actions are in direct opposition to the principle of good neighbourly relations”.
Good-neighbourly relations between Montenegro and Croatia indeed came under pressure — shortly before representatives of NSD and DNP received executive posts in the expanded government.
Resolution on genocide in the Jasenovac, Dachau and Mauthausen camps
At the beginning of 2024, Germany and Rwanda proposed a draft resolution to designate 11 July as International Day of Remembrance of the Victims of the Genocide in Srebrenica.
The vote on the resolution was postponed twice. Then, pro-Serb political forces in Montenegro united in a campaign to deny the mentioned genocide. The President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić met with about 100 politicians from around the world to dissuade them from voting for the resolution, and the head of the entity Republika Srpska (BiH) Milorad Dodik intensified separatist rhetoric in his country. In turn, the Speaker of the Montenegrin Parliament Mandić proposed, as a reaction, the adoption of a resolution on genocide in the Jasenovac camp (modern Croatia), and the pro-Serb coalition in the Montenegrin Assembly submitted its draft for approval.
As is known, Jasenovac is a network of death camps from World War II on the territory of the Independent State of Croatia (a satellite of the Third Reich), where Jews, Roma, Serbs and anti-regime Croats were systematically murdered.
Almost immediately after the submission of the draft resolution on genocide at Jasenovac, the Croatian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs sent to Montenegro a rather strong note of protest calling on it not to “politicise the victims” of either Jasenovac or Srebrenica.
On 23 May 2024, at a meeting of the UN General Assembly, it was finally possible to adopt the resolution on remembrance of the victims of the genocide in Srebrenica. Montenegro was one of the 84 countries that supported that document.
However, “at home” (that is, in Montenegro) pro-Serb forces organised a vote for their own initiative. Already on 28 June 2024, after, almost at the last moment, a reference to the camps in Dachau and Mauthausen had been added to the title of the resolution, it was adopted by 41 votes in Parliament. Part of the parliamentary majority and the opposition left the chamber in protest.
The international community, including Croatia, reacted rather critically: the then President of the European Council Charles Michel even cancelled his visit to Montenegro that had been planned for 30 June. C. Michel invited Montenegro’s President Jakov Milatović to Brussels, stressing that “it’s important Montenegro stays focused on EU track”.
The Croatian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs stated that it “regrets that Montenegro decided to ignore the calls of the Republic of Croatia to avoid politicising the victims of Jasenovac and not to take actions that could negatively affect bilateral relations and Montenegro’s European path,” and also that “the resolution on Jasenovac was adopted with the aim of undermining and relativising the UN resolution on the genocide in Srebrenica”.
In addition, on 25 July 2024 Croatia declared the President of the Montenegrin Parliament Andrija Mandić, Deputy Prime Minister Aleksa Bečić (leader of the Democratic Montenegro party) and Member of Parliament from the Democratic People’s Party Milan Knežević personae non gratae for “their systematic actions aimed at undermining good-neighbourly relations and the continuous use of Croatia for domestic political purposes”.
Thus, the pro-Serb bloc’s initiative became an additional burden on the already existing list of problems in relations between Montenegro and Croatia. Among them are long-standing issues whose resolution Croatia expressly requires for Montenegro’s further progress towards the EU.
Otherburdens in bilateral relations
The Morinj camp
The Morinj camp near the town of Kotor is a military facility that during the Croatian War of Independence was used as an “assembling centre” where prisoners from Croatia were detained during the aggression of the JNA and Serbian volunteers (reservists from Montenegrin territory took part primarily) against Dubrovnik and Konavle (the southernmost municipality of Croatia). War crimes occurred at that camp — cruel treatment of prisoners, both civilian and military.
For years Croatia has demanded compensation from Montenegro for its citizens who were held at the Morinj camp. In the period 2013–2025 Montenegro paid more than EUR 1.5 million to victims, but the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg pointed to “inconsistent practice of Montenegrin courts”. Due to the absence of an established threshold for monetary compensation, some cases were approved and some similar ones were rejected.
Thus, the issue of compensation remains unresolved.
It is also worth noting that on Montenegro’s path to the EU, in addition to negotiation Chapter 31, the question of fair compensation for victims is also important for Chapter 23 — “Judiciary and fundamental rights”.
The Morinj camp story also has another side — the commemoration of the war crimes committed there.
On 10 October 2022, with the participation of the foreign ministers of Croatia and Montenegro, a memorial plaque was installed at the site of the former Morinj camp commemorating the Croatian victims.
The Croatian Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Gordan Grlić-Radman at that time said that recognition of the crimes is an important step for good-neighbourly relations between the two countries and for Montenegro’s integration into the European community.
The day after the plaque was installed, the mayor of Kotor Vladimir Jokić (Democratic Montenegro) stated that the plaque had been installed without the permission of local authorities. On 18 October the Directorate for Inspection Affairs of Montenegro announced that the memorial plaque should be dismantled.
In addition to the formal lack of permission for installation, pro-Serb political forces inside the country were outraged by the mention of “Greater Serbian aggression” and by the text generally: “We remember the crimes committed to the shame of the name and spirit of Montenegro. We express regret for all the suffering endured by the prisoners. May this never happen again”.
The incumbent Minister of Defence of Montenegro Dragan Krapović at the time stated that the memorial plaque at the Morinj camp had been installed “mistakenly,” that the inscription “does not contain facts,” and that it should be replaced by a plaque “with an adequate text.” As a result of these statements and of his remarks regarding ownership of the training ship Jadran, the Croatian Minister of Defence Ivan Anušić even cancelled his meeting with his Montenegrin counterpart in January 2024.
Despite the decision to dismantle the commemorative plaque, Prime Minister of Montenegro Milojko Spajić ordered it to be protected, so to this day it remains in place unchanged.
The name of the swimming pool in the town of Kotor
On 18 August 2021 the municipal council of Kotor decided to rename the town’s swimming pool, which had previously held the name “Nikša Bućin” (in honour of a partisan anti-fascist who died fighting the Chetniks in 1944). The pool received a new name — in honour of Zoran “Džimi” Gopčević, whom the city authorities named one of the best water polo athletes of the Kotor region.
However, the athlete had participated in the JNA aggression against Croatia and was commander of the guard of the aforementioned Morinj camp. The municipal council vote included deputies from Democratic Montenegro as well as from the pro-Serb Democratic People’s Party and New Serb Democracy.
The Croatian side reacted very critically to this move: “It is utterly unacceptable for a public facility to be named after a guard of the notorious Morinj camp from 1991. Such a decision does not correspond to the spirit of good-neighbourly relations we are building with Montenegro, and it will undoubtedly have consequences for our future relations,” the Croatian MFA statement stressed.
Croatia’s condemnation materialised in July 2024 when the Croatian authorities recommended to their water-polo clubs not to play matches at the municipal pool in Kotor. Later in 2025, during the World Water Polo Championship, Croatian athletes succeeded in moving their match from Kotor to Podgorica.
The Prevlaka peninsula
The dispute over the Prevlaka peninsula, located at the very entrance to the Bay of Kotor, is one of the key points of disagreement between Montenegro and Croatia.
The Prevlaka peninsula is a relatively small territory, some 2.6 kilometres long and 500 metres wide.
For almost two decades since Montenegro’s declaration of independence (despite numerous changes of Montenegrin governments) no concrete progress has been achieved in resolving this dispute. The state border around the peninsula is still regulated by an agreement from 2002 — concluded before Montenegro achieved independence.
Misunderstandings over Prevlaka are primarily based on different interpretations of the subject matter: Croatia considers the land border issue closed, while the maritime border question as subject to discussion. The Montenegrin side, for its part, lacks unanimity on resolving this conflict, and statements by some pro-Serb politicians openly challenge the agreement on the interim regime along the border between the two countries. That is, certain Montenegrin pro-Serb politicians effectively question the currently agreed land border between Montenegro and Croatia.
In this context it is worth recalling Miodrag Lekić, an “old hand” of Montenegrin politics who until 2023 was a Member of Parliament and in the past participated in negotiations on Prevlaka. M. Lekić was once one of the founders and leaders of the Democratic Front — the coalition of pro-Serb parties that also included today’s Democratic People’s Party and New Serb Democracy. He, in particular, voted against Montenegro’s accession to NATO and against the adoption of sanctions against the Russian Federation following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
On 31 December 2024 in an article for Vijesti M. Lekić wrote: “We believe that the Bay of Kotor belongs to one owner. In essence, as it has always been in the history of the Adriatic Sea and the history of Boka (the Bay of Kotor) itself. …In the times of Venice and Austria, who dominated the Adriatic coast the longest, …the situation around Prevlaka was clear. Whoever possessed the Bay of Kotor also possessed Prevlaka as an integral part of the Bay of Kotor”.
The Croatian side, as we have emphasised, expresses a diametrically opposite position.
Vanda Babić-Galić, advisor to the Croatian Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, told the Centre for Civic Education (Montenegro): “We have never hidden this, we have always said clearly and transparently — for Croatia the land border is indisputable, Prevlaka is part of Croatia and falls within its internationally recognised borders, and there can be no negotiations about this”.
This year’s consultations between the Montenegrin and Croatian sides on 27 January and 14 May gave hope for renewed effort to resolve the Prevlaka dispute, but so far nothing is known about the establishment of intergovernmental commissions on this issue or about other concrete steps along that path.
The influence of the pro-Serb coalition on resolution of outstanding issues in relations with Croatia — expert assessments
A major deterioration in relations between Montenegro and Croatia in recent years was the blocking by Zagreb of Podgorica’s closure of Negotiating Chapter 31 in December 2024.
Commenting on the reasons for the blockage, the Speaker of the Montenegrin Parliament and leader of New Serb Democracy Mandić said that Croatia blocked the closure only because of the status of outstanding issues such as Jadran, Morinj, Prevlaka and others. A. Mandić believes that the Jasenovac resolution in no way affected this.
Member of the European Parliament from Croatia Tomislav Sokol rejected that view: “Prevlaka and Jadran are open topics, but they are not the reason for the blockage. The reason is the anti-European and Greater Serbian policy that Andrija Mandić is promoting in order to create regional instability. The task of other leaders is to prove that they are truly loyal partners on the European path, and not a fig leaf for Mr Mandić”.
As long as pro-Serb and pro-Russian forces maintain their presence in Montenegro’s parliamentary majority and in the executive bodies of Montenegro, real good-neighbourly relations with Croatia will be impossible to achieve, since “the growth of anti-democratic and anti-European policy in candidate countries progressing in the European integration process will not be tolerated (by Croatia)” — said Assistant Professor Nikoleta Đukanović of the University of Donja Gorica to Vijesti.
Croatia and the EU jointly oppose the strengthening of pro-Serb and anti-European forces within the governing structures of candidate countries. This conclusion can be drawn, in particular, from the earlier cancellation of the visit of the former President of the European Council Charles Michel to Montenegro after the controversial (and offensive to Croatia) Jasenovac resolution was adopted by the Montenegrin Assembly.
Director of the Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM) Nevenka Vuksanović voiced a similar view: “Of course, the EU will not tolerate the strengthening of non-European ideas, and I believe that in the near future we will witness certain obstructions from Croatia, especially if Andrija Mandić’s rhetoric does not change”.
Croatian political commentator Davor Gjenero regards, among other measures of opposition to anti-European decisions in Montenegro, the declaration of three pro-Serb Montenegrin politicians as personae non gratae:
“By identifying three politicians from Montenegro (I deliberately do not call them Montenegrin politicians, because they are more Russian and Serbian than Montenegrin) — Mandić, Knežević and Bečić — as undesired, Croatia clearly defined its position: on the one hand, regarding a sovereign, pro-European Montenegro that has received friendly support from official Zagreb since gaining independence, and on the other hand, regarding actors who seek to extend the Russian and Serbian world into Montenegrin territory, with whom Zagreb has no intention of conducting political negotiations”.
However, changing specific individuals who conduct destructive policy towards bilateral relations — for example the Minister of Defence Dragan Krapović — will not help, believes Vatroslav Belan (leader of the pro-Western opposition Liberal Party of Montenegro):
“It would be pleasant and surprising for Montenegro to take such a responsible step. On the other hand, replacing one minister from the Democratic party would be another empty trick without a substantive change of policy. The best solution would be to agree on the resignation of the entire government, because we will not go to the EU with this (government)”.
The presence and influence of pro-Serb forces have created both a political obstacle and the need for systemic, institutional solutions to restore dialogue with Croatia and to advance European integration. Resolving bilateral problems might intensify at the moment when EU accession will appear close, believes journalist Željko Pantelić of Vijesti: “this dispute will arise at the final phase of negotiations, when Podgorica will be motivated to make concessions because membership of the EU will be within reach”.
Thus, prospects for normalising relations and advancing European integration remain realistic provided there is consistent institutional work and political balance in Podgorica; without this the risks of postponing EU accession increase significantly.
