The main outcome of 2025 for the Western Balkan was a prevented deterioration of the security situation in the region. Although at the beginning of the year the forecasts were different and not always encouraging.
In conclusion, 2025 became a period of relative stability from the security point of view, but also a period of political turbulence, institutional crises, EU integration at different speeds, and geopolitical equilibristics.
Protests without a significant result
Protest activity in Serbia in 2025 was a direct consequence of the societal shock after the tragedy of 1 November 2024 in Novi Sad (the collapse of the station canopy, 16 dead). However, despite its high potential, the protest movement, whose core consists of students, did not lead to meaningful shifts. As of the end of 2025, those responsible for the tragedy have still not been identified and punished. Snap parliamentary elections have not been announced—although this was actively demanded by the protesters. Moreover, in the local elections that took place throughout 2025, the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) triumphed, which demonstrates the strength and influence of the current Serbian authorities, the weakness of the opposition, and the insufficient political influence of the protest movement.
The most significant outcome of the protests could be considered Jared Kushner’s, Donald Trump’s son-in-law, resignation to build a hotel complex on the site of the ruined buildings of the General Staff in Belgrade. The decision was made by Kushner’s company after large protest actions, as well as after the prosecution opened criminal cases against the lobbyists of this project in the government. However, it is obvious that this step was also significantly influenced by the overall deterioration of relations between Belgrade and Washington that occurred during 2025.
Downfall between many chairs
2025 can be considered the year of the collapse of Serbian multi-vector policy. The traditional attempts of Aleksandar Vučić to develop beneficial relations for the current Serbian authorities with all the international key actors—the EU, the United States, Russia—led to the directly opposite effect. At the end of 2025, Belgrade finds itself in an atmosphere of critical cooling of relations with all its most important partners.
The EU. At last, The European Union did not open Cluster 3 in the accession negotiations with Serbia. Several reasons are named for this decision, but the main ones are considered Serbia’s refusal to synchronize its foreign policy with the EU’s policy (that is, refusal to introduce sanctions against Russia) and the strengthening of authoritarian tendencies. Vučić’s hopes for the influence of friends and sympathizers of the Serbs in the EU did not come true. Serbia’s EU integration in fact remains on pause.
USA. Not only the formal, but also the actual introduction of sanctions against the company Naftna industrija Srbije, NIS due to the Russian majority owner (Gazprom Neft and other Russian companies) became a powerful blow not only to the energy sector, but also to Serbia’s economy as a whole.
Vučić strongly hoped that Trump’s coming to power and the project to develop the General Staff site by the company of Trump’s son-in-law would help him lobby Belgrade’s interests in Washington more effectively. But this bet failed.
Russia. Belgrade was unable to agree with Moscow on a new long-term preferential contract for the supply of Russian gas. The only thing Vučić managed (in particular, also at the cost of visiting Moscow on 9 May) was to extend the previous agreement, which after another extension will be valid until 31 March 2026. This, on the one hand, provided Serbia with cheap gas for the winter period; on the other hand, it placed the Serbian authorities in a state of being on a “probation period”.
Being under the threat of losing a preferential price for the key energy resource for the country’s economy, Vučić cannot make any decision that could even hypothetically displease the Kremlin. Foremost, this concerns the nationalization of NIS to stop the sanctions pressure and resume the company’s work, and the supply of Serbian-produced ammunition to those buyers who can (even theoretically) supply it to Ukraine.
Provocateurs for export
During 2025, many assessments and comments were made regarding Russia’s soft power in the Western Balkans. However, the most vivid illustration of Russia’s hybrid presence in the region is considered to be the placement of centers for training agents in Serbia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina to organize unrest in Moldova during elections in that country. It is claimed that it was Russian instructors who trained Moldovans to provoke clashes and violent protests.
The exposure of the network of these training centers became a reason behind claims that Moscow not only conducts hybrid operations in the region but also uses the Western Balkans as a logistical hub for destabilizing other European countries.
Tactical retreat
Bosnia and Herzegovina, contrary to many forecasts, managed to overcome the acute stage of the political crisis associated with a series of secessionist decisions adopted in Republika Srpska. Thanks to unprecedented international pressure, first and foremost from Washington, the anti-constitutional decisions of RS were de facto reversed.
Moreover, Milorad Dodik, the leader of this secessionist direction, formally stepped away from the leadership of Republika Srpska, effectively complying with the verdict of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina that banned him from holding public office. However, Dodik preserved his real influence over processes in RS: he remained the leader of the party ruling in RS, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD). In addition, a “Dodik’s man” was elected as the new President of RS.
Electoral epic
2025 in Kosovo became a year of institutional paralysis and an attempt to overcome the political crisis through elections.
After the parliamentary elections in February, Albin Kurti and his movement Vetëvendosje failed to obtain a majority in the new parliament. This led to months of unsuccessful attempts to elect the parliament’s leadership and start the full-fledged work of this body, and then to the failure of attempts to form a government. The outcome is new elections on 28 December. Vetëvendosje again does not have an absolute majority on its own, but they have more parliamentary seats and more chances to establish a stable governing coalition.
The Serbs of Kosovo in 2025 finally abandoned the idea of boycotting elections and, in general, participation in the work of state institutions. The largest Serbian party in Kosovo, overseen by Belgrade, the Serb List, took active part in all elections of 2025, which is meant to demonstrate the return not only of the Serbian community in Kosovo, but also of the Serbian authorities to the idea of demonstrating their readiness for dialogue on the Kosovo issue.
However, the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina mediated by the EU in 2025 demonstrated stagnation and lack of results.
At different speeds
The sphere where life was in full swing in 2025 is EU integration.
Montenegro consolidated its leading position, closing a full 6 negotiating chapters in a year. Podgorica’s goal—to join the EU in 2028—currently looks more realistic than ever. However, a whole range of still unresolved issues with neighboring Croatia somewhat spoils this optimistic mood.
Another “top student of EU integration” in 2025 was Albania. The country ends the year with all clusters opened in negotiations with the EU.
One cannot but acknowledge that this was achieved thanks to the persistence and commitment to the European idea of the Albanian leader Edi Rama. However, constant corruption scandals in the highest echelons of Albanian goverment remind us that Tirana still has a lot of work on the path to the EU.
But North Macedonia, which not long ago was moving toward the EU alongside Albania, in 2025 marked time. Bulgaria’s demands to amend the Constitution regarding the Bulgarian community remain relevant, but the current VMRO-DPMNE authorities are not going to fulfill this without clear guarantees of EU accession. No way out of this deadlock was found throughout 2025.
2026
The year 2026 must give answers to the questions posed by 2025.
Will Serbia be able to continue balancing between East and West?
Will Vučić remain in power? Will he finally turn into an authoritarian leader?
Will secessionist scenarios in Republika Srpska be repeated?
Will Podgorica reach an agreement with Zagreb, or will the heavy consequences of the war-torn 1990s block Montenegro’s path to the EU?
Will Sofia, Skopje, and Brussels be able to find a solution that unlocks North Macedonia’s EU integration?
How long will Albania’s EU-integration momentum last?
Can the Belgrade–Pristina dialogue mediated by the EU be considered a working instrument, or is it time to “send it into retirement”?
In general, what will be the role of Brussels, Washington, and Moscow in the region?
And, finally, to what extent will the development of the situation in the region ensure at least relative stability in the Western Balkans?
CWBS Analytical Group
