Each year on 9 May, the Russian regime commemorates Victory Day in the Second World War. The military parade traditionally held on this occasion has long served not only to downplay the role of the West and Europe in defeating Nazi Germany but also as a display of force and a symbolic threat to Europe, projecting military and nuclear power. Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia has become an increasingly serious threat to European security, while the number of its international allies has steadily declined. Today, its loyal supporters are largely confined to political leaders who are either blackmailed or deeply corrupt. Within the European Union, these include the prime ministers of Hungary and Slovakia, Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico, while in the Western Balkans, the key figures are Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and the President of Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik.
Historical Background
Russian influence in Serbia has been present for centuries, but it has never exerted as strong an impact on the country’s political and social fabric as it has since Aleksandar Vučić came to power in 2012. A former member of the far-right and pro-Russian Serbian Radical Party, still led by his political and ideological mentor Vojislav Šešelj, Vučić rose to political prominence during the wars that devastated the former Yugoslavia. He was among the youngest political figures who openly encouraged war crimes in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Unlike Šešelj, however, Vučić was never held accountable before the Hague Tribunal for these actions.
Since taking power, Vučić has implemented a systematic strategy to dismantle the post-5 October Serbia — the democratic order established after the peaceful revolution that ended the Milošević dictatorship in 2000. The reform process was initiated by Zoran Đinđić, Serbia’s first democratic prime minister who was assassinated in 2003. From the fall of Milošević’s criminal regime — whose key figures were largely convicted in The Hague for the gravest war crimes — until 2012, Serbia had been gradually building young democratic institutions through close cooperation with the European Union and the broader West. Vučić recognised that dismantling democracy and independent institutions from within would allow him to consolidate absolute power, while simultaneously maintaining the facade of a pro-European orientation. The greatest support for this political strategy came from then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel, whose position and special relationship with Vladimir Putin Vučić skillfully leveraged to preserve close ties with Russia. In doing so, he secured near-total dominance over the domestic electorate.
The Failure of U.S. Administrations in the Western Balkans
Aleksandar Vučić has remained in power for an unusually long time, outlasting numerous U.S. administrations that have since faded into political retirement, while his own position has steadily grown stronger — as has Russia’s influence in the Western Balkans. The administration of President Barack Obama, through its short-sighted and naïve foreign policy, created space for Russia’s reassertion in the region and beyond. By focusing almost exclusively on resolving the Kosovo dispute between Serbia and Kosovo, the United States in 2012 chose to engage new political actors — former radicals and pro-Russian politicians such as Tomislav Nikolić and Aleksandar Vučić. This move reflected Washington’s desire to secure a quick solution to the Kosovo issue as part of a broader effort to tick off one of many foreign policy priorities.
Since then, U.S.–Serbia relations have evolved within the framework of an increasingly proactive Serbian policy that regularly tests the boundaries of its expansionist ambitions. These ambitions have since become official state policy, embodied in the ideological project of the “Serbian World” , modelled after Russia’s “Russkiy Mir.”
The approach of all U.S. administrations toward Vučić’s Serbia has been largely passive, centered on concessions made in exchange for perceived progress on foreign policy goals such as Kosovo. In this dynamic, American policy has failed — not only in managing relations with Vučić or securing a sustainable resolution on Kosovo, but also in containing Russia’s growing influence in the Western Balkans. Even more concerning is the fact that U.S. foreign policy often appeared unaware of the scale of this failure — or simply refused to treat it as a serious problem.
During Donald Trump’s first term, the Western Balkans became a stage for aggressive and destabilising Russian operations aimed at undermining NATO. The attempted coup in Montenegro in 2016, orchestrated by Russia’s GRU with the support of Serbian intelligence services, had long-term consequences for Montenegro’s stability and its European path. A similar incident occurred in 2017, during the storming of the North Macedonian parliament. In both cases, the absence of robust institutional and political support from the United States meant that those responsible were never prosecuted for their crimes. Russian support in both instances was channelled through Serbian networks, while Vučić managed to avoid any consequences thanks in large part to the continued indulgence of U.S. administrations.
Russian Propaganda in Ukraine and the Rise of the “Serbian World”
In parallel with Russia’s growing influence in the Western Balkans, Moscow intensified its propaganda efforts in Ukraine following the annexation of Crimea, systematically denying the existence of Ukrainian identity, language, and nationhood as it prepared for a full-scale invasion in 2022. In the Western Balkans, its key ally and proxy, Aleksandar Vučić, closely followed the moves of the Russian regime and began developing his own plans to implement the concept of the “Serbian World.” This project aims to undermine the sovereignty of neighboring countries by instrumentalising ethnic Serb minorities and interfering in their internal affairs — primarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo, with longstanding influence in North Macedonia as well.
In 2019, Vučić presented a plan “Non-paper” for a “peaceful redrawing of borders” and the creation of a Greater Serbia, Greater Albania, and Greater Croatia — a proposal that would have directly endangered the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo. The plan was floated at the time of the Washington Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, which was overseen by then-President Donald Trump. However, the proposal never gained serious traction, primarily because the European Union categorically rejected any change of borders in the Western Balkans. Undeterred, Vučić continued to pursue his nationalist ambitions, adapting them to evolving geopolitical conditions.
With Joe Biden’s arrival in the White House in 2020, Vučić repositioned himself as a close partner of Washington. Through the involvement of Ambassador Christopher Hill — a trusted figure within the Biden administration — Serbia was acknowledged as a regional military power, while the “Open Balkan” initiative replaced previous calls for border changes with a project that ultimately served similar pro-Russian objectives. Effectively, “Open Balkan” became the new vehicle for advancing the goals of the “Serbian World.” In doing so, Ambassador Hill and the Biden administration — knowingly or not — ended up strengthening Russia’s hand in the region by bolstering its most effective proxy.
Vučić’s success was remarkable: he managed to reframe the ambitions of the “Serbian World” through the “Open Balkan” initiative, giving it a regional framework and a sense of international legitimacy. The initiative effectively served to strengthen Serbia’s political and economic dominance over Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and northern Kosovo, all under the guise of regional cooperation and integration. Albania, pursuing its own regional interests, endorsed the initiative, while North Macedonia was pressured to join — a development that contributed to the return to power of pro-Russian political forces involved in the 2017 attempted coup in the North Macedonian parliament.
In Montenegro as well, political factions linked to the 2016 attempted coup returned to power, signalling a peak in Russian influence across the region. While the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine weakened Moscow’s standing in Europe more broadly, it paradoxically reinforced its foothold in the Western Balkans — largely thanks to the indirect support, whether deliberate or not, extended by successive U.S. administrations to pro-Russian actors like Aleksandar Vučić.
Why Did Vučić Decide to Attend the Military Parade in Moscow?
Serbia’s connection with Russia operates on two mutually reinforcing levels. The first is the long-term spiritual and cultural influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which has historically positioned Serbia and the broader region within Russia’s orbit and continues to serve as a key channel for Russian soft power in the Western Balkans. The second level involves political elites who, on a medium-term horizon, deepen these ties further — often acting as “useful idiots” in service of the broader strategic goals of both the Serbian Church and the Russian state. Relying on the Serbian public’s deep-rooted cultural and historical affinity for Russia, these elites leverage the relationship for domestic political gains, fueling nationalist and anti-Western sentiment and solidifying electoral support. In doing so, short-term political opportunism is transformed into long-term geopolitical vulnerability, embedding Russian influence ever more deeply in Serbia’s political and societal landscape.
After 13 years of Vučić’s rule, the symbolic culmination of Russia’s influence in Belgrade was reflected in two key meetings held in Moscow — one between President Vladimir Putin and the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the other between Putin and Aleksandar Vučić, who also attended Russia’s military parade on 9 May. During these meetings, Russia’s strategic interests in the Western Balkans were reportedly discussed, accompanied by clear expressions of loyalty from the Serbian side. Patriarch Porfirije’s messages in Moscow reaffirmed the perception that Vladimir Putin’s Russia is viewed by the Serbian Church as a fundamental spiritual and political ally. His statements not only legitimise Serbia’s authoritarian drift but also fuel anti-Western mobilisation within Serbian society.
Through these declarations, Patriarch Porfirije has solidified the Church’s role as a long-term promoter of Russian influence in the Balkans. At the same time, Vučić has built upon this spiritual alignment between the Serbian and Russian Orthodox Churches by forging a political alliance with the Kremlin — a move that carries profound and far-reaching consequences for Serbia’s European future.
Despite knowing that both he and his government would pay a political and personal price for attending the 9 May parade in Moscow, Vučić went through with the visit. Why? The answer is simple — Vučić has calculated that the European Union is weak in the Western Balkans, while Washington, as previously demonstrated, shows little genuine interest in countering Russia’s growing presence in the region. As a result, Serbia’s official ‘four-pillar’ foreign policy — balancing Brussels, Washington, Moscow, and Beijing — has effectively become a three-pillar strategy, with Brussels falling out of the equation.
Vučić is well aware that he no longer holds the credibility in Brussels he once enjoyed just months ago, and he recognises that the EU will increasingly take a harder line against his government. Yet he has concluded that maintaining power for another term, or possibly two, depends more on the backing of Vladimir Putin, and Viktor Orbán than on EU support. Consequently, he is pulling Serbia deeper into Moscow’s embrace, no longer fearing EU reactions. In doing so, Serbia is entering a political trajectory reminiscent of Georgia — a deeply divided country that, through internal repression, corruption, and external support from Moscow, manages to maintain a slim governing majority.
In economic terms, Vučić is likely to shift Serbia’s reliance away from European investors and increasingly toward Chinese capital, aligning the country with Beijing’s strategic footprint in the region, while continuing to play the strategic card of rare natural resources found in Serbia and Republika Srpska — such as lithium — emboldened by the Trump administration’s demonstrated interest in critical minerals in Ukraine.
This rapprochement with Putin does not signal Vučić’s downfall — on the contrary, it represents a new beginning. His government will now pursue a more openly confrontational stance toward the European Union, while maintaining formal relations with a possible future Trump administration, Putin’s regime, and China. Though weakened by protests and ongoing political crises, Vučić is restructuring his regime to survive at any cost. In the long term, this will push Serbia further away from the EU integration process and weaken the EU’s influence in the Western Balkans. Such a Serbia will again pose a threat to peace and stability in the region, playing the role of the “Belarus of the Balkans” — or, as many analysts have noted, Serbia has consciously chosen to become a “Russian and Chinese aircraft carrier” in the Western Balkans.
The European Union and Anti-Regime Protests in Serbia
When the dust settles, it becomes evident that the West has suffered a defeat in Serbia — and to some extent, across the wider Western Balkans. This shift has further weakened the European Union’s standing in a strategically vital part of the continent. The return of Donald Trump to the U.S. political stage adds another layer of concern, raising fears that the West is losing influence even in its own geopolitical backyard. If this decline serves as a wake-up call for the European Union and the United Kingdom to re-engage meaningfully with the Balkans, it may turn out to be a costly but ultimately valuable lesson. Much now depends on the response of the European “troika”: Keir Starmer, Emmanuel Macron, and Germany’s newly elected Chancellor, Merc.
The political trajectory of Serbia will largely hinge on the support and pressure applied by the European Union. Any attempt to channel the momentum of the mass civic and student protests— already the largest demonstrations in Serbia’s recent history — will require sustained political and institutional backing from the EU. Student protests alone cannot produce systemic change, but they do open a window for internal awakening and a potential weakening of Russia’s proxies in the region, especially Aleksandar Vučić and Milorad Dodik.
Germany will play a particularly decisive role in the period ahead. The new chancellor’s stance on Serbia and Vučić’s increasingly pro-Russian regime could prove pivotal — not only in shielding Europe from further Russian expansion through the Western Balkans, but also in shaping the future of the EU’s enlargement policy. The outcome of this renewed European engagement will have ramifications well beyond the Balkans — it will reverberate in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, three additional front lines where European stability and credibility are being tested.
Altiero Spinelli’s warning feels more relevant than ever: “Europe will be saved only if it acts as one.” Serbia under Aleksandar Vučić can no longer be considered a pillar of stability in the Western Balkans, and the European Union must now decide how to respond to Putin’s most reliable proxy in the region. Regardless of the internal outcome of Serbia’s democratic struggle, the EU’s strategic focus must turn to the remaining five Western Balkan states that have expressed a clear commitment to continuing on the path to European integration. Encircling Serbia with successful democratic transitions and supporting the rest of the region’s EU aspirations may be the most effective course of action. Such a strategy would serve a dual purpose: on the one hand, bolstering pro-democratic forces within Serbia and curbing Russian influence; on the other, limiting both Russian and Chinese capacity to destabilise the region further.
Any alternative scenario would amount to Europe’s continued strategic retreat from its own continent — and in the long run, could call into question the very survival of the European project.
Balša Božović
Chair of the executive committee of the Regional Academy for Democratic Development (Serbia).
The articles published in the “Opinions” column reflect the personal opinion of the author and may not coincide with the position of the Center
