It has become an axiom that throughout Aleksandar Vučić’s reign, Belgrade has been pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy. That definition should be taken quite literally as Serbia has been moving in several directions at the same time. These included European integration; active cooperation with individual Western democracies, primarily the U.S., France, and Germany, with an emphasis on economy; development of relations with Russia in all areas, including military, cultural, energy, and religious; and building up special relations with China…
The start of the Russo-Ukrainian armed conflict had a minimal impact on Serbian foreign policy as Belgrade hoped to wait out a full-scale war without fundamentally changing its geopolitical stance, remaining a “partner for all”.
For more than three years, Vučić led the country through the labyrinth of multiple vectors, trying, at the same time, to retain power domestically and to benefit from neutrality politically and, mainly, economically.
Signals have been mounting that this policy had exhausted itself, but Vucic had long managed to balance without failing.
European “carrot”
Take Belgrade’s snub at introducing restrictive measures against Moscow and generally aligning its foreign policy with the EU. In response, Brussels went only as far as criticizing and condemning this stance without proceeding with clear legal steps. Indeed, since the beginning of 2022, the process of Serbia’s accession to the European Union has slowed down significantly as the opening of the next negotiation chapters (clusters) remains on hold. Still, the EU has never officially stated that Serbia’s European integration shall be suspended and neither has it imposed any sanctions on the country.
Apparently, the Europeans have opted for the “encouragement tactics”, or “carrot policy”.
This was clearly seen in Brussels’ reaction to Vučić’s trip to Moscow on May 9 for the World War 2 Victory Parade.
Despite critical, sometimes harsh, remarks from European officials, there has been no major deterioration in relations between the EU and Serbia. Moreover, almost a month after Vučić’s controversial rendez-vous, the European Commission included Serbia’s lithium and boron mining project, Jadar, in the list of strategic ones.
It is no secret that the project remains really controversial within Serbia, but from the EU’s perspective, it is only about positive things: ensuring the influx of investments, promoting economic growth and mutually beneficial economic integration.
It is obvious that the European Union sees Serbia as a partner and is trying to act accordingly. Vučić is constantly pointed at his “errors” (insufficiently democratic style of government, pro-Russian policy) in different formats, but no formal “reprimand” is applied. In turn, the Serbian authorities, despite the anti-Western demarche involving their president defiantly attending a parade in Moscow and the growth of authoritarian tendencies, reiterate commitment to European integration.
This two-sided political game has already given rise to opinions in Serbia’s public discourse that the EU allegedly has no actual intention to accept the country to the bloc and that the accession efforts are nothing but a process for its own sake that may last forever… However, as long as the Europeans agree to allocate funding to Belgrade for various projects and programs and as long as the Serbian authorities remain invested in cooperation with the EU, no mass public opposition to this kind of policy should be expected.
Hard with Washington, easy with Beijing
The situation is a little more complicated with the Americans. Apparentlym, Vučić, counted on greater favors from the Trump administration but all he received was record “reciprocal tariffs” from the U.S. at almost 37% and a refusal to ultimately lift the sanctions off “Oil Industry of Serbia” (NIS), introduced by the Biden administration. The sanctions against NIS are, in fact, yet to come into force as they were postponed several times by the White House. However, they were never recalled.
It seems Washington has not yet decided what to do with Belgrade. Amid uncertainty, the Serbian authorities must act cautiously, taking into account the possible reaction on the part of the Americans, which certainly affects foreign policy.
Against this background, Belgrade’s relations with Beijing, excellent without exaggeration, stand in bright contrast. Prime Minister Đuro Matsut recently emphasized that over the past decade, Serbia has developed one of the most intensive and dynamic partnerships with China in this part of Europe, while the Chinese ambassador to Serbia, Li Ming, recently emphasized that the friendship between Serbia and China had become a model for relations between countries around the world.
It remains unclear how Belgrade will continue to combine partnership with Beijing and cautiously constructive relations with the United States but this is not a question of today, and Vučić has time to develop a strategy.
Russian claims
An immediate reaction from the Serbian authorities is required in another geopolitical direction, where Vučić seems to have received his last warning over obvious multi-vector stance.
On May 28, the press office of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service said “Serbian defense enterprises, contrary to the ‘neutrality’ declared by official Belgrade, continue to supply ammunition to Kiev.” Referring to “information received by the SVR,” Russian intelligence operatives accused the Serbian authorities of employing “a scheme with fake end-user certificates and intermediary countries”, including the Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, and even “exotic options involving African countries”.
The statement mentioned almost all of Serbia’s leading defense firms, including Jugoimport SDPR, Zenitprom, Krusik, Sofag, Reyer DTI, Sloboda, Prvi Partizan.
Russia laid down no specific facts to back their allegation, but the general tone of the press release made it clear Russia does have some evidence, and it’s on this evidence that the claim is based.
However, the statement was not about disclosing certain intelligence in order to inform the public, but, as it goes in Russia’s street lingo, about the Kremlin issuing a “predyava”, which basically means confronting the Serbian authorities. Translated into normal language, a “predyava” is an informal claim that is made due over alleged or actual damage or harm inflicted, a demand to deliver on obligations and commitments undertaken. Such a claim usually has no legal base, including verified contracts, but, rather, verbal agreements sealed in an informal (criminal or criminalized) environment.
It is precisely because of this format that the statement contains emotionally-charged accusations against Belgrade rather than some “dry” intelligence data.
Briefly, the Kremlin’s claims are as follows:
Russia “came to the aid of the Serbs at critical moments in their history” – “the liberation of Serbia from the yoke of the Ottoman Empire”, the period of the First and Second World Wars, the war in Yugoslavia (“NATO bombing of Belgrade, the Kosovo tragedy”), but now, as “the West has unleashed a war against Russia”, “the Serbian military industry is trying to shoot Russia in the back”.
It might take long to argue on any of these bits as the entire history of Serbian-Russian friendship is rather complex and contradictory. One thing is clear, however, which is the point is not historical events, but what is happening in Europe now.
Foes or friends?
In essence, through the SVR, the Kremlin informed Belgrade that they regards its neutrality (or multi-vectoral stance) as a shot in the back, and expect the Serbian authorities clearly define their priorities, that is, friends and foes.
As Russia is waging war against Ukraine – and, as per Moscow, against the West – the Russian authorities are no longer satisfied with Serbia’s complex and ambiguous position. The Kremlin wants certainty and clarity in an answer to the question – are the Serbs allies or adversaries to the Russians?
Regional and international analysts are now thoroughly analyzing the shift in Russian policy toward Serbia and predicting further developments.
In their opinion, the first manifestation of the Kremlin’s discontent was the extension of the gas supply contract on terms favorable to Belgrade for only four months. The presence of the Serbian president at the parade in Red Square was obviously appreciated by the Kremlin, although that appreciation was restrained. Putin clearly wants more from Vučić.
In the statement by the Foreign Intelligence Service, Moscow’s specific priority demands for Belgrade have already been laid down and made public. An explosion that rocked a military plant in Valjevo shortly after the statement by the Foreign Intelligence Service could be perceived as an additional signal in this context. Although Russian involvement in the incident has not been proven, few believe this was a coincidence.
In the coming months, Vučić will have to – and probably already has to – refute the accusations coming from Russian intelligence. Of course, he has a chance to find convincing arguments in his favor, because the Yugoslav-Serbian experience of producing and supplying weapons to the global market is rather extensive and diverse. But whether any of his answers will satisfy the Russians remains unclear.
A path toward a Balkan Belarus?
It seems that while Vučić and his team hope to pursue their policy of balancing between East and West, the Russian leadership has set a course to turn Serbia into an unequivocal ally.
Moscow may demand from Belgrade not just to rule out any possibilities for Serbian weapons to make it to Kyiv, but a comprehensive military and political union alike the one Russia has secured with Belarus. Paraphrasing the SVR statement, the Kremlin probably wants to see “the contribution of Serbian defenders to a war that would result in a strategic defeat for the West.”
There may also be a lower-scale option, but it also provides for a halt of Belgrade’s cooperation, especially in the military area, with countries that can be attributed to the pro-Western or pro-Ukrainian bloc. Therefore, not only the “questionable” ammunition trade, according to the SVR, but also the Serbian-French contract for fighter jets, which also allegedly threatens Russian interests, has come under the attack of Russian propaganda.
The Kremlin allegedly gave Vučić time to resolve all the problematic issues of Serbian-Russian relations and a chance to prove his loyalty to Putin. However, analysts are positive that Moscow is simultaneously implementing not only Plan A, which is supposed to force the current Serbian leadership into a close alliance with Russia, but also Plan B, which involves replacing the current Serbian leader with someone more loyal to the Kremlin.
It is significant that dissatisfaction with Vučić and expectations of his replacement can be seen in an article from June 1 in Russia’s weekly Zvezda (“Star”). The founder of the publication is the eponymous “Television and Radio Company of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”, accordingly, there can be no accidental wording there that has not been coordinated with the Kremlin.
The author of the piece, supposedly presenting the opinion of Serbian society, condemns Vučić as a traitor and claims that the current Serbian leader has already been “written off”.
Against the backdrop of articles by Serbian political scholars about the strengthening of Russian influence among the participants in anti-government protests in Serbia, the accusations voiced by Moscow no longer only imply that Plan B exists, but rather suggest that it’s already being implemented.
That is, while the U..S has not clearly formulated its Balkan policy, and the EU is trying to focus on the economy, Russia has become more proactive and is now employing hybrid methods.
And here the question is no longer whether Vučić will be able to preach his multi-vector policy or whether he will remain in power, but whether the Western bloc has enough power, tools, resources, knowledge, skills, abilities, and motivation to survive this hybrid confrontation with Russia in the Balkans.
