The Berlin Process in the Era of Trump’s Return – Balsa Bozovic

Image 1: Six Western Balkan States

Context

Since 2011, Serbia has accelerated the adoption of documents and policies shaping its regional approach. The “Serbian World” project, reminiscent of Russia’s “Russkiy Mir,” revives the Serbian question in the Western Balkans by asserting that all Serbs in the region, regardless of where they live, should be united under a single political umbrella. The ultimate aim is to create favorable international conditions that might allow Serbia to redraw its borders.

2011: Adoption of the Strategy on the Diaspora and Serbs in the Region

• Serbia adopted the Strategy for Preserving and Strengthening Relations with the Diaspora and Serbs in the Region, emphasizing the goal of “preserving and strengthening Serbian identity” among Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. Widely interpreted as “Memorandum II,” this strategy updates earlier national strategies.

2013: The Introduction of the Term “Serbian World”

• The term “Serbian World” entered public discourse as a rebranding of earlier concepts of territorial unification of Serbs, modeled after Russia’s “Russkiy Mir.” This initiative incorporates both political and cultural dimensions to extend Serbian influence.

2019: Adoption of the Charter on the Serbian Cultural Space

• The Charter on the Serbian Cultural Space was signed by the ministers of culture of Serbia and Republika Srpska, affirming “cultural cohesion” among Serbs in the region. This move bolstered the strategic goal of unifying all Serbs within a shared cultural framework.

2020: Adoption of Serbia’s National Security Strategy

• Serbia’s National Security Strategy prioritized preserving Republika Srpska as a key foreign policy objective, further emphasizing Serbia’s commitment to maintaining influence among Serbs in the region.

2022: Link to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

• Russia’s aggression against Ukraine underscored similarities in rhetoric and tactics between Russian and Serbian narratives about territorial aspirations. The “Serbian World” concept strengthened Serbia’s ties to Russian influence, with Serbia being the only European country that did not impose sanctions on Russia.

2024: Declaration of the All-Serb Assembly

• The Declaration on the Protection of National and Political Rights and the Joint Future of the Serbian Peoplewas adopted on June 8, 2024, during the All-Serb Assembly in Belgrade. This document comprises 49 points covering various aspects of the national, cultural, and political life of the Serbian people.

The Berlin Process: Background and Retrospective

The Berlin Process was launched in 2014 as an initiative by then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel, at a time when European integration of the Western Balkans had stalled, and support for EU enlargement was waning within the Union itself. The process aimed to strengthen regional cooperation, enhance economic stability, and align the Western Balkans with European standards, ultimately creating conditions conducive to eventual EU membership.

However, an often-overlooked geopolitical dimension sheds light on the political backdrop of the Berlin Process—it was initiated in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

Merkel, as the architect of the Berlin Process, envisioned it as a tool to foster stronger ties among Western Balkan nations through joint projects in infrastructure, education, employment, and reconciliation. These elements were deemed essential for achieving lasting stability in the region. Additionally, the process served as a geopolitical buffer, protecting the Western Balkans from external influences, particularly Russia, whose territorial aggression in Ukraine destabilized European security.

The Berlin Process emphasized concrete projects and agreements, such as mutual recognition of ID cards, university diplomas, and professional qualifications, along with infrastructure, energy, and digital connectivity. It also eliminated roaming charges, gradually breaking down barriers and building a unified regional market of 18 million people. In essence, it is an integrative initiative aimed at harmonizing the Western Balkans with the European Union through accelerated investments.

Thus, the Berlin Process was designed to integrate the Western Balkans without guaranteeing EU membership and align the region’s foreign and security policies with those of the EU. Its intensity and comprehensive scope surpass the capacities of parallel initiatives promoted from other external actors.

Through the Berlin Process, Western Balkan countries have had the opportunity over the past decade to gradually advance toward a European perspective. This has served as an incentive for adopting reforms critical for EU integration. Although the Berlin Process did not guarantee EU membership due to internal disagreements regarding enlargement, it successfully fostered regional cooperation and facilitated the implementation of key initiatives that bring the region closer to European values and standards. However, from the outset, doubts about the EU’s intention to achieve significant breakthroughs through this initiative were fueled by the relatively limited investment budget allocated for the Western Balkans.

Key Events in the Berlin Process

• 2014: Launch of the Berlin Process as a platform to promote cooperation and integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union. Key projects in infrastructure and energy were initiated as pillars of regional development.
• 2015: At the Vienna Summit, regional leaders signed agreements supporting projects aimed at improving connectivity and strengthening economic stability. The initiative to establish the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO) was also introduced.
• 2016: At the Paris Summit, the Berlin Process gained further momentum through initiatives for ecological projects and educational program advancements. Agreements on professional cooperation and youth mobility became central themes.
• 2017: The Trieste Summit launched a series of infrastructure projects, including those in the transport sector, alongside agreements on energy connectivity. The idea of a common regional market was also introduced.
• 2018: The London Summit emphasized the rule of law and anti-corruption efforts as key prerequisites for regional stability and economic cooperation.
• 2020: The Sofia Summit adopted the Action Plan for establishing a Common Regional Market, including free movement of people, goods, services, and capital.
• 2021: Roaming charges were eliminated among Western Balkan countries, becoming one of the most visible achievements of the Berlin Process, facilitating communication and business across the region.
• 2024: The Berlin Summit marked the tenth anniversary of the process. The European Union allocated €1 billion in aid for the Western Balkans’ energy sector, making the Berlin Process a driving force for the green transition and sustainable development in the region.

The Broader Context of Western Balkan Integration

An essential aspect of understanding the integration process of the Western Balkans is recognizing that simply fulfilling roadmaps and chapters is not enough. The work required goes far beyond technicalities, demanding democratization and a transition of the region’s largest state, Serbia, from Russian influence to embracing the values of Western civilization and the European Union.

One of the Berlin Process’s most significant objectives in this regard is fostering reconciliation and establishing the truth about the victims of the wars in the 1990s. This includes prosecuting war crimes and perpetrators, alongside other mechanisms of transitional justice, which are particularly crucial for the post-conflict space of the former Yugoslavia. Serbia, notably lagging in addressing its past, plays a critical role in this process.

In this sense, the Berlin Process aligns with the judgments and work of the Hague Tribunal for crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, reinforcing accountability and justice as a foundation for peace and regional stability.

Challenges Facing the Berlin Process

Since its inception, the Berlin Process has operated under the shadow of ongoing security challenges and external influences, particularly from Russia. For instance: In 2016, the attempted coup in Montenegro, orchestrated by Russian intelligence in collaboration with elements of Serbian security services. In 2017,the attempted coup in the Macedonian Parliament (Sobranie), involving Russian intelligence and agents with Serbian passports.

In both cases, Russian operations relied on either active support or passive observation from Serbian security structures. Moreover, the Serbian regime often leaned on these Russian activities, especially when aligned with the goals of the “Serbian World” policy, which politically tethered neighboring countries to Serbia while distancing them from European integration and, by extension, the Berlin Process.

Vučić’s Strategy of Deceiving the U.S. and the EU

Amid a series of crises that have struck the European Union—from Russia’s annexation of Crimea to Donald Trump’s 2016 election victory, the migrant crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic—Serbia has actively undermined regional reconciliation efforts supported by the Berlin Process. It has also used the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina as a tool to weaken the EU’s position in the Western Balkans, benefiting Russia as it prepared for war against Ukraine. It is worth recalling that Vučić secured the backing of Western governments (the U.S. and Germany) to form a government in Serbia in 2012 by promising to resolve the Kosovo issue and normalize relations between Belgrade and Pristina.

The normalization process initially appeared promising under Vučić’s rule when the EU was unified. During this period, with the EU—particularly Angela Merkel and Germany—turning a blind eye to democratic backsliding and human rights issues in Serbia, Vučić consolidated his absolute power across all levels of government. He later stalled the process when EU internal challenges emboldened him. Vučić’s intentions regarding the Kosovo issue were never genuine; he merely sought to use EU funds and investments to strengthen his autocratic grip on power, enabling him to blackmail the very institution financing him.

Russia has been, and remains, satisfied with Serbia’s foreign policy, which disrupts Europe’s security and foreign policy framework. This dynamic has allowed Vučić to govern without significant opposition while closely collaborating with Vladimir Putin. Simultaneously, he has positioned himself as the sole negotiator with the EU and the U.S., while strengthening ties with Russia and China.

During Merkel’s tenure, Vučić enjoyed political and financial support, establishing himself as one of her “good guys” alongside Albanian Prime Minister Rama, Macedonian Prime Minister Gruevski, and Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán. Together, they cooperated to curb migrant flows to the EU. In this period, Vučić gained trust from both the EU and Russia. However, with Merkel’s backing, “stabilitocracy” replaced democracy as the dominant governance model in the Western Balkans, rendering the Berlin Process less effective.

Attempting to Undermine the Berlin Process

In 2016, Donald Trump unexpectedly won the U.S. presidency. Anti-globalists and far-right factions across Europe found common ground with Trump’s corrupt administration, which was sympathetic to Balkan autocrats and sought quick solutions to its benefit, particularly concerning the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue.

Trump aimed for an expedited resolution to showcase his foreign policy achievements ahead of the 2020 elections. Recognizing Trump’s urgency, Vučić proposed the partition of Kosovo. Richard Grenell, the U.S. Special Envoy for Europe, supported this idea, leading Kosovo to reluctantly enter negotiations. The proposal envisioned exchanging three northern Kosovo municipalities for the Preševo Valley, effectively redrawing borders in Europe.

The EU, led by Merkel, strongly opposed this dangerous precedent, aware of its implications for other parts of the Western Balkans and beyond. Redrawing borders along ethnic lines would legitimize similar actions elsewhere, advancing Vučić’s nationalist vision of a “Serbian World,” aligned with Putin’s “Russkiy Mir,” then unfolding in Ukraine. Such actions would pave the way for other territorial changes globally, echoing Putin’s annexation of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Crimea.

This alignment between the “Serbian World” and “Russkiy Mir” underscores their shared objectives: destabilizing the international order to justify expansionist ambitions. Germany and the EU’s firm opposition ultimately led Trump’s administration to publicly deny any serious consideration of the Kosovo partition.

While Trump lost the 2020 election, Vučić viewed this as losing only a battle, not the war. He cautiously postponed his plans, banking on Grenell’s assurance of Trump’s 2024 re-election bid. Vučić’s strategy thrived in the global climate of continuous crises, enabling him to exploit disinformation campaigns and state-controlled media to maintain power.

Throughout Trump’s first term, Serbia actively worked to undermine the Berlin Process, aligning its interests with Moscow’s authoritarian regime. Distancing Serbia and the Western Balkans from the Berlin Process inherently means distancing them from the EU, particularly Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which increasingly fall under the malign influence of the “Serbian World.”

The Open Balkan Initiative (Mini Schengen) as an Alternative to the Berlin Process

2019, A Turning Point

The year 2019 marked a period of stagnation in EU enlargement and fatigue regarding European integration. The Western Balkans saw little progress, and the Berlin Process began losing momentum due to internal EU challenges. Meanwhile, Russia was gearing up for its invasion of Ukraine, creating a turbulent regional environment.

The Mini Schengen initiative emerged at a particularly opportune moment for Russia, aligning with its strategy of spreading crises across Europe. While the Berlin Process provided a politically articulated framework, albeit with limitations, the Western Balkans witnessed a resurgence of expansionist policies akin to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and other activities, such as its occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and its grip over Moldova and Georgia.

In Russia, the state pursued societal “fascization” through media monopolies and the abuse of state apparatuses, distorting reality domestically while fueling imperialist ambitions rooted in Russian Orthodoxy. This approach echoed in the Western Balkans, where defeated nationalist elements from the 1990s, often supported by Russian foreign policy, began reviving expansionist and mini-imperialist aspirations.

Serbia, the region’s largest country, governed by the same political actors from the 1990s, sought national unity to stoke nationalism with territorial ambitions directed at Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro (dubbed “Little Ukraine”). These ambitions culminated in the infamous Non-Paper, allegedly backed by Serbia and tacitly supported by Croatia and Albania. The document proposed dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina into three parts—Republika Srpska, a Croatian Herzegovina, and a Bosniak-dominated region. It also envisioned Montenegro returning to Serbia’s influence and Kosovo merging with Albania to form “Greater Albania.”

This political posturing was accompanied by the Mini Schengen initiative, launched in 2019 and rebranded as Open Balkan in subsequent years, serving as a litmus test for Western tolerance of territorial changes in the region.

Milestones in the Open Balkan Initiative

2019, Launch of the Initiative

In October 2019, the initiative—then known as Mini Schengen—was launched in Novi Sad by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama, and North Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev. Its goal was to establish the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital among member states, enhancing regional economic integration and facilitating communication and trade.

2020, Preparations for Agreements

Throughout 2020, the three founding countries worked on agreements to simplify travel, trade, and economic ties. However, the initiative faced criticism for lacking clear international support, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro expressed skepticism, declining to participate.

2021, Rebranding and Initial Agreements

The initiative was rebranded as Open Balkan to emphasize its regional character and ambition for a unified market. In September, the first agreements were signed, including mutual recognition of work permits, enabling citizens to work across member countries without bureaucratic hurdles. Border crossings were simplified, allowing travel with only ID cards, and joint measures for emergency responses were adopted.

2022, Expansion and Further Agreements

At the Ohrid Summit, leaders signed additional agreements covering agriculture, energy, and civil protection. Plans for developing digital infrastructure and harmonizing phytosanitary standards to ease trade were also agreed upon. Observers, including Montenegro’s Prime Minister Dritan Abazović and Bosnia’s former Council of Ministers chairman Zoran Tegeltija, attended the summit, fueling speculation about expanding the initiative.

2023, Conditional U.S. Support

The U.S. offered conditional support for Open Balkan, emphasizing alignment with EU commitments and inclusivity for all Western Balkan countries. While the EU cautiously welcomed the initiative, it stressed adherence to European standards and equality among regional states. Despite these endorsements, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Montenegro remained reluctant, citing concerns over political motives and potential hegemonic ambitions.

2024, Progress and Future Plans

At the most recent summit, Serbian President Vučić pledged exemptions for Open Balkan members from Serbia’s export bans on certain goods, incentivizing economic cooperation and reinforcing the shared market. Efforts to attract other regional countries continue, with leaders emphasizing strengthened collaboration.

Open Balkan in the Context of Regional and Global Politics

The emergence of Open Balkan has significant geopolitical implications. While framed as a regional integration project, it has raised concerns about serving as a vehicle for Serbia’s nationalist ambitions under the guise of economic cooperation. Critics argue that Open Balkan risks undermining the Berlin Process by fostering a parallel structure aligned with Serbia’s “Serbian World” narrative and Russia’s geopolitical strategy.

By circumventing broader EU frameworks, Open Balkan could destabilize the region, enabling malign external influences and reviving expansionist aspirations. The initiative, therefore, must navigate a delicate balance between fostering genuine regional cooperation and avoiding the pitfalls of political manipulation and exclusionary policies.

The Difference Between the Berlin Process and Open Balkan

The Berlin Process and Open Balkan differ significantly in the type of agreements they promote and the methods of their implementation. Open Balkan relies on bilateral and trilateral agreements, some of which have been ratified only in Serbia, while Albania and North Macedonia have yet to adopt all proposed agreements. In contrast, the Berlin Process advocates for agreements adopted uniformly by all signatory countries, fostering a more unified approach and building greater trust among participants. These agreements include the recognition of ID cards, diplomas, and professional qualifications, as well as collaboration in transportation, ecology, and digitalization.

One of the Berlin Process’s defining aspects is its commitment to reconciliation and transitional justice. It actively supports projects and activities focused on uncovering facts about victims, prosecuting war crimes, and implementing transitional justice mechanisms. Such topics are absent from Open Balkan, which is focused solely on the economic interests of its members. In summary, the Berlin Process aims to connect the Western Balkans to the EU by promoting cooperation through European values and addressing historical conflicts. In contrast, Open Balkan prioritizes economic benefits and trade relationships among a few regional countries, excluding some Western Balkan states and neglecting the importance of reconciliation and addressing the past.

Open Balkan also reflects Serbia’s dominance in the region and serves as a conduit for Russian foreign policy, distancing Western Balkan states from EU accession.

War in Europe

Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, populist politicians in the Balkans and Europe anticipated a swift Russian victory. Leaders like Vučić and Dodik were among the first to share these expectations, reassured by Moscow that Putin’s “special operation” would last only a few days. Serbia’s regime notably remained silent during the first week of the invasion. It is important to note that similar expectations were held by many European leaders. However, Ukraine, under President Zelensky, refused to surrender. By mounting a determined defense, Zelensky shattered Putin’s “blitzkrieg” concept and saved his country through sheer resilience.

The policy of opposing Russian aggression did not prevail through the initiative of Europe’s political establishments. Instead, European public opinion pushed governments to support Ukraine. This solidarity, fueled by popular demand, secured the unwavering support of the most critical ally in the Western world—public sentiment.

Ukraine’s resistance disrupted the plans of pro-Russian politicians in the Balkans. The behavior of autocratic leaders like Vučić and Dodik, the Serbian Orthodox Church (a key ally of the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia), and Hungary’s Orbán suggests they anticipated Ukraine’s quick defeat. Preparations for new crises in Europe, particularly in the Western Balkans, were to follow Russia’s swift victory.

The expected rapid defeat of Ukraine was part of a larger plan to assert Russian dominance and weaken the West. This would have emboldened Serbia’s regime to pursue its mini-imperialist ambitions in the Western Balkans. The plan envisioned the dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, unilateral independence declarations by Republika Srpska, and the entry of Serbian forces into northern Kosovo. This would be followed by Montenegro’s full integration into the “Serbian World” and the resolution of Serbia’s “national question,” rooted in Milošević’s destructive campaigns of the 1990s.

Such developments would have accelerated the erosion of the Biden administration’s credibility and paved the way for Trump’s return to the White House. Even after Biden’s election, Richard Grenell maintained close ties with Serbia’s regime, which financed his activities. Grenell remained a key contact for Vučić, who banked on Trump’s return to power. This alignment with Trump’s political resurgence was also central to Russia’s broader strategy. While their interests diverge, both Serbia and Russia recognized the value of destabilizing the West through Trump’s potential re-election.

The Future of the West in the Era of Trump’s Return

The unanticipated resilience of Ukraine thwarted these plans. However, Vučić and Orbán now hope for a Russian victory through a new U.S. administration led by Trump, which they believe would “end the war.” Such an outcome, preserving Russian gains in Ukraine, would mark a de facto victory for Putin.

The so-called “Trump International” network, ideologically and strategically aligned with Russia, views Western democratic achievements as adversaries. Much like Hitler’s disdain for the Weimar Constitution, this network seeks to exploit the freedoms and weaknesses of democracy to destroy it from within. Putin and Vučić’s goals include installing politicians and elites in the West who align with far-right ideologies in Europe, including figures like Orbán, Le Pen, and Fico.

For Vučić, the European Union is merely a necessary evil. He leverages EU funds and economic growth while arming Serbia and waiting for favorable international circumstances to advance his pro-Russian “Serbian World” project. In this way, European taxpayers indirectly finance an autocratic regime in Serbia that actively undermines Europe’s security and foreign policy.

Meanwhile, Vučić continues to deceive Western policymakers by telling them what they want to hear while awaiting Trump’s potential victory, which might provide him with a strategic opening for his pro-Russian agenda in the Western Balkans. Like Putin and Orbán, Vučić does not seek a direct conflict with the West—rather, he aims to reshape it to his liking.

Trump’s return to the White House, should it happen, would profoundly alter global dynamics. Europe, Ukraine, the Western Balkans, Georgia, Moldova, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and NATO face unprecedented challenges and an uncertain future.

The European Union and the Western Balkans in the Trump Era

After profound changes in the United States, Trump’s next focus is on his relationship with the European Union. Trump’s long-term goal is to render the EU politically incoherent, transforming it into an economic tool subservient to his regime’s relations with the East. The signals are alarming: compliance is the demand. Trump’s regime will only support candidates in EU member states aligned with his “Trump International.” Figures like Vučić, Orbán, Fico, Wilders, Le Pen, and Germany’s AfD are shaping Europe in Trump’s image. Their task is clear—dismantle democracy and create an atmosphere of insecurity through disinformation, enabling governance through fear while entrenching long-term power and altering societal values.

In return, autocrats and dictators receive backing, making the Western Balkans even more divided and perpetually at risk of conflict.

However, Europe’s unity in supporting Ukraine offers hope. Despite efforts by Serbia, Hungary, and Slovakia to undermine Ukraine’s defense against Russia, the EU has found strength in its common foreign and security policy to counter Trump’s campaign promises. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock emphasizes that Germany’s response to Trump’s “America First” will not be “Germany First,” but rather, “United and Strong Europe First.”

Potential future German Chancellor Friedrich Merz from the CDU has announced a strict ultimatum for Putin: “Russia has 24 hours to withdraw from Ukraine, or Germany will lift all restrictions on long-range German weapons for Ukraine.” Polish President Andrzej Duda has made it clear to Trump that Poland stands united in defending Europe against Russia and would consider any wavering a betrayal. Boris Johnson, a former Trump supporter, insists that the UK remains steadfast in its position that Russia must be defeated in Ukraine. French President Emmanuel Macron underscores the importance of defending European interests in the face of any shifts in U.S. foreign policy under Trump.

While this unified stance is an unexpected development for many autocrats within Trump’s International in Europe, Vučić and Orbán remain determined to disrupt European unity. They continue to erode the EU’s reputation, claiming that circumstances have changed and that the EU must adapt. This is precisely the narrative Putin seeks to amplify.

The Berlin Process and the Western Balkans

The Berlin Process no longer enjoys majority support in Serbia, the largest country in the region. Yet, even in its incomplete form, the Berlin Process remains the Western Balkans’ primary line of defense against Russian foreign policy. The process is admittedly weak and flawed, but it is the only framework available for the region to latch onto.

Without the Western Balkans, there can be no united Europe. Without Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, there can be no secure Europe. Despite numerous disagreements and vulnerabilities, the EU is the sole guarantor of preserving the values needed to resist the imperialist ambitions of Russia and others yet to reveal their stance.

Though Europe may feel isolated, it still has the capacity to defend its principles and remain the world’s most prosperous region.

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The “Non-Paper” Controversy

In April 2021, Slovenian media reported on a supposed “non-paper” attributed to then-Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša. According to these reports, the document outlined proposals for redrawing borders in the Western Balkans, including the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the annexation of Republika Srpska to Serbia, and the unification of Kosovo with Albania.

The articles published in the “Opinions” column reflect the personal opinion of the author and may not coincide with the position of the Center