Elections as an unblocking mechanism or a reproduction of the political crisis in Kosovo? – Orhan M. Çeku

1. Introduction

The Central Election Commission of the Republic of Kosovo faces a short deadline to organize new early parliamentary elections, which mark the third electoral cycle within a period of approximately one and a half years. The early elections, which will be organized on April 7, came as a result of the political crisis over the election of the President of the Republic. Political parties in the Assembly of Kosovo failed to reach a political consensus on the appropriate name to be elected President of the country. In the absence of a sufficient quorum of 2/3 (80) of the deputies, the Assembly dissolved itself.

The election of the President in Kosovo has repeatedly served as a catalyst for institutional and political crises, reflecting not only tensions between political actors, but also the structural limitations of the constitutional system itself. Instead of functioning as a formal process of institutional stabilization, this procedure has often become a deadlock, producing institutional vacuums, contested constitutional interpretations and, in certain cases, even the dissolution of the Assembly and calls for new elections, as in the case of 28 April 2026. In this context, early parliamentary elections have been perceived as a legitimate mechanism for unblocking political crises, offering the opportunity to reconfigure the balance of power and create a functional majority. However, political experience in Kosovo suggests that elections do not always produce lasting institutional stability. On the contrary, in conditions of high party fragmentation and the absence of a culture of consensus, they can contribute to the reproduction of the same political configurations that generated the initial crisis.

This article aims to critically analyze the role of elections as a potential instrument for unblocking political crises in Kosovo, while examining their structural limitations and potential effects on the reproduction of institutional deadlock. Drawing on an interdisciplinary approach that combines constitutional analysis with a political science perspective, the article addresses the question of whether elections represent a real solution to the crisis of the Presidential election, or whether they function more as a cyclical mechanism that pushes and reproduces the crisis in new forms.

In this context, a theoretical framework on institutional crises is initially presented with an analysis of constitutional provisions and institutional practice in Kosovo, then an analytical look at political blockades; continuing with the analysis of the fragmentation of the political scene and the logic of party competition; to possible political scenarios and their implications for institutional stability and the democratic functioning of the state; as well as possible constitutional changes for the election of the President in Kosovo.

The main question being asked: Are elections a means of unblocking or a mechanism that reproduces the crisis?

The main hypothesis that arises is: Do elections, in the absence of structural reforms and culture of compromise, tend to reproduce the crisis?

2. Recurring crises surrounding the election of the President in Kosovo

The repeated crises surrounding the election of the President in Kosovo constitute one of the most visible symptoms of institutional instability and fragmentation of the political scene. In a parliamentary system where the President is elected by the Assembly, this process requires not only the fulfillment of formal constitutional criteria, but above all a certain level of political consensus between the parliamentary forces. It is precisely the lack of this consensus that has transformed the election of the President into a critical moment, often blocking the normal functioning of the institutions.

The election of the President of the Republic of Kosovo constitutes one of the most consensual procedures provided for by the Constitution, requiring not only a qualified majority of votes, but also a high parliamentary quorum. The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court has emphasized that these requirements are not formal, but substantial, in order to guarantee the democratic legitimacy and unifying role of the President. The Constitutional Court’s decision of 2011, on the sufficient quorum for the procedure of electing the President, has created political crises in several cases.

The first crisis that Kosovo faced was the election of businessman Behxhet Pacolli as president in 2011.            

The Constitution of Kosovo stipulates that the election of the President is carried out by two-thirds (2/3 which is equal to 80 deputies out of 120 in the Assembly) of the votes of all deputies of the Assembly. If no candidate receives a two-thirds (2/3) majority in the first two ballots, a third ballot is organized between the two candidates (if more than 2 candidates have been nominated) who received the highest number of votes in the second ballot and the candidate who receives a majority of the votes of all deputies (61 votes) is elected President of the Republic of Kosovo. If in the third ballot, no candidate is elected President of the Republic of Kosovo, the Assembly is dissolved and new elections are announced, which must be held within forty-five (45) days (Article 86 of the Constitution). The election procedure with a simple majority of 61 votes seems simple, but in reality, it presents practical difficulties to reach the quorum to start the procedure of electing the president. The Constitutional Court, with its judgment No. ref.: AGJ 107/1, 30.03.2011, has declared the election of Mr. Behxhet Pacolli as president of the country unconstitutional. According to this judgment, the presence of 2/3 of the deputies of the Assembly of Kosovo on the occasion of the election of the President of the Republic is a necessary condition in all rounds. The lack of a quorum makes the process unconstitutional, regardless of the voting result. In the political dimension, the crises surrounding the election of the President are closely linked to the fragmented structure of the party system. The lack of a stable parliamentary majority and the polarization between the main actors create conditions where any process that requires inter-party cooperation becomes potentially conflictual. Taking into account the provisions of the Constitution and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, a broad political consensus in the country is required for the election of the President.

Following the Constitutional Court decision in 2011, parliamentary political parties, under pressure from the US Embassy, ​​particularly His Excellency Ambassador Christopher Dell, reached a consensus on the election of Ms. Atifete Jahjaga as President of Kosovo. Ms. Jahjaga successfully completed her full mandate (2011-2016). In 2016, following a coalition between the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) (the two largest parties at the time), following a process opposed by the then opposition led by the Vetevendosje Movement (LVV), the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) and the Social Democratic Initiative, Hashim Thaqi, the leader of the PDK, was elected President of the Republic of Kosovo. Following Thaqi’s resignation from the position of President (following the indictment by the Specialist Chambers in The Hague)) In 2020, initially as Acting President based on constitutional provisions – ex officio, Ms. Vjosa Osmani, who held the position of Speaker of the Assembly of Kosovo, took office. After the 2021 elections, with political consensus of the parliamentary parties in the Assembly of Kosovo, Ms. Vjosa Osmani was elected President of the country. Ms. Osmani completed her constitutional mandate on April 4, 2026. The political parties in the country failed to reach a political consensus on the name of the candidate to be voted for president and early parliamentary elections will be organized on June 7. The political crisis that led to early elections was produced as a result of the insistence of the winning party, the Vetevendoje Movement (LVV). LVV and its leader Albin Kurti insisted on the legitimate right for the President to be elected with their proposal. Albin Kurti offered co-government to the opposition parties LDK and PDK. LDK was offered the position of Deputy Prime Minister and four ministries. Later, the position of Speaker of the Assembly was also offered to LDK, but both offers were rejected by Lumir Abdixhiku, Chairman of LDK. LDK rejected the offers, arguing that LVV aimed to maintain control over all three institutions (Government, Parliament and Presidency) and that the offers were frivolous. Clashes continued until the expiration of the constitutional term (April 28, 2026), plunging the country into crisis and heading towards elections. Prime Minister and LVV leader Albin Kurti also presented an offer of co-government to PDK. Mr. Kurti offered the position of Speaker of the Assembly, proposing a “roll call” where the acting president, Albulena Haxhiu, would vacate the seat (the position of Speaker of the Assembly) to a PDK representative, such as Bedri Hamza or Vlora Çitaku. Bedri Hamza and the PDK demanded that the offer be written and official, while later rejecting it, describing it as a political maneuver.

The invitations to the opposition parties by Mr. Kurti proved to be political maneuvers and which were not sincere to elect the President of the country and to avoid early elections. This was reinforced when Prime Minister Kurti, one day before the expiration of the constitutional term, proposed two other names for President: Ms. Feride Rushiti and Ms. Hatixhe Hoxha. Both figures proposed by Kurti turned out to be close to the LVV. By proposing candidates who are members of the LVV, or close to Prime Minister Kurti, the LVV made it clear that it does not want a consensual and politically impartial president. The proposals it made to the opposition political parties for an agreement turned out to be agreements for other positions and not for the post of president. So, Prime Minister Kurti made it clear that the President should be a figure from the LVV and controllable by him. This became even clearer when Prime Minister Kurti refused to propose Ms. Vjosa Osmani for President. After disagreements with the then LDK leadership, Ms. Osmani formed the “Guxo” initiative and competed on a joint list with the Vetëvendosje Movement in the February 2021 elections. The joint list LVV+Guxo won the elections with more than 50% and new institutions were created by these two political forces. Ms. Osmani was elected President, while Mr. Kurti was elected Prime Minister of Kosovo. The Kurti – Osmani binomial generally functioned well with minor differences, but President Osmani’s international authority apparently hindered Prime Minister Kurti. The situation of dissatisfaction culminated with President Trump’s invitation to Ms. Osmani to join the Gaza Peace Board.

The major rift or definitive breakdown of relations between President Vjosa Osmani and Prime Minister Albin Kurti came as a result of disagreements over power and support for a second presidential term, with divisive voices that have intensified significantly during 2026. This rift created the Presidential crisis and the country will head to the ballot boxes on June 7.

The recurring crises surrounding the election of the President in Kosovo cannot be understood simply as failures of the political moment, but as a reflection of a deeper structural problem—the combination of a constitutional architecture that requires consensus with a political reality characterized by the polarization of the political elite and the lack of compromise. Without addressing this gap between norm and practice, such crises are expected to remain a constant part of the country’s institutional life.

 3. Theoretical framework – Institutional crisis and political blockade

In parliamentary systems, the effective functioning of institutions depends on the ability of political actors to build functional majorities and achieve institutional compromise. In situations where political parties fail to produce minimal agreements on key state issues, what is known in political theory as “institutional deadlock” is created. This phenomenon implies the inability of institutions to exercise their constitutional functions due to political conflict, parliamentary fragmentation, or lack of consensus among relevant actors.

In the context of Kosovo, the process of electing the President has repeatedly produced such deadlock situations. Since the President is elected by the Assembly and requires certain parliamentary majorities, any coalition crisis or political polarization is directly reflected in the institutional functionality. In this way, the election of the President is transformed from a constitutional procedure into an instrument of political negotiation and inter-party pressure.

Parliamentary systems characterized by high party fragmentation are particularly vulnerable to institutional crises. In these systems, no political entity manages to secure clear parliamentary dominance, necessitating the creation of often fragile and heterogeneous coalitions. The greater the political fragmentation, the more difficult it becomes to reach consensus on issues that require a qualified majority or cross-party cooperation.

According to Arend Lijphart, pluralistic and fragmented societies require consensual models of democracy, based on compromise, power-sharing, and broad political inclusion. In the absence of such a consensual culture, parliamentary systems risk producing instability and persistent institutional gridlock.

One of the most important distinctions in democratic theory is that between the formal legitimacy and the functional legitimacy of political institutions.

Formal legitimacy is related to the procedural and legal compliance of power with democratic rules, primarily through free and constitutional elections. In this sense, elections represent the basic mechanism for the production of political authority and the democratic transfer of power.

However, the existence of formal legitimacy does not necessarily guarantee institutional functionality. Functional legitimacy implies the real ability of institutions to govern, to make decisions and to guarantee political and legal stability. A political system can be completely legitimate from a procedural point of view, but at the same time dysfunctional due to political blockages and the lack of capacity for effective decision-making.

In this context, Juan Linz argues that political crises often arise not only from a lack of formal legitimacy, but also from the weakening of institutional effectiveness and the loss of the system’s capacity to produce political stability. For this reason, parliamentary democracies require not only legitimate electoral procedures, but also functional mechanisms of cooperation between political actors.

Democratic elections are considered the fundamental mechanism of political legitimacy in democratic systems. Through them, citizens delegate political authority and determine institutional representatives. In periods of political crisis, early elections are often presented as an instrument for institutional unblocking and restoring democratic legitimacy. However, elections do not necessarily produce political stability. In fragmented and polarized systems, they can function as a “double-edged sword”: on the one hand, they create new political legitimacy; while on the other, they can deepen existing divisions and reproduce the same parliamentary configurations that caused the initial crisis.

In the case of Kosovo, early elections have often been used as a mechanism to break out of institutional deadlock. However, political experience has shown that, in the absence of substantial changes in political relations or a culture of compromise, they have often produced new cycles of instability and institutional crises. This was clearly seen during the last year, when two parliamentary elections were organized and a third is expected to be organized within a year and a half. In this way, elections can serve both as a democratic legitimizing instrument and as a factor in the reproduction of political polarization. This finding is also related to the political approach of the leader of  Self-Determination Movement (Lëvizja Vetëvendosje) and Prime Minister Albin Kurti, who has often been perceived as leaning towards centralization of power and greater institutional control. The political narrative built against the opposition, presented as responsible for the corruption accumulated over the years and for the disputed agreements with Serbia, has enabled Kurti to gain considerable support in public opinion. This support has been reflected particularly among a part of the electorate and by the Albanian diaspora in Western countries, who have perceived his discourse as an alternative to the traditional political elites.

4. Fragmentation of the political scene and the logic of party competition

The political scene in Kosovo has been characterized for years by a high level of political fragmentation and polarization between the main parliamentary entities. Although the recent elections have produced a dominant entity in relation to the others, the overall parliamentary structure continues to remain divided and dependent on coalition dynamics, tactical support, and short-term political calculations. In such an environment, processes that require institutional consensus—such as the election of the President—often become instruments of political rivalry rather than democratic cooperation.

The logic of political party functioning in fragmented systems is dominated mainly by electoral calculation. Instead of aiming for institutional compromise, political parties often aim to maximize electoral gains and preserve political capital in front of their electorate. As a result, compromise can be perceived as political weakness, while confrontational positions can be perceived as an instrument for electoral mobilization and consolidation of party support. Such an approach is also reflected in the political strategy of Albin Kurti and LVV, whose political discourse has been built largely on polarizing with the opposition and presenting themselves as an alternative to traditional political elites. In this context, maintaining a confrontational narrative towards the opposition has served not only as a mechanism of political differentiation, but also as an instrument for mobilizing the electorate and strengthening the political legitimacy of the government. As a result, institutional compromise is often perceived as potentially costly in electoral terms, especially in a political environment where anti-establishment rhetoric and polarization continue to generate considerable public support.

In this context, the lack of incentives for compromise appears as one of the main factors of institutional blockages in Kosovo. When political parties assess that new elections can bring them greater political benefits than reaching an agreement, then the interest in unblocking the institutions is replaced by the strategy of electoral calculation. As a result, state institutions often become part of a tactical game for political dominance, rather than functional mechanisms of democratic governance. An important dimension of this situation is also related to the leadership crisis within the traditional opposition parties, especially Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). The lack of a consolidated leadership and a clear political vision has limited the capacity of these entities to build convincing governing alternatives and to exercise an effective opposition role. Instead of a long-term strategy for institutional stability and restoring public trust, the opposition has often focused on tactical calculations and political opposition of the moment, making it even more difficult to create a climate of institutional cooperation. In this way, the weakness of the opposition leadership has contributed not only to the fragmentation of the political scene, but also to the continuation of the logic of polarization and institutional blockade. This dynamic is also reflected in the case of Ramush Haradinaj and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), where although the political entity has had relatively limited electoral support, in some political processes it has managed to play a decisive role in the formation of governments. The fact that Haradinaj has served as Prime Minister twice with a relatively low percentage of the national vote illustrates the fragmented nature of the political system in Kosovo and the disproportionate importance that smaller parties can have in coalition configurations. In this way, the process of institution-building is often determined not only by electoral weight, but also by the ability for political negotiation and strategic positioning within parliamentary coalitions.

Another important dimension is related to the relationship between the ruling party and the opposition. In functional parliamentary systems, the opposition plays a supervisory and alternative governing role, while contributing to the maintenance of institutional stability. However, in polarized political contexts, the ruling party–opposition relationship often shifts from democratic competition to ongoing political antagonism. In such cases, even issues of state importance are treated through the logic of short-term political gain.

It is here that the fundamental question about the functionality of the political system in Kosovo arises: do political actors have a real interest in unblocking institutions and democratic stability, or are political crises used as a mechanism for accumulating political and electoral capital? The answer to this question is crucial to understanding whether early elections represent a real solution to the crisis or just its reproduction in a new political form.

5. Possible scenarios for exiting the crisis

The institutional crisis surrounding the election of the President in Kosovo may produce several possible political and institutional scenarios, which depend on parliamentary reports, the behavior of political actors and the willingness to compromise. In this context, early elections are often presented as the main alternative for unblocking the situation, although the political experience in Kosovo shows that they do not necessarily guarantee long-term institutional stability.

Scenario 1: Elections as an unblocking mechanism

One of the most likely scenarios for exiting the crisis is the organization of new parliamentary elections, in the hope that they will produce a more stable political configuration and a functional parliamentary majority. In theory, early elections serve as a democratic mechanism for renewing political legitimacy and reconfiguring the balance of power between political parties.

This scenario works mainly in cases where elections produce: 1.) A clearer parliamentary majority (if the LVV receives more than 51.1%); 2.) Coalitions between political parties; 3.) The LVV receives the same percentage of votes, i.e. 51.1%.

The first option – which is aimed at by LVV and Prime Minister Kurti – is to increase the number of votes won, i.e. more than 51.1% (as it received in the elections of December 28, 2026) to 55-57%, which would translate into 62-63 MPs. This scenario would politically eliminate a part of the political leaders and the opposition parties would have no other alternative than to vote for the President proposed by LVV.

The second option – the most likely scenario is that LVV wins 42% and wins 47 seats in the Kosovo Assembly out of 120. In this scenario, LVV is forced to form a coalition with one of the opposition parties and will accept the President’s negotiation. Under these circumstances, the possibility of institutional blockade is reduced and the capacity of institutions for effective decision-making, including the election of the President, is increased.

The third possibility – the elections produce results similar to the existing political configuration, then the crisis risks reproducing itself in a new form. In fragmented systems like Kosovo’s, elections may change the numerical ratios, but not necessarily the political culture of confrontation and lack of compromise. For this reason, early elections may turn from an unblocking instrument into a mechanism for repeating the institutional crisis.

Scenario 2: Repetition of the political crisis

Another realistic scenario is the continuation of the same political logic after the elections. If the political structure remains fragmented and parties continue to operate on the basis of electoral calculation and political polarization, then there is a risk that the elections will not produce real solutions, but only a “formal reset” of the institutions.

In this case:

• new institutions are created,
• but the same conflictual relationship between political actors is maintained,
• producing a convulsion similar to the previous one.

This phenomenon is characteristic of systems where elections are used more as a tactical instrument for political reconfirmation than as a mechanism for building institutional consensus. As a result, the crisis is not resolved in substance, but is only temporarily postponed until the next political deadlock.

In the case of Kosovo, the political experience of recent years has shown that frequent parliamentary elections have not eliminated institutional instability, but in some cases have contributed to the deepening of political polarization and inter-party rivalry.

Scenario 3: Solution outside of elections

Another alternative for exiting the crisis is to reach a political agreement without going to new elections. This scenario is based on the logic of institutional compromise and cooperation between the ruling and opposition parties to preserve state stability.

Such a solution could include:

• political agreement between parliamentary parties,
• support for a consensual candidate for President,
• or agreement on a minimum institutional agenda.

In theory, this is the most rational scenario from an institutional stability perspective, as it avoids the political and financial costs of new elections and guarantees institutional continuity. However, its realization requires a high level of political trust and a willingness to compromise—elements that have often been lacking in Kosovo’s political scene.

In this context, the role of international factors, which have historically exerted influence on political and institutional processes in Kosovo, cannot be ruled out. In situations of deep crisis, international diplomatic pressure can serve as an additional factor in reaching political agreements and avoiding institutional blockade.

6. Constitutional changes and the election of the President in Kosovo

The repeated crises surrounding the election of the President in Kosovo have continuously stimulated political and academic debates on the need for constitutional reforms regarding the manner of electing the head of state. The current constitutional model provides for the election of the President by the Assembly, through qualified majorities in the first rounds and simple majority in the third round, provided that a quorum of 2/3 of the deputies is reached in the first two votes. However, political practice has shown that this mechanism has often become a source of institutional blockades and political crises.

The issue of how to elect the President in Kosovo has been constantly discussed, especially after the repeated institutional crises that have accompanied this process. The debate has mainly focused on two alternatives: maintaining the current parliamentary model with procedural reforms, or moving to direct elections by the people.

Proposals for constitutional reforms

After the political crisis of 2011 and the election of Atifete Jahjaga, the possibility of constitutional amendments to reform the institution of the President was seriously discussed, with the aim of avoiding parliamentary blockades and the crisis of political negotiations within the Assembly. One of the main proposals concerned:

The election of the President directly by the citizens.

After the Constitutional Court of Kosovo declared the election of Behgjet Pacolli unconstitutional in 2011, Kosovo faced a deep institutional and political crisis. In order to avoid new elections and to stabilize the situation, political parties reached a political agreement, which led to the election of Ms. Atifete Jahjaga as a consensual and non-partisan figure. As part of this agreement, the reform of the method of electing the President was also foreseen through constitutional amendments, with the aim that in the future the President would be elected directly by the citizens.

Following the political agreement, a constitutional reform commission was established, which prepared draft constitutional amendments. Among the main proposals were:

• The transition from parliamentary elections to direct elections of the President,
• Limiting the mandate of President Jahjaga, in order for the reform to enter into force more quickly and for new presidential elections to be organized according to the new model.

In practice, this meant that President Jahjaga’s mandate would not end according to the constitutional term for which she was elected by the Assembly.

On 23 March 2012, the request with the proposed amendments was submitted to the Constitutional Court for assessment. The request for assessment of the constitutionality of the constitutional amendments is based on the mandatory provisions foreseen in the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. The Constitution of Kosovo expressly provides that constitutional amendments must be sent in advance to the Constitutional Court of Kosovo for constitutional review before being adopted by the Assembly, namely Article 144, point 3:“Amendments to this Constitution may be adopted by the Assembly only after the President of the Assembly of Kosovo has referred the proposed amendment to the Constitutional Court for a prior assessment that the proposed amendment does not diminish any of the rights and freedoms set forth in Chapter II of this Constitution.”

On 20 July 2012, the Constitutional Court issued a judgment (KO29/12 and KO48/12) analyzing these amendments. The Court considered that some of the proposed amendments to direct popular elections should have undergone strict evaluation procedures in order not to violate fundamental constitutional principles. The Court, after examining the proposed amendments, found that they were contrary to the spirit and fundamental principles of the Constitution, in particular:

• The principle of legal certainty,
• The principle of constitutional legitimacy, and
• The protection of constitutional rights and guarantees provided for in Chapter II (Fundamental Rights and Freedoms) of the Constitution.

The Court argued that: The President was constitutionally elected for a specific term, and the retroactive termination or limitation of her term through constitutional amendments violated constitutional stability and the principle of the rule of law. The Constitutional Court defended constitutional principles and fundamental rights and freedoms. It emphasized that constitutional amendments cannot be used to violate constitutional positions legitimately acquired under the existing legal order. The Court indicated that the power to amend the Constitution is not absolute, but is limited by fundamental constitutional principles. The CC decision also affirmed that:

“Constitutional institutions and mandates cannot be arbitrarily changed for momentary political interests.”

This was one of the most important cases where the Constitutional Court of Kosovo acted as a guarantor of constitutional order and limited the political majority in constitutional amendments.

On March 5, 2026, at the very end of the constitutional mandate, President Mrs. Vjosa Osmani submitted to the Assembly the constitutional amendments for the direct election of the President by the people. These amendments were not a new draft, but rather brought back into the procedure the proposals prepared by the Commission for the Amendment of the Constitution in 2011, after the crisis of the election of Behgjet Pacolli and the political agreement that had brought about the election of Atifete Jahjaga. Osmani’s request came at a tense political moment, when political parties were not reaching a consensus on the election of the new President and there was a real risk of the dissolution of the Assembly and the holding of new parliamentary elections. In her public statement, Osmani argued that the successive failures in the election of the President by the Assembly had proven the limitations of the current parliamentary model and that direct citizen legitimacy could avoid repeated political blockades. Her political message was summed up in the formulation: “Let the people speak.” From a political perspective, Osmani’s initiative was interpreted in several dimensions. Its supporters considered it an attempt to: strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the President, avoid ongoing parliamentary crises, and institutionally stabilize the country.

Meanwhile, critics argued that the initiative also had a personal political dimension, given that it was presented at the end of the presidential mandate and at a time when there was a lack of sufficient political support for her re-election by the Assembly. In this regard, the debate was not only about the constitutional reform, but also about the political motives and timing of its initiation and the real political and constitutional possibilities for change. Legal experts and political analysts criticized Ms. Osmani’s approach to the proposal for constitutional amendments. Constitutional changes require social-political cohesion and strict constitutional procedure.

1: Arguments in favor of direct election

Supporters of direct elections argue that direct elections would separate the institution of the President from narrow coalition calculations and parliamentary political bargaining. Direct Election of the President:

• The president would have stronger democratic legitimacy;
• the possibility of parliamentary blockades would be reduced;
• institutions would gain greater stability;
• citizens would have a more active role in selecting the head of state.

2: Arguments against

On the other hand, opponents of this model argue that direct elections can produce: a conflict of legitimacy between the President and the Prime Minister; a tendency towards presidentialization of the system; institutional tensions in a system that constitutionally remains parliamentary.

In this regard, many constitutional lawyers have assessed that the direct election of the President would require: not only a change in the method of election, but also a redefinition of the constitutional powers of the President, in order to preserve the institutional balance of powers.

3: Is change possible in the future?

From a legal perspective, the Constitution of Kosovo allows for constitutional amendment, but the procedure requires: a qualified majority in the Assembly (2/3 of the deputies), including the votes of deputies from non-majority communities.

This makes the process politically complex and dependent on broad parliamentary consensus. For this reason, although the idea of ​​direct election of the President continues to periodically return to public debates, its realization remains difficult without a broad political agreement between the main parties and non-majority communities. However, if institutional crises surrounding the election of the President continue to recur, pressure for constitutional reform may gradually increase. In such a situation, direct election of the President may return as a serious alternative to avoid parliamentary blockades and to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the institution of the President.

7. Competition between political parties for the June 7, 2026 elections in Kosovo

The early parliamentary elections of June 7, 2026 represent one of the most unusual political processes in Kosovo’s post-independence history. They take place after the Assembly’s failure to elect a new President, resulting in the automatic dissolution of the Assembly and the country entering another electoral cycle within a relatively short period of time.

These elections are not just a classic race for parliamentary power, but a political referendum on:

• the institutional functionality of the state,
• the leadership of Albin Kurti,
• and the ability of the political system to produce stability.

The presidential election crisis has transformed the campaign from a programmatic debate into a debate on: political legitimacy, the culture of compromise, and responsibility for the institutional blockade. In this respect, the June 7 elections are also a test for the parliamentary model of political functioning in Kosovo.

The dominant position of Self-Determination Movement and Albin Kurti’s strategy

The dominant political entity remains the LVV led by Albin Kurti, which enters the elections with the advantage of: the governing position, the most organized political structure, and the dominance of the public narrative. According to current poll trends, LVV continues to remain the convincingly largest political force in the country. Kurti’s political strategy continues to be based on several pillars: anti-establishment rhetoric, discourse against the old political elites, the fight against corruption, and state sovereignty in relation to Serbia. Kurti is trying to present the presidential crisis not as a failure of the government, but as a result of: the opposition’s blockage, and its lack of readiness for institutional compromise. A very important element is that LVV is entering the elections with the aim of: securing a more stable parliamentary majority, which would allow it not only to more easily form institutions, but also greater control over constitutional and institutional processes.

The opposition crisis: PDK and LDK

One of the main characteristics of this race is the relative weakness of the opposition in the face of the political dominance of the LVV.

The PDK remains the largest numerical opposition, but faces: a lack of a new political narrative, difficulty distancing itself from its past governing, and a lack of mobilizing the electorate beyond its traditional base. Although Bedri Hamza is perceived as a more pragmatic and technocratic figure, the party has yet to build enough momentum to seriously challenge Kurti. The PDK has failed to demonstrate the political strength it once had under founder and leader Hashim Thaqi. His absence has fragmented the party and fueled rivalries between the old guard and new arrivals to the party.

LDK continues the identity and organizational crisis of recent years. Although Lumir Abdixhiku has attempted to modernize the political discourse, the party has not yet managed to: bring back the traditional electorate, nor to present itself as a strong governing alternative.

If the scenario of Vjosa Osmani being the carrier of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) list fully materializes, this potentially significantly changes the dynamics of the political competition for the elections of June 7, 2026. Recent reports indicate that there is a political agreement within the LDK that Osmani will have a central role on the electoral list, while Lumir Abdixhiku will remain the candidate for prime minister. If Osmani becomes the main face of the LDK campaign, the elections could transform from a classic party competition into a political duel between the two most popular figures in Kosovo, and this would produce strong personalization of the campaign and new political polarization. Osmani’s return to LDK represents an attempt to reconsolidate the traditional Rugova electorate, bring back disappointed voters, and recover the losses that the party suffered after her departure in 2020. It should be remembered and not forgotten that the LDK’s greatest electoral crisis began precisely after the internal conflict with Osmani and her departure from the party. For this reason, her return has much greater symbolism than just an electoral candidacy, it is presented as an attempt to “reunify” the traditional center-right electorate. Osmani, as the bearer of the LDK list, inevitably brought discontent to some important LDK figures. It remains to be seen how the electorate will reflect in the elections.

AAK’s (Alliance’s) position and the role of smaller parties

Ramush Haradinaj and AAK (Alliance) remain potential coalition partners, despite their more limited electoral support. Political experience in Kosovo has shown that smaller parties can play a disproportionate role in forming governments, especially in situations where no single party achieves a sufficient parliamentary majority. Haradinaj continues to build his political profile on security issues, relations with international allies, particularly the United States, and experience as a leader of the executive. However, AAK (Alliance)’s potential to influence institution-building will depend largely on the overall LVV result and the opposition’s ability to coordinate post-election.

8. Conclusion

The presidential election crisis in Kosovo has proven that the country’s institutional problems stem not only from constitutional provisions, but also from the way political actors interpret and use them in the service of their political and electoral calculations. In theory, early parliamentary elections represent a legitimate democratic mechanism for unblocking political crises and renewing institutional legitimacy. However, political experience in Kosovo shows that elections, although necessary in certain situations, are not always sufficient to guarantee institutional stability and democratic functionality.

In a political system characterized by party fragmentation, political polarization and the absence of a culture of compromise, elections have often produced only a temporary reconfiguration of political relations, without eliminating the structural causes of the crisis. As a result, they have functioned both as an unblocking mechanism and as an instrument for reproducing institutional deadlock. This is precisely where the paradox of the political system in Kosovo lies: democratic procedures exist and are formally respected, but the lack of a minimum political consensus limits the ability of institutions to produce long-term stability.

The ongoing debates on reforming the way the President is elected, including the idea of ​​direct election by citizens, show that there is political and institutional awareness for changing the current model. However, any constitutional reform will be insufficient if it is not accompanied by a change in political culture and the creation of a more consensual approach to the functioning of state institutions. Otherwise, even new constitutional models risk being instrumentalized by the same logics of political rivalry and electoral calculation.

Consequently, institutional stability in Kosovo cannot be built solely on procedural mechanisms or frequent parliamentary elections, but on the ability of the political class to build institutional trust, democratic compromise, and state accountability. Without these elements, political crises will continue to emerge cyclically, regardless of the constitutional formula for the election of the President. In this sense, the crisis of the election of the President does not represent a deviation from the functioning of the political system in Kosovo, but a reflection of the limitations and contradictions of the current model of institutional functioning itself.

The articles published in the “Opinions” column reflect the personal opinion of the author and may not coincide with the position of the Center