Western Balkans Overview Jan 26, 2026 – CWBS

Western Balkans Overview Jan 26, 2026 – CWBS
  • Truck drivers blocked border crossings in four Western Balkan countries

Truck drivers from Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina began mass blockades of border crossings for freight transport on January 26. The trigger for the protest was the introduction of the new monitoring system for entering and leaving the European Union (EES), but the main dissatisfaction of the protesters is related to the application to truck drivers of the same Schengen stay rules as those applied to tourists.

According to the rules, drivers from non-EU countries are allowed to stay in the Schengen Area for no more than 90 days within any 180-day period. Transport associations from the four countries of the region claim that such a length of stay in the Schengen Area is insufficient for the work of professional drivers.

The participants in the blockade are demanding that their governments urgently negotiate with Brussels on excluding truck drivers from the general Schengen restriction system, granting them a special status similar to that enjoyed by railway and air transport workers, as well as those employed in the maritime sector.

European Commission spokesperson Markus Lammert stated that the Commission is aware of the concerns expressed by truck drivers from the Western Balkans, is closely monitoring the situation, and is maintaining contact with partners in the region. “This is an issue that has our close attention, that we are working on and considering,” Lammert said.

  • Montenegro closed another chapter in negotiations with the EU

At an Intergovernmental Conference with the European Union in Brussels on January 26, Montenegro provisionally closed negotiating Chapter 32, which concerns financial control. This is the 13th closed chapter out of a total of 33.

Chapter 32 – Financial Control concerns the implementation of internationally recognized standards in the fields of public internal financial control, external audit, and EU best practices, as well as their application across the entire public sector, including fiscal discipline and transparency in the use of national and European funds. The closure of this chapter means that the candidate country has a functional and reliable system of public finance control and the capacity to protect national and future European Union financial resources.

After the closure of Chapter 32 in Brussels, European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos stated that Montenegro still has a great deal of work ahead, primarily in the area of the rule of law, and that the European Commission is ready to help the country close all chapters by the end of the year. “This is an ambitious goal, but I believe it is possible,” Marta Kos said.

Completing accession negotiations by the end of this year means that Montenegro’s goal of becoming the 28th EU member by 2028 is entirely realistic. Experts note that Montenegro’s progress on its path toward the EU directly affects the entire Western Balkans region, as it demonstrates that the enlargement policy is still credible and that reform efforts can indeed lead to tangible results.

  • Hungary’s MOL to pay €1 billion for a controlling stake in NIS

Hungary’s MOL will pay around €1 billion for a controlling stake (56.16%) in Serbia’s Oil Industry (Naftna industrija Srbije, NIS) to its current Russian owners (Gazprom Neft and Gazprom). “As far as I understand, the (price) was between €900 million and €1 billion for 56% of the shares,” Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić said on Blic TV.

According to Vučić, the Serbian side had expressed readiness to buy NIS shares for a higher amount—at least €2 billion—but such a deal was not concluded. He refrained from a detailed analysis of the reasons for this decision, noting that disclosing the motives of the Russian side could harm Serbia’s interests. At the same time, the president made it clear that such a move by Moscow was unexpected for Belgrade in the context of bilateral relations. “Such an approach can hardly be called entirely friendly,” Vučić concluded.

Meanwhile, it became known that the buyer of NIS will not be MOL alone, but a consortium that, in addition to MOL, will include ADNOC (UAE). It is envisaged that the Hungarian company will be the majority and controlling owner of NIS, while the partner from the United Arab Emirates will be a minority shareholder.

The purchase agreement for NIS shares, which is under U.S. sanctions due to its Russian owners, must be approved by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Earlier, OFAC granted time until March 24 for Russian companies to exit the NIS shareholder structure.

  • Electoral scandal in Kosovo

The electoral process in Kosovo has found itself at the center of an unprecedented scandal following the discovery of large-scale falsification of voting results. Even a month after the December 28 elections, the Central Election Commission continued a full recount of ballots, while law-enforcement authorities reported mass detentions of those involved in electoral manipulation.

The CEC decided to recount the votes after spot checks revealed significant discrepancies. The process showed that manipulation occurred mainly within party lists: members of election commissions transferred votes from one candidate to another in order to artificially secure parliamentary seats for certain individuals.

The loudest scandal occurred in Prizren.

On January 23, the Basic Prosecution Office of Prizren announced the detention of 109 persons suspected of vote manipulation. Among them were members of election commissions from four major parties: the Self-Determination Movement (Lëvizja Vetëvendosje, LVV), the Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokratike e Kosovës — PDK), the Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës — LDK), and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës — AAK). On January 25, the court ordered one month of detention for the first group of 23 suspects (22 election commission members and one observer).

Irregularities were also recorded in other cities.

CEC representatives note that although the recount is unlikely to radically change the percentage distribution among parties, it will significantly alter the personal composition of the future Kosovo parliament by removing those who attempted to secure seats through manipulation.

The large-scale recount of votes and the violations uncovered have significantly delayed the official announcement of the results of the elections held on December 28, 2025, and, accordingly, the start of work of the new parliament and the formation of a new government.