At first glance, Montenegro appears to be one of the European Union’s most reliable partners in the Western Balkans regarding Russia. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Podgorica has consistently aligned its foreign policy with the EU’s restrictive measures, introduced visa restrictions, supported sanctions packages, and maintained a clear pro-Western diplomatic position. The country has remained almost fully aligned with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, reinforcing the perception that Russian influence has been significantly curtailed.
Beneath this formal alignment, however, the picture is considerably more complex. Implementation has proven more uneven than policy declarations suggest. Questions surrounding the seizure of assets belonging to sanctioned Russian oligarchs, the prevention of sophisticated money-laundering schemes, and the dismantling of financial networks connected to Russian capital remain unresolved. Previous investigations have demonstrated how Russian money entered Montenegro through offshore structures, real estate, and luxury assets, illustrating that financial influence often survives political sanctions.
The more significant challenge, however, lies in the political domain. Following the controversial replacement of the leadership of the National Security Agency (ANB) in 2022, Montenegro has undertaken few publicly visible counterintelligence operations specifically targeting Russian malign influence. While security institutions have concentrated on organized crime and corruption, there has been relatively limited public evidence of systematic efforts to identify, expose, and dismantle Russian political influence networks.
This relative absence of visible activity should not be interpreted as evidence that Russian influence has diminished. Rather, Moscow appears to have adapted its strategy. During the previous decade, Russian activities relied heavily on overt disinformation, anti-NATO mobilization, and direct attempts to influence elections. Those methods became increasingly costly following Montenegro’s NATO accession and especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Instead of abandoning its objectives, Russia has gradually shifted toward a more institutionalized model of influence.
Consistent with the Black Knight framework, bolstering remains the dominant Russian strategy, but its implementation has evolved. Rather than primarily spreading anti-Western narratives, Moscow increasingly relies on strengthening domestic political actors already embedded within Montenegro’s institutions. Parties such as Nova srpska demokratija (NSD), together with other elements of the former Democratic Front ecosystem and sympathetic political partners, continue to represent the principal channels through which Russian strategic interests can be advanced. The objective is no longer simply to obstruct Euro-Atlantic integration from outside, but to shape political decision-making from within democratic institutions.
This reflects an important strategic recalibration. Russia increasingly recognizes that preventing Montenegro’s accession to the European Union may no longer be realistic. Instead, the more advantageous outcome is for Montenegro to enter the EU while retaining political actors capable of promoting positions compatible with Russian interests. In that respect, Montenegro resembles a long-term investment rather than a lost geopolitical battleground. The goal is the emergence of another member state that could complicate European consensus on sanctions, foreign policy, enlargement, or relations with Moscow – similar to the disruptive roles often associated with Hungary and, at times, Slovakia.
Coordination therefore becomes as important as bolstering. Russian influence increasingly depends on maintaining cooperation among political parties, media networks, religious structures, and civil society actors that share overlapping ideological preferences. Instead of constant information warfare, influence is exercised through coalition-building, institutional appointments, legislative bargaining, and gradual normalization of pro-Russian positions within mainstream politics. This approach is less visible than traditional propaganda but potentially more durable because it becomes embedded in the institutions of democratic governance themselves.
As Montenegro approaches the final phase of its EU accession process, Russian strategy is therefore likely to prioritize institutional resilience over public confrontation. The central question is no longer whether Montenegro will join the European Union, but what kind of member state it will become once it does. From Moscow’s perspective, the optimal outcome is not a country outside Europe, but a country inside Europe capable of reinforcing divisions within the Union and quietly advancing Russian geopolitical interests from within.
Danilo Kalezic. Montenegrin political scientist
The articles published in the “Opinions” column reflect the personal opinion of the author and may not coincide with the position of the Center
