President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić announced a mid-May visit to China. “In my professional life, this will certainly be the most important visit for the sake of the citizens of Serbia,” he stated.
Vučić’s statement demonstrates that, despite the recent complications in China’s relations with the European Union, the Chinese direction of foreign policy continues to remain a priority for Serbia.
However, partnership relations with Beijing are important not only for Belgrade, but also for Podgorica, Skopje, Banja Luka…
Against the backdrop of intensified efforts by the European Union to reduce Chinese influence, the significance of Beijing’s presence in the Western Balkans is becoming a factor not only of regional, but also of pan-European economics and politics.
- Visualization of influence
Chinese influence in the Western Balkans region has a solid visualization: highways, railways, bridges, energy facilities, large state contracts, and political obligations that inevitably arise around such projects. There are countries (Serbia) where interaction with China has gone even further, up to security cooperation.
The European Union — which the Western Balkan countries aspire to join — remains the undisputed leader in grant assistance: annual IPA grants amounted on average to around 0.8% of the region’s GDP, while Chinese grants accounted for only 0.02%. But in lending, the picture is different: the EU annually provided loans amounting to about 1.5% of the region’s GDP, while China provided 1.2%. In Serbia, the portfolio of Chinese loans has already exceeded the EU loan portfolio. Thus, in the sphere of loans and large contracting projects, the Chinese presence has proven to be far more tangible than is often imagined.
From the very beginning, Beijing placed its bet on projects that authorities can show voters as proof of “concrete results” and “development”: new highways, railway lines, bridges, modernization of transport corridors. This is where the main political strength of China in the Western Balkans lies — in large infrastructure solutions that produce a rapid visible effect, but are often accompanied by opaque conditions, weak oversight, and significant long-term risks.
- The Serbian case
Chinese influence is most visible in Serbia, which has long become the main political and economic showcase of China’s presence in the Western Balkans. The modernization of the Belgrade–Budapest railway corridor, new bridges, bypass roads, industrial and logistics projects involving Chinese state-owned companies have made Serbia the main regional platform for Beijing’s cooperation with the Balkans. But behind this showcase, another story is becoming increasingly visible — about the price of such a model. The disaster at the railway station in Novi Sad in November 2024 following the collapse of a concrete canopy, which occurred after reconstruction works within the broader Serbian-Chinese-Hungarian railway project, turned the infrastructure issue into a full-fledged political crisis. A major transport project that was supposed to symbolize modernization unexpectedly became a symbol of corruption risks, weak oversight, and the dangerous amalgamation of the state, business structures close to the authorities, and political propaganda. Moreover, this very incident triggered large-scale anti-government protests and undermined the rating of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić.
Another occasion to draw attention to this issue was the news from Budapest: after the defeat of Viktor Orbán’s party in the elections, an audit of investments in the joint railway modernization project with China from Belgrade to Budapest is intended. At the same time, Serbia itself continues an investigation into possible corruption during the modernization of the section leading to the Hungarian border. The case involves 14 suspects, including two former ministers, while budget losses are estimated at USD 115 million. According to the investigation, the Chinese consortium CRIC-CCCC may have been illegally provided with at least USD 18.7 million in benefits. However, the most painful negative consequence associated with this project was undoubtedly the tragedy at the Novi Sad railway station.
The story of the Belgrade–Budapest railway is important not only for Serbia and Hungary, but for the entire region as well: it clearly demonstrates how large Chinese infrastructure projects in the Western Balkans are increasingly becoming a source of political, financial, and reputational risks.
- The military aspect
It is also important that the Chinese presence in Serbia has long ceased to be limited to the economy in the narrow sense of the word. In recent years, Belgrade has been consistently purchasing Chinese weapons. In 2022, Serbia publicly displayed the FK-3 surface-to-air missile systems acquired from China, becoming the first European operator of this system. And in March 2026, Vučić confirmed the purchase of Chinese CM-400AKG air-launched missiles, which once again made Serbia a unique European user of Chinese precision-guided weapons. This is an important point: Serbian-Chinese ties in the Balkans are no longer limited only to highways, railway stations, or bridges, but are also entering the strategically sensitive military-technical sphere. This is precisely why the Serbian case differs from the rest of the region not only in the scale of economic cooperation with Beijing, but also in the depth of political trust toward it.
The new scandal surrounding the railway from Belgrade to Budapest only reinforced this trend. The fact that one of the most ambitious Chinese infrastructure symbols in the region is increasingly associated not with modernization, but with inspections, suspicions, budget losses, and questions regarding the contractual model, is indicative. But even more indicative is that even against the backdrop of such scandals, Serbia is not demonstrating readiness to radically reduce dependence on Chinese contractors. On the contrary, Chinese companies continue to receive large projects, while the cooperation model itself remains generally unchanged. This means that Chinese influence in Serbia should no longer be measured purely by the volume of new investments — what matters more is how deeply Chinese companies are already embedded in the state construction system and how strongly local elites have become accustomed to a format in which major infrastructure decisions are made under a regime of political exception rather than through a normal competitive procedure.
- Road hazard
Montenegro provides a different, but no less indicative example. Here, the Chinese presence has long been associated primarily with the Bar–Boljare motorway, whose first section — Smokovac–Mateševo — was opened in July 2022 and became one of the best-known stories in Europe about the risks of a “debt trap.” It was precisely the Montenegrin motorway that for a long time made the Western Balkans an example of how a major infrastructure ambition can turn into a source of debt and political vulnerability. But the story did not end there: in February 2026, Podgorica signed a contract with the Chinese consortium PowerChina–Stecol–PCCD for the construction of the next Mateševo–Andrijevica section worth EUR 693.9 million. This concerns a section approximately 23 km long, financed not only from the budget, but also with the participation of a EUR 200 million EBRD loan and an EU grant of EUR 150 million. This is a significant signal, because even after all the warnings regarding the first section, the Chinese contractor once again retained a key position in a strategic project.
The Montenegrin case clearly demonstrates the long cycle of Chinese influence. Initially, there is a large and politically advantageous project that local authorities frame as a historic breakthrough. Then questions arise about its cost, loan conditions, economic feasibility, environmental consequences, and the realism of the promised benefits. Next, Western partners help partially reduce financial risks, but this does not necessarily mean the displacement of the Chinese role. On the contrary, Chinese companies often remain the most important contractors for subsequent stages as well. As a result, China does not necessarily obtain direct political control, but it does obtain a long-term presence in strategic sectors and, most importantly, the inertia of dependence on its contractors.
- Road hazard-2
North Macedonia demonstrates another side of the problem. Here, the Chinese footprint is also primarily infrastructural, but the Chinese projects themselves are more associated with corruption scandals, delays, and growing budgets after the start of the project. The best-known example is the construction of the Kičevo–Ohrid motorway with the participation of Sinohydro. The project was delayed for years, became more expensive, and turned into one of the most toxic symbols of how “quick solutions” in infrastructure can result in political and institutional failure.
Construction, which began back in 2014, was accompanied by serious design errors: incorrectly mapped routes, unstable slopes, tunnels that required redesign, and more than 80 modifications during the course of the works. This caused a sharp increase in costs — from the initial EUR 374 million to more than EUR 600 million, and later to EUR 803 million, which the Parliament of North Macedonia officially approved in March 2026. The new completion deadline was moved to 31 May 2027.
The problems were not only technical. Sinohydro, which is implementing the project, was already on the World Bank’s list of debarred companies for corrupt practices at the moment it received the contract. This fueled suspicions regarding the terms of the agreement, the quality of state oversight, and political patronage. As a result, the Kičevo–Ohrid motorway became one of the clearest examples of how large Chinese infrastructure initiatives in the Balkans can create long-term financial, political, and institutional risks — even in countries where the scale of Chinese presence is smaller than in Serbia or Montenegro.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Chinese presence is not as concentrated as in Serbia or Montenegro, but the logic there is the same. In BiH, the Chinese footprint is particularly visible in energy and large infrastructure initiatives, which local elites often promoted as a saving alternative to slow and complex European mechanisms. And in Bosnia as well, Chinese projects regularly become not stories of rapid success, but rather those of delays, disputes, and problematic economic feasibility.
An indicative example is the construction project of Unit 7 of the Tuzla Thermal Power Plant, which the Federation of BiH agreed upon in 2017 with the Chinese company China Gezhouba Group and financing from the Chinese Exim Bank: despite political promises of a “strategic breakthrough,” the project became bogged down in legal disputes, EU criticism over state guarantees, delays, and effectively stalled after the Chinese contractor withdrew from contractual obligations in 2021. A similar dynamic is observed in Republika Srpska, where the construction of the Dabar Hydropower Plant, entrusted to China Energy Gezhouba Group, is progressing slowly due to permit delays, environmental disputes, and lack of transparency in procedures, which have repeatedly been acknowledged by both local authorities and European institutions. Another characteristic example is the Gacko 2 Thermal Power Plant project, which the government of Republika Srpska attempted to implement together with China Machinery Engineering Corporation in 2017–2018: despite loud statements about investments exceeding EUR 1 billion, the project never moved into the phase of actual construction due to the lack of agreed financing, doubts regarding economic feasibility, and contradiction with BiH’s climate obligations.
This once again underscores the main point: Beijing does not offer the region a new, higher-quality development model, but operates effectively in an environment where local governments need large visible projects without excessively strict conditions regarding transparency, competition, and standards.
- A challenge for the EU
Alongside infrastructure and military projects, Beijing is also building a softer version of its presence in the region — through education, language programs, and academic exchanges. Confucius Institutes operate in Belgrade, Novi Sad, and Niš; they offer language courses, prepare students for HSK exams, provide scholarship opportunities, and connect the study of the Chinese language with broader educational and professional prospects. Similar platforms exist in other countries of the region as well: in particular, a Confucius Institute operates at the University of Montenegro, and in Banja Luka — at the University of Banja Luka. This educational segment is, of course, not as influential as infrastructure contracts, but it helps Beijing create a more sustainable and socially acceptable presence in the region — especially where economic projects already provoke controversy.
The current moment is also important because China’s role in the region is entering a new phase. Whereas in the 2010s the focus was primarily on expansion, grand promises, and “projects of the future,” now the focus is increasingly on the legacy of agreements already made. In other words, China influences the Balkans not only through new investments, but also through the consequences of old ones: unfinished highways, more expensive railways, debt obligations, dependence on Chinese contractors, and the political habit of local governments returning to the same partners even after scandals.
Chinese influence in the Western Balkans should neither be exaggerated nor underestimated. China has not become a full-fledged geopolitical hegemon in the region and is clearly unable to compete with the EU as a political magnet or integration center of gravity. But that is not its goal either. Beijing’s strength in the region is more pragmatic. The Western Balkans may be viewed by Beijing as a kind of foothold in Europe, from which it is convenient to expand its influence across the continent, above all into EU countries. Moreover, the already established economic, financial, and infrastructural ties of the region with China will become part of the EU internal market after future enlargements. Reducing Chinese influence in Europe is impossible without reducing it in the Western Balkans. For the European Union, this means that the policy of containing Chinese influence cannot be limited to the internal market: it must also encompass the pre-accession space, where today the economic and institutional parameters of future enlargement are being formed. But under conditions where candidate countries (above all Serbia) are striving, on the contrary, to develop their relations with Beijing, Brussels’ task is a complex, multilayered challenge.
CWBS Analytical Group
