For several years now, the socio-political life of Serbia — one of the key states for stability and security in the Western Balkans, as well as a country with an extremely ambiguous geopolitical positioning — has been going through a rather turbulent and dramatic period. The country is regularly swept by large-scale protests, driven by students and youth, but which have brought together a fairly diverse public from many social strata and ideological backgrounds. At the same time, this is not always specifically a pro-European public. The main unifying factor for the protesters is the rejection of the figure of the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, who, together with his Serbian Progressive Party, has been heading the state for more than 12 years.
The trigger for the new surge of the protest movement was the death of 16 people on 1 November 2024 as a result of the collapse of the canopy of the railway station in Novi Sad. The protesters blamed the tragedy on a “corrupt government” both at the local and higher levels. In the summer of 2025, the scale of the protests in the capital reached alarming proportions for the authorities, and many observers began to predict a rapid political end for Aleksandar Vučić. However, he remains in power and has no intention of giving up. The scale of the protests, meanwhile, gradually began to decline. For their part, the Serbian president and his entourage consistently see a “foreign trace” in the protests, sometimes even openly “the hand of Zagreb” or the intelligence services of one or another “Western country.”
Among Vučić’s loyalists, it is customary to stigmatize the protesters as “traitors,” “Ustaše,” “foreign mercenaries,” or simply “thugs,” and in a softer version — “blockaders,” due to the demonstrators’ practice of blocking roads and transport junctions. The opposition, in turn, gave supporters of the authorities its own label — “ćaci.” The word originates from the graffiti “Ćaci u školu,” which appeared on 22 January 2025 at the entrance to one of the gymnasiums in Novi Sad. The intended phrase was “Đaci u školu” — “Students to school,” that is, a call to study instead of demonstrating, but the author mistakenly wrote “ćaci” instead of “đaci.” According to many observers in the region, the level of antagonism and everyday mutual hostility between supporters of the two political camps has now reached a fairly acute level.
At the beginning of April 2026, Vučić himself brought the issue of snap elections to the center of the political agenda. After consultations with representatives of parliamentary forces on 7 April, he stated that he would continue to “call for dialogue,” emphasized the need for at least minimal public trust in the electoral process, and also made it clear that the question of summer elections remains open: if the country moves toward a “major crisis,” they will not take place, and if the situation stabilizes, such an option is not excluded. This cautious but telling formula itself indicates that the topic of snap elections is for Vučić one of the main ways to manage the political crisis that has been ongoing in Serbia for more than a month. Earlier, the president announced consultations with political forces to overcome the crisis, but critics from the very beginning perceived these talks more as preparation for possible snap elections than as an attempt at real political dialogue. Against this background, the heterogeneous protest anti-government movement itself is already directly demanding snap parliamentary elections as soon as possible.
Thus, this discussion in Serbia is no longer technical in nature; it has become a way to respond at once to several crisis narratives: prolonged anti-government protests, declining trust in institutions, violence during local elections, increasing pressure on the media, and a general sense that the power structure is entering a phase of nervous self-defense. In such a situation, elections may appear as a way out. But they may also be something entirely different — an attempt by the regime to seize the initiative, shift the crisis into a familiar plebiscitary format, and once again force the country to play by rules defined by Vučić himself.
The immediate impetus for a new wave of discussion about snap elections was the local elections on 29 March in ten Serbian municipalities. Formally, the authorities presented them as confirmation of their strength: the Serbian Progressive Party declared victory in all ten communities. But it was precisely these elections that only intensified the crisis. Observers from the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe recorded violence, threats, and the appearance of masked individuals near polling stations. Independent Serbian observers from the civil organization CRTA spoke of organized manipulation, violations of the secrecy of the vote, and an overall atmosphere incompatible with democratic standards. After the vote, the EU also described reports of violence and irregularities as “unacceptable.” Thus, the local elections did not bring de-escalation. They only demonstrated gravity of the conflict between the authorities and that part of society which no longer believes in the fairness of the electoral process.
Accordingly, the voting results of 29 March, which were positive for President Vučić and his political force, provided grounds for two diametrically opposite conclusions. For the current Serbian authorities, this is an argument that even at a difficult moment they retain a strong electoral machine, institutional control, administrative resources, and therefore the ability to win. For critics of the regime, the conclusion is entirely different: the formal victory of the SNS conceals the erosion of real support and indicates serious tension and concern within Vučić’s circle. And it is precisely this duality that makes the decision on snap parliamentary elections so complicated. If Vučić is indeed convinced that the system is still sufficiently strong and controllable, elections may become a tool for strengthening the legitimacy of his rule. If, however, the ruling elite in Serbia sees that even managed voting no longer provides a sense of full dominance, then a hasty move toward elections becomes a risk — the risk of actually losing to their opponents and, for the first time in more than 12 years, losing power.
If one looks at the situation from Vučić’s perspective, the logic of restraint for now appears no less strong than the logic of offensive action. Yes, he has already opened the topic of snap elections and deliberately does not close it, but this does not mean that a decision has already been made. It is advantageous for the Serbian president to keep elections as an instrument of political pressure, without necessarily pressing the button immediately. It is no coincidence that Vučić is sometimes called a “master of managed chaos.” This is precisely his style: to turn the election date into part of presidential calculation, rather than an element of an ordinary democratic calendar. Therefore, the current consultations may be both preparation for a new vote and a way to gain time, test the weak points of opponents, and also check whether it is still possible to assemble a new government configuration without major risk to power.
Why might the regime hold off? Because protest energy in Serbia is high but has not yet been fully transformed into a unified electoral format. This is one of the main advantages of the authorities. The student movement, civic initiatives, and opposition parties currently converge on the main point — the need for snap parliamentary elections — but do not have a single leadership center, a common organizational machine, or an agreed way to enter the national level. The opposition conglomerate includes both clearly pro-European forces and politicians and activists who position themselves as more Russophile than Vučić himself. This is likely what the Serbian leader is counting on: for him, in essence, elections are beneficial only when dissatisfaction is already high but has not yet taken shape as a coherent political alternative with a strong leader. Regime in Serbia has traditionally been strong precisely when opponents are emotionally mobilized but organizationally fragmented. At present, Aleksandar Vučić does not have his own Zoran Đinđić on the other side of the political field — one of the leaders of the Bulldozer Revolution of October 2000, which overthrew the notorious Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milošević.
From this follow the three most realistic scenarios for this year.
The first is rapid snap parliamentary elections already before summer, conditionally speaking “before Vidovdan.” It is possible if the regime decides that the local victories of 29 March, the lack of a structured political wing of the protest movement, and the usual advantage in resources provide a sufficient window of opportunity.
The second is an autumn or late autumn scenario, which currently appears even more realistic: the authorities spend several more months trying to lower the protest temperature, stabilize ratings, and only then go to elections under more controlled conditions.
The third is postponing snap parliamentary elections at least until the end of 2026, if the regime center decides that a new vote only increases risks. The very fact that all three options are being discussed simultaneously in the public space is telling in itself.
There is also another factor that should not be underestimated — the external one. Western partners are reacting with increased nervousness to violence by the authorities, pressure on journalists, and the general deterioration of the democratic climate in Serbia. Western media write directly that Vučić’s consultations are perceived by the
opposition as meaningless, and that on the streets of Serbian cities it is no longer just about isolated security incidents, but in fact about a “spiral of violence” against opposition journalists. For Brussels, snap elections under current conditions — without serious improvement of media and institutional rules — may become not a way out of the crisis, but its legalization. And here another paradox arises: Aleksandar Vučić may use elections for internal stabilization of the regime, but at the same time further worsen Serbia’s international image as a country that is moving ever further away from European democratic standards. Not to mention that, despite Belgrade’s continued official rhetoric about the European path, Serbia remains one of the few European countries that has not joined sanctions against the Russian Federation and is trying to maintain regular bilateral relations with Moscow.
Thus, the most accurate answer to the question of the possibility of snap parliamentary elections in Serbia this year is that they are more than realistic, but are not yet inevitable. The topic of elections remains for President Vučić both a weapon and a risk at the same time. If the current Serbian ruling elite decides that the protest movement has not yet become a monolithic and organized political actor with strong leaders, and that control over the electoral machine is still sufficient, voting may be scheduled earlier than it now seems. If, however, Vučić and his entourage see that even local victories at the end of March have not restored a sense of full control, elections will be postponed again. That is why the main question now is not whether Serbia will go to snap parliamentary elections in 2026. The main question is when exactly President Vučić decides that the moment works in his favor, not against him. Finally, much will also depend on the broader geopolitical alignment and on possible “black swans” at the level of the European continent and beyond.
CWBS Analytical Group
