On 25 September, The Wall Street Journal published a major investigation into the activities of U.S. Ambassador to Greece Kimberly Guilfoyle. One of the main figures in the article was a man who regularly accompanied her at official and unofficial events in Greece and other countries of Southeastern Europe.
His name is Christos Marafatsos
According to the WSJ, he was present at Guilfoyle’s meetings with politicians, government officials and businesspeople, maintained subsequent contacts with the people she had met, and in some cases effectively continued negotiations on her behalf. Some of the people who met with the ambassador perceived Marafatsos as an official of the U.S. administration or an embassy employee.
In fact, he holds no official position. Marafatsos is a private individual, an American businessman of Greek origin and a registered lobbyist. One of his clients became the Greek AKTOR Group, which has a direct interest in expanding supplies of U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Southeastern Europe. The WSJ reports that AKTOR paid Marafatsos for work related, among other things, to contacts with the U.S. executive branch.
Kimberly Guilfoyle herself is also not a career American diplomat. Before being appointed ambassador, she worked as a prosecutor and Fox News television presenter, became one of the prominent media figures of MAGA, and spent many years in Donald Trump’s close political circle. She was engaged to Donald Trump Jr. The Wall Street Journal describes her work as ambassador as an example of a new diplomacy in which celebrity, business and geopolitics intermingle.
Personal connections, media visibility and direct access to the president’s political circle are an important part of Guilfoyle’s political capital. In such an environment, Marafatsos could appear to the people she met as another informal representative of the American side. His actual status became significant after it emerged that he represents a private company that could profit from projects actively promoted by the ambassador. The interaction between Guilfoyle, Marafatsos and AKTOR forms the central line of the WSJ investigation.
A Lobbyist at the Negotiating Table
According to the newspaper, Guilfoyle actively promoted U.S. LNG in Southeastern Europe, while her diplomatic activity repeatedly intersected with AKTOR’s interests. The WSJ describes trips and meetings at which Marafatsos and AKTOR chief Alexandros Exarchou (Αλέξανδρος Εξάρχου) were alongside the ambassador. The newspaper also links this activity to future contracts for supplies of U.S. LNG through structures involving AKTOR.
AKTOR denies receiving improper advantages. Guilfoyle’s representatives emphasise that she promotes U.S. government policy and works with more than one company.
Support by American diplomacy for U.S. gas exports is not in itself unusual. Any major power helps its own businesses enter foreign markets. In Guilfoyle’s case, the question arose for another reason: a private lobbyist for a specific company gained access to negotiations from whose outcome that company could profit.
Former U.S. diplomat Robin Brooks, who served in the U.S. Foreign Service and worked on the Balkans and Central Europe at the U.S. National Security Council, called the promotion of a foreign private company by a U.S. ambassador problematic. According to her, the presence of a registered lobbyist at such meetings raises the question of whether it is the U.S. government’s interests or private interests that are being advanced there.
The Guilfoyle-Marafatsos case is not an exception but part of a broader model. The second Trump administration is much more willing than the traditional American diplomatic system to use personal connections and people from the president’s business circle. Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff have become the most prominent examples of this model. For Trump, personal trust, direct access and the ability to make deals have great value.
Guilfoyle fits quite naturally into this political culture. She herself is a political appointee, and her connection to the presidential circle is part of her actual influence. The appearance of an informal adviser alongside her does not look out of place within this system.
The problem with Marafatsos lies elsewhere. He was simultaneously an informal figure close to the ambassador and a registered representative of a private company with a direct financial interest in the gas deals promoted by the American side.
The Vertical Corridor: A New Map of Dependencies
To understand why this story goes beyond a personal scandal, it is necessary to look at what exactly the ambassador was promoting. The Vertical Gas Corridor has become an important instrument of U.S. energy policy in the region. It is formed by gas transmission system operators from countries in Southeastern, Central and Eastern Europe. The corridor links LNG terminals, cross-border interconnectors, national gas networks and reverse-flow capacities through which gas from Greece can move northward through the Balkans.
Initially, the core of this system consisted of Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary; Moldova, Ukraine and Slovakia later joined it, followed in September 2026 by Serbia and North Macedonia. North Macedonia’s operator NOMAGAS explicitly described this as joining an initiative that connects the gas transmission systems of Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine, Moldova and Serbia.
Greece serves as the southern gateway to this system. LNG arrives by sea at Greek terminals, enters the gas transmission network after regasification, and from there moves north through Bulgaria and Romania.
The main commodity that the United States currently wants to move along this route is U.S. LNG. In recent years, the United States has sharply increased its production and exports and needs large, stable markets. Southeastern and Central Europe are almost ideal for this: there is already substantial demand for gas, Russia is being politically pushed out of the market, and the necessary transport system is gradually being completed.
The Balkan press describes the extension of the Vertical Corridor to Serbia and North Macedonia as bringing the initiative directly into the Western Balkans and, at the same time, as a test for U.S. LNG: whether strong U.S. political support can be converted into stable and competitive gas flows from Greece northward.
Washington’s commercial interest is obvious, but the significance of the corridor goes far beyond that. Long-term energy dependence creates a political link between supplier and consumer. The greater the share of a critical resource that a country receives from a single source, the more it is forced to take that supplier’s interests into account in its own foreign policy.
Soviet and later Russian influence in Western Europe rested on the same mechanism for decades. Moscow understood this from the very beginning: decisions by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1969 concerning gas supplies to the West show that the gas pipeline to Western Europe was viewed primarily as a mechanism of long-term control over Western governments. Cheap gas provided Russia with more than export revenues. It created industrial and political groups interested in stable relations with Moscow, tied countries to specific infrastructure and increased the political cost of conflict with the supplier.
The promotion of U.S. LNG operates according to the same basic logic of dependence, although the United States and Russia use it in different political systems and by different methods. The larger the share of the Balkan energy market occupied by U.S. supplies, the stronger Washington’s political influence over consumer countries becomes.
The struggle for the Vertical Corridor goes far beyond competition between gas companies. It determines around which centre of power the Balkans’ new energy dependencies will form.
Russia Is Being Pushed Out, Not Defeated
Russia is not leaving the European gas market voluntarily. It is being systematically pushed out.
Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Union began systematically reducing its dependence on Russian energy resources. Sanctions, new regulatory decisions, the closure of individual routes, LNG terminals, new interconnectors and alternative suppliers sharply reduced Russia’s share.
According to Reuters calculations based on data from the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG), Russian pipeline gas exports to Europe fell by another 44% in 2025, to their lowest level since the 1970s. Moscow, meanwhile, continues to declare its readiness to resume large-scale supplies if political conditions change.
Russia lost a substantial part of the European gas market not as a result of ordinary price competition. The West made a political decision to reduce its dependence on Moscow and began restructuring the energy system accordingly.
The United States and Europe acted in the same direction on this issue. But once Russia is pushed out, their interests cease to coincide completely.
Between Two Dependencies
Washington wants to take over the market that Moscow is losing. This gives American companies long-term contracts, the American economy export revenues, and the American state additional leverage over countries that become dependent on its energy resources.
Western Europe faces a different problem. It also wants to eliminate its critical dependence on Russia, but it is not interested in simply replacing it with dependence on the United States. The problem is that it has no real choice.
This is no longer a theoretical concern. In 2025, the United States supplied 58% of all LNG imports into the European Union. European Commission Executive Vice-President Teresa Ribera publicly warned in January 2026 about growing dependence on U.S. LNG and called for broader diversification.
The European model envisages several sources at the same time: Norway, the United States, Azerbaijan, North Africa, Qatar, renewable energy and other options.
The problem lies in scale. Norway faces physical limits on production. Azerbaijan is not capable of quickly replacing the volumes previously supplied by Russia. North Africa has its own political and infrastructure risks. Qatari LNG depends on the security of routes through the Strait of Hormuz, which remains one of the world’s key energy chokepoints.
Europe is entering a period of intense competition with Asia for LNG. The Financial Times writes of growing global competition for liquefied gas ahead of winter, high prices and pressure on buyers, who are increasingly seeking long-term contracts.
Western Europe has found itself between two dependencies. It is deliberately dismantling the Russian one. It does not want the American one to become excessive. There is not yet an adequate third pillar.
“We Can Do That Here Too”: The Romanian Episode
This contradiction manifested itself most sharply in the story involving Romania. According to The Wall Street Journal, at a dinner in Athens in March attended by Greek and American officials, Guilfoyle argued with Greek Energy Minister Stavros Papastavrou (Σταύρος Παπασταύρου). The conversation concerned the anticipated fall of the Romanian government.
“We can do that to any country we want. We can do that here.”
That, according to a participant in the dinner and people to whom the conversation was recounted, was how Guilfoyle described the possibility of American influence in bringing down governments. Papastavrou, according to the WSJ’s account, replied that the United States could not replace Greece’s government, which had been elected by the Greeks. The Greeks understood this as a threat of a coup. Guilfoyle’s lawyer disputed that characterisation of the conversation.
The Financial Times later confirmed that the discussion was specifically about Romania. According to an FT source, Guilfoyle spoke about this on 18 March at an official dinner at the U.S. Embassy in Athens attended by politicians, embassy staff and military personnel. The FT also writes that Guilfoyle subsequently travelled to Bucharest to promote a gas route from Greece through Bulgaria and Romania to Ukraine.
Romanian outlet HotNews placed this story in a separate political context. The publication writes that in Bucharest Guilfoyle met with representatives of Romania’s Social Democratic Party, including Sorin Grindeanu and then-Energy Minister Bogdan Ivan.
Bogdan Ivan himself publicly rejected any connection between these discussions and the fall of Ilie Bolojan’s government. He said that talks with the American side concerned the Vertical Corridor and energy cooperation, and that he had asked the government to give him a written mandate to continue discussions on the transit of U.S. LNG through Romania. According to him, he had not received such a mandate by the time of his resignation.
For Romania, which has its own gas resources, participation in the route is not the same as automatic willingness to purchase large additional volumes of U.S. LNG. The corridor gives it an infrastructure role, transit status and additional flexibility. Long-term purchase commitments create a different level of dependence.
The Bulgarian episode, recounted by HotNews with reference to the WSJ and Novinite, adds another link: it involved pressure on Sofia to buy U.S. LNG through a Greek company. Bulgaria is the key country on the route after Greece, so the dispute over purchases directly concerns the functioning of the entire corridor.
These details change the scale of the scandal. This is not merely about a careless remark by the ambassador or the presence of a private lobbyist alongside her. It is about how political support for infrastructure turns into a dispute over who will buy American gas, through whom, and in what volumes. And it is precisely such contradictions that give Russia an opportunity to return.
Moscow’s Bet — A Split in the West
As already noted, Russian gas influence has never been limited to the sale of an energy resource. For Russia, the main task is not simply to preserve residual sales. Moscow has to change the political conditions under which the West decided to abandon Russian gas. Divisions within the West itself create the best opportunity for this.
If U.S. LNG becomes too expensive, if European politicians begin talking about excessive dependence on Washington, if long-term American contracts are perceived as an instrument of political control, the argument for returning to cheaper Russian gas gains new life. That is why it is important for Russia to preserve political footholds in countries where relations with Moscow still enjoy substantial support.
Serbia remains one such centre. Russian companies still own a controlling stake in NIS, the company that owns Serbia’s only operating oil refinery and supplies a substantial share of its fuel market. The United States is applying sanctions pressure in an effort to force Russian owners out of NIS as part of a broader policy of reducing Russia’s energy revenues, which finance the war against Ukraine.
Serbian foreign policy, meanwhile, has traditionally balanced between the EU, the United States, Russia and China. Serbia’s accession to the Vertical Corridor has much greater political significance than merely the appearance of another route. Russian gas ceases to be the only option, and with it the political leverage also weakens.
On 4 September, Serbia and North Macedonia formally joined the group of countries whose operators are jointly developing the Vertical Gas Corridor. This meant that the system had extended directly into the Western Balkans. Twenty-one days later, The Wall Street Journal published its investigation into Guilfoyle, Marafatsos, AKTOR and the promotion of U.S. LNG.
The main strategic beneficiary of this publication is Russia. The Vertical Corridor strikes at one of the principal sources of Russian power in the region — the absence of alternatives in energy supply. The scandal surrounding the U.S. ambassador makes it possible to change perceptions of the project itself.
A narrative convenient for the Kremlin already exists in the Russian information space: the Vertical Corridor is presented not as freeing Europe from Russian dependence, but as an attempt by the United States to take over its allies’ energy market. This does not make the Russian description true. But the scandal surrounding Guilfoyle fits easily into it: instead of a story about liberation from Russian energy dependence, another emerges — American gas, American political influence, private companies, lobbyists, personal connections and control over new routes.
For Russia, such a framing is advantageous because it shifts attention from the issue of Russian energy dependence to the issue of American influence. The Vertical Corridor ceases to look like a diversification route and begins to be presented as a mechanism of new control. And this framing maps neatly onto the real contradiction between the United States and Western Europe.
Following the WSJ and FT reports, Moscow can tailor this narrative to different audiences. It does not need fabrications — real disagreements over prices, contracts, private intermediaries, LNG routes and political pressure are enough.
Europeans can be told: the United States is not so much freeing you from Russian gas as shifting you into American energy dependence; Washington used the war to hook you on U.S. LNG.
Serbs: the Americans simply want to replace Russian control with their own.
Politicians who advocate restoring cooperation with Moscow: Russian gas is cheaper, the pipelines already exist, and returning to it would make it possible to avoid dependence on the United States.
A Struggle for Power, Not Cubic Metres
Gas wars are often described in the language of prices, tariffs, contracts and investment. That is exactly how they are explained to voters: through heating bills, electricity prices, jobs and industrial competitiveness. At the level of state strategy, the issue is different: who controls the critical resource, the route and dependence on the supplier.
Russia — and before it, the Soviet Union — defended its gas presence in Europe for decades. The United States is actively promoting its own LNG. Western Europe is trying to diversify and avoid moving from dependence on Moscow to dependence on Washington. The Vertical Gas Corridor is one of the principal arenas of this struggle in the Balkans.
The United States and Europe are jointly pushing Russia out of the energy market. After that, Washington seeks to turn a substantial share of the new market into an American sphere of supply and influence. Europeans, meanwhile, are trying to limit both dependencies and build a more complex system involving several suppliers. Russia, by contrast, seeks to break this unity, preserve political footholds and wait for the moment when Western contradictions once again make Russian gas acceptable.
The scandal surrounding Kimberly Guilfoyle is much bigger than the story of one ambassador, one lobbyist or one Greek company. It is clear that it has become one of the symptoms of a hidden struggle at a moment when it is being decided who, after Russia is pushed out, will control the Balkans’ energy dependencies.
CWBS Analytical Group
