Russia is not unknown in the Balkans, but its growing influence remains a worrying element for those countries that aspire to democratic reforms and accession to the EU and NATO. This becomes particularly visible in the case of Serbia and Montenegro, because it coincides with the rise of authoritarianism, as in the case of Serbia, and the decline of the democratic effect in Montenegro. Moreover, the last decade of Russian involvement in the Balkans has shown that external influence on democratization is an important part of understanding the reasons why there are stagnations and setbacks in the democratization process. In this thesis, the experiences of Montenegro and Serbia were studied and the effects of Russian action in each of them were presented. The overall effects of these activities continue to be detrimental to democratic performance, causing instability and the consolidation of authoritarianism.
Additionally, Russia managed to stop and seriously undermine efforts towards democratization with various strategies. Going through the stages of external influence, two strategies were applied depending on the state of the political system and the regime in power. Montenegro is faced with increasing institutional and political pressures, an increase in political violence and street riots, a strategy of opposition to the pro-Western regime and long-term destabilization of the country, while Serbia has experienced the opposite trend. The ruling authoritarian regime in Serbia benefited from Russian stabilization actions, which helped the regime to consolidate and maintain its power. As a result, the country’s democratic performance gradually declined, and in less than 10 years, Serbia became a competitive authoritarian state. Overall, Russian political involvement was not the only reason for the decline in democratic performance in these countries, but it was the main cause and factor that will continue to undermine democratization efforts.
However, Russian engagement in the Balkans is not always proactive. This significantly depends on the policies implemented by the EU and the US. In this constellation of forces, Russia often adjusts the intensity of its actions, but its actual strategies remain relatively stable. Russia always steps up its activities when the EU and the US show disinterest in the region or withdraw strategically, as was the case with the US in Obama’s first term. This pattern is noteworthy, because the main promoters of democracy in the region have actually been the EU, through enlargement policy, and the US, but through what? Based on empirical evidence and their effects on democratic performance, Russia has generally sought to target electoral processes and the overall division of power as the most sensitive to external pressures. Moreover, both cases show that internal actors are easily instrumentalized to represent Russian interests, thus becoming the main focus for the implementation of foreign interference. In fact, the composition of internal factors and their unique connections, mostly ideologically motivated, are key to understanding the success of Russian efforts to oppose democratization. At the same time, the effects of EU and US efforts in promoting democratization, compared to Russian efforts, remain a topic that requires further research. Given the limitations of this thesis, additional study is needed to understand the full scope of these two opposing forces. However, there is no doubt that Russia has so far successfully opposed democratization, and has even distanced Montenegro and Serbia from the possibility of catching up with other Central and Eastern European countries with a similar communist past.
Russia’s increasing engagement in the Balkans, however, may also have positive unintended consequences, encouraging a renewed interest of the West in the region, which may accelerate the process of democratization. In the current international arena, the new model of relations between Russia and the Balkans is based on the assumption that Kremlin will use significant resources to strategically undermine democratic tendencies in the region. In contrast to the post-Soviet era, Russia tends to use ideological tools to justify and conceptualize its actions. Relying on the history of Pan-Slavism and Eastern Orthodoxy has proven to be a successful strategy for penetrating Balkan societies. Recent events, triggered by the invasion of Ukraine, are likely to have a strong impact on Russian activities in the Balkans, but the main direction of activities remains unchanged.
An examination of the “black knight” concept in relation to Russian interference in these Balkan countries shows that there is a legitimate reason for concern, since there is evidence of interference in democratic processes. These countries have been targeted by attacks, including cyberattacks, to gather information that can be used to destabilize their democratic processes. Russia benefits from this, making it easier for it to enter these territories to reclaim lands it considers Russian. The Balkan regression towards ethnic conflicts and similar tensions is encouraged by external actors whose motives are clear. This thesis shows that Russia is indeed using similar mechanisms to stabilize authoritarian regimes, as Western countries once used to promote democracy. However, the mechanisms used to destabilize the regime follow a different logic and are dominantly aimed at strengthening and coordinating opposition structures and undermining confidence in the democratic process. It is no surprise that Russian involvement in the Western Balkans has adverse effects on democracy in the region. However, it is still not clear which segments of the democratic process are most under attack and therefore most vulnerable to foreign interference.
Danilo Kalezic, Montenegrin political scientist
The articles published in the “Opinions” column reflect the personal opinion of the author and may not coincide with the position of the Center
