By all technical parameters, Montenegro leads the pack of candidates for European Union membership. The central party of the ruling coalition, formed by moderate leaders of the 2020 protest movement aligned with the Serbian Orthodox Church, has rebranded itself as staunchly pro-European. They named their fiscal reform program Europe Now, after which they later named their party.
The candidates of this party have, in the past two years, become the President and Prime Minister of Montenegro. Despite numerous scandals—one of which resulted in the party’s split and the expulsion of the newly elected Montenegrin President—the ruling political structure has managed to remain in power, primarily thanks to the support of pro-Russian Serbian ultra-nationalists from the former Democratic Front, now rebranded as the For the Future of Montenegrocoalition. This coalition is widely perceived as an extension of Vučić’s regime in Belgrade and frequently undermines the European achievements of the young technocratic team surrounding Prime Minister Spajić by insisting on divisive issues. Other members of the coalition include the minor clientelist party Democrats and minority parties representing Bosniaks and Albanians.
Despite numerous scandals and nationalist outbursts, the coalition has managed to maintain stability.
The latest major government crisis followed a mass shooting in Cetinje, in which 13 people, including children, were killed. This tragedy sparked protests against the incompetence of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is led by the Democrats—a party that has become synonymous with clientelism, incompetence, and irresponsible governance in Montenegro. The party currently oversees the security sector, which is frequently accused of negligence and of being compromised by Serbian and Russian intelligence influence.
Although Spajić presents himself as a pro-European centrist, his actions—and those of his closest associates—suggest otherwise. His flirtation with Serbian pro-Russian nationalists and church leaders, along with his strong support for Elon Musk’s policies and U.S. President Donald Trump, raise doubts about his true political alignment.
It is no secret that Spajić is a cryptocurrency enthusiast with close ties to international libertarian movements. Despite earlier promises of major reforms and cryptocurrency regulations aimed at making Montenegro a crypto haven, these initiatives are currently on hold.
Spajić’s popularity initially surged following an artificial wage increase, which bought the support of many citizens. However, this support has been waning, particularly due to inflation, which was partly triggered by his fiscal reforms. He has tried to maintain public favor by announcing large-scale investments in infrastructure. However, recent local elections in Podgorica and the economically and touristically significant town of Budva indicate a sharp decline in his party’s popularity. The upcoming elections in Nikšić, Montenegro’s second-largest and industrial center, further highlight his weakening influence, as the city is currently governed by an extreme Serbian nationalist from his coalition.
Spajić’s government faces significant challenges. The European agenda requires reforms that Spajić appears reluctant to implement. His resistance to aligning Montenegro with the EU’s visa policies suggests that he may soon feel emboldened to defy Brussels’ directives more openly.
Much will depend on the outcome of the war in Ukraine and broader geopolitical shifts, which are already causing major disruptions in transatlantic relations. Although Montenegro is a small country, it will have to choose a side and determine its path forward. In the event of a larger crisis, Spajić’s coalition could find itself in an even greater dilemma.
It is still too early to predict the approach of a second Trump administration toward the Balkans, but the well-known regional diplomat Richard Grenell is not widely seen as impartial or objective—especially if you ask people in Kosovo, Bosnia, or Montenegro’s opposition. The initial signals, at least on the social network X, suggest that Spajić and Grenell have a friendly relationship.
Besides the Serbian faction within Spajić’s party, there are also pro-European, civic-oriented members. Some analysts predict another split within the party, which has already lost Montenegrin President Jakov Milatović and former Justice Minister Andrej Milović.
Montenegro’s opposition remains largely disorganized and discredited due to past corruption scandals and ties to organized crime. Furthermore, the largest opposition party is still overshadowed by the influence of former Montenegrin President Milo Đukanović.
This weak opposition struggles to harness public dissatisfaction and fails to present a compelling alternative.
The greatest threats to the current government come from both internal and external pressures, which could prove overwhelming for Spajić’s fragile yet resilient administration.
If protests in Serbia subside and Vučić consolidates his power, Montenegro’s European trajectory could be sabotaged. Just as Putin has no interest in a prosperous, stable Ukraine, Vučić has no interest in a thriving, democratic Montenegro as an EU member state.
These tensions will have to be resolved somehow, and their resolution may come at the expense of either Spajić’s government or Montenegro’s European future.
The articles published in the “Opinions” column reflect the personal opinion of the author and may not coincide with the position of the Center
Ljubomir Filipović. Montenegrin political scientist
